Novus America wrote:Again I agree the Italians made adequate German auxiliaries under German command in several cases.
Any basic reading of the Italian operations in North Africa would disprove this. They were not German auxiliaries, they were the main Axis force. Rommel's abrasive nature, such as denying them logistics and abandoning them as needed, to name two examples, gravely hindered them.
None of the cases you cited had them fighting on their own. All those cases had them under German command fighting as German auxiliaries.
The Italian 8th Army had its own sector under an Italian commander. Try again.
And explain how 36,000 Imperial British wiped out a 150,000 man Italian Army with little effort. Or why they sucked so badly in Greece.
Why did the Soviets lose 500,000 men at Kiev? Why did their operations at Second Kharkov fail so horribly? You seem unable to understand that different situations can exist for units that do not reflect the whole experience.
Above the division level their leadership was largely shit.
And not attacking Greece would have helped, but it would not have made many more ships appear, the Libyan ports massively expand, and a good rail and road network appear in Libya.
The problem of completely inadequate Italian infrastructure in Libya would not have been fixed by not attacking Greece.
You seem completely incapable of understanding that the lack of a Balkan campaign means the resources used for could be transferred to North Africa. You don't need new ships if you can reassign existing ones.