Objective vs Subjective Morality

[Neutraligon]

I can really only think of one where it would be subjective. Any religion that has a god dictating it would still be subjective.

Ah, the Euthyphro dilemma! "Is a thing pious because the gods hold it dear, or do the gods hold it dear because it is pious?"

Yes, the original was about piety specifically rather than about morality in general. And if you skeptics bothered to read the dialogue past the little magic bullet, you'd find a line of questioning that bites to the heart of the very notion of organized religion. But you never do.

Thanks for making things easy for us religious folks!

Actually no that is not what I was pointing to at all. The definition of objective is "not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts." A god dictating morals is thus not objective because the god's opinions and feeling are what determine what those morals are and thus by definition it is subjective.

I have no idea how you got to the Euthyphro dilemma from my original comment. Next time try not to act as smug when responding. Oh also funny thing, this was my opinion even when I was a theist.

[36 Camera Perspective]

Ah, the Euthyphro dilemma! "Is a thing pious because the gods hold it dear, or do the gods hold it dear because it is pious?"

Yes, the original was about piety specifically rather than about morality in general. And if you skeptics bothered to read the dialogue past the little magic bullet, you'd find a line of questioning that bites to the heart of the very notion of organized religion. But you never do.

Thanks for making things easy for us religious folks!

Actually no that is not what I was pointing to at all. The definition of objective is "not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts." A god dictating morals is thus not objective because the god's opinions and feeling are what determine what those morals are and thus by definition it is subjective.

I have no idea how you got to the Euthyphro dilemma from my original comment. Next time try not to act as smug when responding. Oh also funny thing, this was my opinion even when I was a theist.

In theistic objective morality (whether it's divine command theory or whatever branch you want to consider), morality would be objective, not subjective. While I am not a theist, it is nonetheless the case that if the standard tri-omni god existed, his morality would be objective. As an omnibenevolent entity, god is all-good, and therefore, it is analytic truth that whatever moral action god prescribes is just. You may think that god's morality is still subjective for the reason that you stated; god's moral prescriptions depend on god's "opinions and feelings". However, stricly speaking, god's moral prescriptions don't depend on god's opinions and feelings; they depend on his nature as an omnibenevolent entity. As Spinoza pointed out, some people tend to view god as a monarch, an entity embodied with absolute power that can change his decrees at any moment. The truth is, however, that god is constrained by the logic of his very nature. God couldn't invidiate himself.

[36 Camera Perspective]

Morality is primarily subjective. Given the large disconnect between moral codes around the world and throughout history, I don't understand how you could see it as objective. Certainly, as dogmeat said, there are some things that we consider "moral" that are controlled through evolutionary selection, but for the most part humans are just fine murdering, enslaving, torturing, and enacting all other manner of atrocities both while still being moral in the eyes of themselves and their society or even executing these atrocities for the sake of enforcing morality on those affected.

Objective morality means that there are moral obligations that are true regardless of whether or not anyone believes them (i.e. they are mind-independently true). It is a prescriptive statement about the way the world ought to be. Objective morality does not mean that there must be a moral consensus across history, or even within a single society (or hell, even within a family unit or a single person's mind). This would relate to the descriptive realm, or what is the case rather than what ought to be the case. The moral realist can concede that there has been a large disconnect between moral codes around the world and throughout history. They would just say that some of these people were wrong.

[36 Camera Perspective]

That's a gross abuse of the concept of true. A statement can be "true" or "false" by being correlated to the objective reality or not, such as "the weather is sunny today in Paris" or "burning hydrogen with oxygen gives water molecules". But nothing but what _should_ be, about morality, is "true" or "false" in absolute, that's meaningless.

What can be true or false are statements like "your moral system is incoherent" or "your moral system would lead to society collapse" or "you don't really believe in the moral system you're proposing", or "the large majority of people believe murder is wrong" but not "murder is wrong".

But this leads us into another question: is there such a thing as objective reality? I would say no, and by extension, nothing can universally be true or false. Or more accurately, we have no way of knowing whether something can be universally true/false.

