Objective vs Subjective Morality

[Dogmeat]

Ah, the Euthyphro dilemma! "Is a thing pious because the gods hold it dear, or do the gods hold it dear because it is pious?"

Yes, the original was about piety specifically rather than about morality in general. And if you skeptics bothered to read the dialogue past the little magic bullet, you'd find a line of questioning that bites to the heart of the very notion of organized religion. But you never do.

Thanks for making things easy for us religious folks!

That seems rather smug.

True, he's not wrong though.

Or, at least, I've never heard a satisfactory response.

[Krasny-Volny]

I'm a believer in the objective morality Novskya discusses in the post I quoted above.

Just because something isn't empirically measurable - like say, the physical shape of the planet - that does not make it any less of an objective fact.

It does make it less of an "objective" fact. Objective things are demonstrable.

I disagree with the notion that if something cannot be empirically proven, it cannot exist as objective fact.

[Albrenia]

That seems rather smug.

True, he's not wrong though.

Or, at least, I've never heard a satisfactory response.

What was the point, again? The Dialogue is a classical work and I doubt I could correctly obtain its meaning in just one read through, so otherwise I won't be able to respond before this thread's moved on.

[Dogmeat]

It does make it less of an "objective" fact. Objective things are demonstrable.

I disagree with the notion that if something cannot be empirically proven, it cannot exist as objective fact.

Not being proven doesn't mean that something does not exist, or even that it is not objective.

I does mean that you have no justification for claiming that it is.

If you can't show it, you don't know it.

[Dogmeat]

True, he's not wrong though.

Or, at least, I've never heard a satisfactory response.

What was the point, again? The Dialogue is a classical work and I doubt I could correctly obtain its meaning in just one read through, so otherwise I won't be able to respond before this thread's moved on.

I guess the overall point would be not to pretend to know things that you don't.

[Theris Carencia]

Ah, the Euthyphro dilemma! "Is a thing pious because the gods hold it dear, or do the gods hold it dear because it is pious?"

Yes, the original was about piety specifically rather than about morality in general. And if you skeptics bothered to read the dialogue past the little magic bullet, you'd find a line of questioning that bites to the heart of the very notion of organized religion. But you never do.

Thanks for making things easy for us religious folks!

That seems rather smug.

All I can say is that once you read the dialogue to the end, watching skeptics cling to that one pithy quote while ignoring the rest will cause you no end of amusement.

It's like watching someone who owns a backhoe chose to excavate a site using a plastic child's beach shovel instead... dozens of times... seemingly without ever even thinking to bring the heavy machinery to bear.

To put it another way, if a skeptic underutilizes his resources to the extent that I feel like I'd be taking advantage of him by responding to his arguments as-is, I'm a good enough sport to tell him about it... provided he's willing to be a good sport about me giving him a bit of a hard time in the process.

[Albrenia]

What was the point, again? The Dialogue is a classical work and I doubt I could correctly obtain its meaning in just one read through, so otherwise I won't be able to respond before this thread's moved on.

I guess the overall point would be not to pretend to know things that you don't.

Oh. Oooooooh.

*mind blown*

[Theris Carencia]

What was the point, again? The Dialogue is a classical work and I doubt I could correctly obtain its meaning in just one read through, so otherwise I won't be able to respond before this thread's moved on.

I guess the overall point would be not to pretend to know things that you don't.

You're not wrong, but that's kind of the overall point of quite a few of the dialogues.

This dialogue, specifically, seems to be getting at the following question: "If the gods are as high and mighty as they supposedly are, why do they ask us to do things?"

[Albrenia]

I guess the overall point would be not to pretend to know things that you don't.

You're not wrong, but that's kind of the overall point of quite a few of the dialogues.

This dialogue, specifically, seems to be getting at the following question: "If the gods are as high and mighty as they supposedly are, why do they ask us to do things?"

Because Gods are dicks, mainly.

I'll admit my knowledge of the classics is rather below average. So sorry for misreading your comment as more hostile than intended.

It's gonna be a while before I know how to drive that backhoe, however.

[Theris Carencia]

I disagree with the notion that if something cannot be empirically proven, it cannot exist as objective fact.

Not being proven doesn't mean that something does not exist, or even that it is not objective.

I does mean that you have no justification for claiming that it is.

If you can't show it, you don't know it.

Do you accept common sense perceptual experience, introspection, or metaphysical inquiry as valid modes of justification?

If not, did you ever stop to wonder whether or not your stringent epistemological stance might look a little bit silly when seen through someone else's glasses?

[Morizari]

Morality is a social construct and is entirely subjective.

[Dogmeat]

Not being proven doesn't mean that something does not exist, or even that it is not objective.

I does mean that you have no justification for claiming that it is.

If you can't show it, you don't know it.

Do you accept common sense perceptual experience, introspection, or metaphysical inquiry as valid modes of justification?

If not, did you ever stop to wonder whether or not your stringent epistemological stance might look a little bit silly when seen through someone else's glasses?

"metaphysical inquiry," just to pick one, does not produce statements which can be called "objective" even within the context of metaphysics. Metaphysics has no agreed upon method of self-correction, and of the myriad metaphysical models that have been imagined, there in no method (except, sometimes, measuring them against naturalistic models) for determining which, if any, is superior.

Suppose that morality really is "objective." How do "common sense perceptual experience, introspection, or metaphysical inquiry" prove it?

[Greater Catarapania]

Do you accept common sense perceptual experience, introspection, or metaphysical inquiry as valid modes of justification?

If not, did you ever stop to wonder whether or not your stringent epistemological stance might look a little bit silly when seen through someone else's glasses?

"metaphysical inquiry," just to pick one, does not produce statements which can be called "objective" even within the context of metaphysics. Metaphysics has no agreed upon method of self-correction, and of the myriad metaphysical models that have been imagined, there in no method (except, sometimes, measuring them against naturalistic models) for determining which, if any, is superior.

So anything that doesn't deal with numbers somewhere along the line is shooting in the dark? Every meaningful field of discourse ultimately either boils down to vector/tensor manipulation or statistics? I find that line a bit hard to swallow. And yet, it's hard to see what "no self correction/no way to compare models" type complaints could mean without some kind of implicit numerocentrism. So long as metaphysics starts with a firm background in common sense perceptual experience - possibly augmented by physical science - the metaphysician should get along just fine.

Can one use, say, ordinary logic to distinguish between possibilities? Or do we need to use something fancy like ANOVA tables in order to get objective results? Was there no true knowledge prior to 1600 when "Science" was born?

Suppose that morality really is "objective." How do "common sense perceptual experience, introspection, or metaphysical inquiry" prove it?

Do you believe in health?

Do you think that it's an objective quality of an organism?

Can ideas be healthy or unhealthy? How about relationships? Societies?

If such "higher-order" varieties of healthiness are real, doesn't that place constraints on the behavior of the individual?

*EDIT* I'm Theris Carencia, btw. Forgot to change back from being the puppet.

[Dogmeat]

"metaphysical inquiry," just to pick one, does not produce statements which can be called "objective" even within the context of metaphysics. Metaphysics has no agreed upon method of self-correction, and of the myriad metaphysical models that have been imagined, there in no method (except, sometimes, measuring them against naturalistic models) for determining which, if any, is superior.

So anything that doesn't deal with numbers somewhere along the line is shooting in the dark? Every meaningful field of discourse ultimately either boils down to vector/tensor manipulation or statistics? I find that line a bit hard to swallow. And yet, it's hard to see what "no self correction/no way to compare models" type complaints could mean without some kind of implicit numerocentrism. So long as metaphysics starts with a firm background in common sense perceptual experience - possibly augmented by physical science - the metaphysician should get along just fine.

I don't recall mentioning numbers at all. That seems to be your invention.

Look: Bigfoot might exist. And if Bigfoot exists, then Bigfoot exists objectively. This is a real - albeit not very likely - possibility. But without better evidence, calling Bigfoot an "objective fact" isn't justified. Even if your common sense and metaphysics insist otherwise, it still isn't justified.

Can one use, say, ordinary logic to distinguish between possibilities? Or do we need to use something fancy like ANOVA tables in order to get objective results? Was there no true knowledge prior to 1600 when "Science" was born?

I don't think I'm being particularly unreasonable to ask for something more then "my feels" when it comes to things that other people claim are "objective."

People who claim that objective morality is a thing have made a fairly impressive claim, they should have fairly impressive evidence.

Suppose that morality really is "objective." How do "common sense perceptual experience, introspection, or metaphysical inquiry" prove it?

Do you believe in health?

Do you think that it's an objective quality of an organism?

Can ideas be healthy or unhealthy? How about relationships? Societies?

If such "higher-order" varieties of healthiness are real, doesn't that place constraints on the behavior of the individual?