Of course there is such a thing as objective reality, even if one tries to argue that there is very little we can truly come to know about it. We know, via Descartes' cogito, that our own mind exists, so that's one thing we can indubitably take to be objectively real. Even if all of our sense perceptions are illusions, there must then be a subject capable of being deceived in the first place.

[36 Camera Perspective]

No human creation i or can be objective.

Your post is a human creation; is it therefore subjective? If so, why should I, rationally speaking, give up my moral realism in light of your post?

[Cekoviu]

But this leads us into another question: is there such a thing as objective reality? I would say no, and by extension, nothing can universally be true or false. Or more accurately, we have no way of knowing whether something can be universally true/false.

Of course there is such a thing as objective reality, even if one tries to argue that there is very little we can truly come to know about it. We know, via Descartes' cogito, that our own mind exists, so that's one thing we can indubitably take to be objectively real. Even if all of our sense perceptions are illusions, there must then be a subject capable of being deceived in the first place.

That is a fair point, and one I didn't consider.

[Novskya]

>no axiology to back that up
smh

Solipsism is one of those artificial doctrines that has never actually been held by any flesh-and-blood exponent, but was simply invented by some theorists as a rod with which to beat others whom they opposed.

A cognitive solipsism that would preclude reference to intersubjectively identifiable particulars, and would thus block the possibility of interpersonal communication, is just unpleasant and patently false.

That's not a particularly strong debunking of the concept I've put forth. Assuming that you exist, it would follow that the reality I live in is objective (or itself within a reality that is objective), but I cannot say with certainty that you do. Until definitive proof is given for the existence of this reality, I'm sticking with epistemological solipsism.

Before I go on refuting this, I would like a clarification.
Would the practical judgements you make about other beings aside from your own differ depending on the truth or falsity of your solipsistic thesis?

[Cekoviu]

That's not a particularly strong debunking of the concept I've put forth. Assuming that you exist, it would follow that the reality I live in is objective (or itself within a reality that is objective), but I cannot say with certainty that you do. Until definitive proof is given for the existence of this reality, I'm sticking with epistemological solipsism.

Before I go on refuting this, I would like a clarification.
Would the practical judgements you make about other beings aside from your own differ depending on the truth or falsity of your solipsistic thesis?

Most likely. I have no real way of knowing.

[Zottistan]

I'm lately taking issue to the notion that "culturally derived" and "subjective" are synonyms. They're really not. Of course morality isn't objective in the sense that the laws of physics are objective. But it's certainly not down to the individual either, although the individual does have some very limited say in it. Morality is an emergent property of social groups. It is, at the end of the day, a human invention, but not the invention of an individual, and the individual is still subject to external morality even though moral truths aren't universally applicable physical truths. Morality is objective in the same sense that economics or sociology are objective.

[36 Camera Perspective]

Of course there is such a thing as objective reality, even if one tries to argue that there is very little we can truly come to know about it. We know, via Descartes' cogito, that our own mind exists, so that's one thing we can indubitably take to be objectively real. Even if all of our sense perceptions are illusions, there must then be a subject capable of being deceived in the first place.

That is a fair point, and one I didn't consider.

Another point is that if nothing is univerally true or false, there is nothing that rationally compels me to believe anything that you say, and therefore, I am justified in believing that there are universal truths no matter what you say. This is why relativism is a hard position to defend in practice. The only relativistic (in this case, "perspectivistic" would be a better term) philosophy I respect is Nietzsche's ethics, which at least offfers some kind of medium for sifting through opposing ethical views.

[Novskya]

Before I go on refuting this, I would like a clarification.
Would the practical judgements you make about other beings aside from your own differ depending on the truth or falsity of your solipsistic thesis?

Most likely. I have no real way of knowing.

I think you misunderstand my question bro.
If the solipsistic thesis were true, would the outcome of an engagement (experiment, inquiry) with a being aside from your own differ from the outcome if it were false?
If so, then proceed to engage, and adjudicate the outcome.
If not, then solipsism does not actually enter into your conception of beings aside from your own, and may be summarily dispensed with on pragmatic grounds.