*EDIT* I'm Theris Cathencia, btw. Forgot to change back from being the puppet.

The distinction between a living organism and a dead one is about as clear and objective as anything in science. Health, in the biological sense, has to do with one's relative position along a spectrum, the final end of which is death. There are other types of health, and can deal with those as well. Nuance isn't a problem for me, despite your attempts to cast me as some kind of rigid dogmatist. My very first post in this thread had to do with evolved social instincts and their effect on the health of a group, as an explanation for the often convergent nature of morality.

And if you want me to explain in detail why convergent behavioral biology still isn't objective morality, I can.

[Pilarcraft]

Well, in my personal opinion, Morality is Subjective. However, I expect others to follow my subjective moral code when I am part of an interaction with them. For example, I personally find being Homophobic immoral, and so I expect others to at least reign in their homophobia to a level that it won't be obvious (like, calling them inhuman or sth) while interacting with me. I recognize that a level of morality has to be collectively objective (for example, murder. Exceptions aside, we all see killing others as morally wrong.), but most things are not really objective. After all, there is no source for objective morality.

[The Parkus Empire]

Morality is absolute vs. relative, not objective vs. subjective

[Phoenicaea]

..ehm I don t understand the definition, about subjective and objective so well.. this apart, me too I agree with "subjective". this is about the definition of "moral".

If not, if objective, I d rather call it "ethics". these are definitions I know about.

[Alvecia]

Every objective morality is based upon a subjective belief. No morality is truly objective.

[Anywhere Else But Here]

Ah, the Euthyphro dilemma! "Is a thing pious because the gods hold it dear, or do the gods hold it dear because it is pious?"

Yes, the original was about piety specifically rather than about morality in general. And if you skeptics bothered to read the dialogue past the little magic bullet, you'd find a line of questioning that bites to the heart of the very notion of organized religion. But you never do.

Thanks for making things easy for us religious folks!

That seems rather smug.

Especially when no one actually brought up the dilemma. Neutraligon voiced an opinion that wasn't nearly fleshed out enough to be recognisable as the dilemma, then Theris somehow leapt to the dilemma and berated atheists for not understanding the dilemma that they hadn't attempted to use in the debate.

So they're effectively being smug about a remark--not really a refutation--in response to a point that nobody made. Which is an...interesting way to debate.

[Internationalist Bastard]

My morals come from base human empathy
Whichever that is

[The Anglo-American Commonwealth]

5.) There must be an end to the chain of ends or else which reach an incomprehensible chain of ends ad infinitum. This final end is an end-in-itself, in which the end is reached purely for its own sake and not for the sake of another end.

You had me convinced up until here. Why is it the chain of ends must terminate? Why can't it go on forever?

[Sovaal]

Well, in my personal opinion, Morality is Subjective. However, I expect others to follow my subjective moral code when I am part of an interaction with them. For example, I personally find being Homophobic immoral, and so I expect others to at least reign in their homophobia to a level that it won't be obvious (like, calling them inhuman or sth) while interacting with me. I recognize that a level of morality has to be collectively objective (for example, murder. Exceptions aside, we all see killing others as morally wrong.), but most things are not really objective. After all, there is no source for objective morality.

Why should they be the ones to reign in their morality, and not you?

[Pilarcraft]

Well, in my personal opinion, Morality is Subjective. However, I expect others to follow my subjective moral code when I am part of an interaction with them. For example, I personally find being Homophobic immoral, and so I expect others to at least reign in their homophobia to a level that it won't be obvious (like, calling them inhuman or sth) while interacting with me. I recognize that a level of morality has to be collectively objective (for example, murder. Exceptions aside, we all see killing others as morally wrong.), but most things are not really objective. After all, there is no source for objective morality.

Why should they be the ones to reign in their morality, and not you?

It's not that "They should", but more of a "I won't hang out with them if they don't" kind of thing.

[Esternial]

It depends on your focus. In general, morality is subjective.

Within a specific subset of the population, certain morals may be widespread and accepted as "objective", but that'd solely be the case from certain perspectives. Of course this implies that no set of morals is inherently superior - which I agree with. However, some morals (or a combination of morals) can be considered better for a functioning society.

The morals themselves aren't necessarily morally superior, but the effect that upholding them has is beneficial for one (or several) instance(s).

Take for instance abortion. Let's assume there's a metric for overall "goodness". Aborting a pregnancy in a society with very low birth-rates could be seen as a negative impact on this metric due to already low birth-rates and lack of individuals to contribute to a society. In a society with high birth-rates, it could be seen as a positive impact on this metric by putting less pressure on certain social services.

To judge the morality of something, you need to have a starting point of reference. "Objective" morals are merely subjective morals within a specific frame of reference: static to all observers within a moral framework - but not outside.

[Sudardes]

It seems to me that many people are conflating what is truly moral vs what is percieved moral. Personally, I believe in non-relative morals (considering that I am a deontologist.) I mostly stem my non-relative system from the fact that things are good-in-itself as:
1.) Whenever one acts, it is necessarily with some good in mind, as one intends to do some sort of good by committing to an action. Whether or not the action is good, creates good, or achieves the good intended is not the point, but rather the fact in itself that one acts for a good.
2.) All of our actions intend to realize some sort of end, the result that we call good. In this the end becomes the good, however the source of the good is placed by the agent, and so this value judgement is agent-relative.
3.) When one acts to achieve an end, the end is done in order to commit to another further end. For example, I buy a car so I can get around with greater convenience, so I can more readily convene with friends, so we can share camaraderie, etc.
4.) The notion of achieving an end for another end implies a hierarchy of ends, where the initial end becomes a mere means for the next end. By the relegation of the initial end to a means, a superior value is given the end further down the chain.
5.) There must be an end to the chain of ends or else which reach an incomprehensible chain of ends ad infinitum. This final end is an end-in-itself, in which the end is reached purely for its own sake and not for the sake of another end.
6.) All people's ends are for the achievement of the end-in-itself, and therefore an end valued by all. If we look at the notion of this hierarchy, it is appropriate to label the end-in-itself the highest good, as it is at the top of all hierarchies and one that cannot be superseded.
7.) The end-in-itself is Good.

The implication is that Good (in the context of Aristotle, a virtue) has inherent value and that it is a cornerstone of metaethical structures. What "Good" is a question that must be answered by the ethicist, and the interpretations have generally been what creates all the major ethical theories throughout history. It is thereby irrational to think of values as anything other than good in-itself (from which we can derive ethical theories from that are not based on subjective values.)

When a person calls one thing good he seeks it; and when one calls a thing bad, he wishes to avoid it. These usages can be split into areas of which things are sought as means to some further end and those which they seek as good as ends in themselves. Of course, this is not to say that ends are applicable to all. For example, a starving man finds food as a "good" whilst an overweight man sees it as "bad". In order for something to be good, it is to be "good without qualification" (as Kant puts it). For something to be "good without qualification", it has to not act as a "good" for one end and "bad" for another. It must be sought as good totally independently of serving as a means to something else; it must be "good in-itself" (see above as to justification for why). Furthermore, while one thing may be good as means relative to a particular end, that "end" becomes a "means" relative to some other "end".

It is to be noted that for something to be absolutely and universally good, it has to be good within every instance of its occurrence. All those which people call "good" (whatever that may be) can become bad if the will which one uses it is bad. That is, if we were to imagine a bad person (i.e. one who willed or wanted to do evil) in which who has all traits in which we might call "good" (such as intelligence, wit, pride, etc), then these very traits would make only that much worse his will to do what is wrong. Thus, for something to be "good", it has to be done out of Good Will.

Many facts of reality have inherent normative claims coming off of them. Organisms have ends built into them by the virtue of their structures. So, the denial of one's own teleology through some form of nihilism is rising from convolutions which problems rise up when discussing justification of our beliefs with our propositions. We can derive normative claims from the concepts of man. My bro Quine addresses this issue of emotivism which is based on a strong empiricism which leaves us with a bad theory of concepts.

What this all seems like to me is a failure to see beyond the normative claims and y'all not having an axiological anchor because you either weren't able to ground yourselves in a realist framework, even if it is secular like the utilitarians. Utilitarianism is a main choice amongst a lot of people but most ppl fall into apathy and this disconnect into moral anti-realism. First. because they are uninformed on their personal and local level and secondly due to the sociocultural conditions.

(Do I get bonus points for being the first non-moral relativist?)

a x i o m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s d o n ' t e x i s t o u t s i d e o f h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . o n e c a n n e v e r f o r m u l a t e a n e g a t i o n c o m p l e t e t h e o r y a s o n e c a n n e v e r f i n d t h e f u l l r a n g e o f o b j e c t i v e a x i o m s. a l s o a p r i o r i s d o n ' t e x i s t.