[New Emeline]

Most likely. I have no real way of knowing.

I think you misunderstand my question bro.
If the solipsistic thesis were true, would the outcome of an engagement (experiment, inquiry) with a being aside from your own differ from the outcome if it were false?
If so, then proceed to engage, and adjudicate the outcome.
If not, then solipsism does not actually enter into your conception of beings aside from your own, and may be summarily dispensed with on pragmatic grounds.

Can you repeat that in idiot speak please

[36 Camera Perspective]

Most likely. I have no real way of knowing.

I think you misunderstand my question bro.
If the solipsistic thesis were true, would the outcome of an engagement (experiment, inquiry) with a being aside from your own differ from the outcome if it were false?
If so, then proceed to engage, and adjudicate the outcome.
If not, then solipsism does not actually enter into your conception of beings aside from your own, and may be summarily dispensed with on pragmatic grounds.

But if we adopt pragmatism, then we must also throw out a greal deal of other important philosophical inquiries. For instance, all of the mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanisms are empirically equivalent, yet they offer us vastly different ontologies.

[36 Camera Perspective]

I think you misunderstand my question bro.
If the solipsistic thesis were true, would the outcome of an engagement (experiment, inquiry) with a being aside from your own differ from the outcome if it were false?
If so, then proceed to engage, and adjudicate the outcome.
If not, then solipsism does not actually enter into your conception of beings aside from your own, and may be summarily dispensed with on pragmatic grounds.

Can you repeat that in idiot speak please

It's a horned dilemma.

Translation: Does the world look different if I am the only person that is real, than it does if other beings exist? If the world looks different when I am the only person that is real, then I should go out and look for that difference in order to confirm solipsism. If the world does not look different (i.e. a world where I am the only being that is real looks the same as a world where all other beings are real), then solipsism has the same practical consequences as believing that other beings exist, and so on pragmatic grounds (i.e. the view that the truth of an idea should be judged by its practical implications), we should not accept solipsism, since it does not lead to any different practical implications than the belief that other beings are real (i.e. the world looks the same either way).

[New Emeline]

Can you repeat that in idiot speak please

Translation: Does the world look different if I am the only person that is real, than it does if other beings exist? If the world looks different when I am the only person that is real, then I should go out and look for that difference in order to confirm solipsism. If the world does not look different (i.e. a world where I am the only being that is real looks the same as a world where all other beings are real), then solipsism has the same practical consequences as believing that other beings exist, and so on pragmatic grounds (i.e. the view that the truth of an idea should be judged by its practical implications), we should not accept solipsism, since it does not lead to any different practical implications than the belief that other beings are real (i.e. the world looks the same either way).

Thanks!

[Freaneet]

There is no morality. Only power.

[Novskya]

There is no morality. Only power.

Care to elaborate?

[Cekoviu]

Most likely. I have no real way of knowing.

I think you misunderstand my question bro.
If the solipsistic thesis were true, would the outcome of an engagement (experiment, inquiry) with a being aside from your own differ from the outcome if it were false?
If so, then proceed to engage, and adjudicate the outcome.
If not, then solipsism does not actually enter into your conception of beings aside from your own, and may be summarily dispensed with on pragmatic grounds.

Ah. Forgive me, I'm not particularly familiar with some philosophical terminology (and am also an idiot). I don't think a change would occur in terms of my experience, but the supposed reality of other beings would be called into question. That something doesn't necessarily cause a difference in perception is no reason to discard it.

[Novskya]

But if we adopt pragmatism, then we must also throw out a great deal of other important philosophical inquiries. For instance, all of the mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanisms are empirically equivalent, yet they offer us vastly different ontologies.

Pragmatism, as is typical of any sufficiently robust philosophical disposition, advises us to dispense with some (kinds of) questions, recontextualize others, and originate yet others.

In regards to Quantum Mechanics, it is true that various interpretations are ontologically at odds; and it is likely true that, as yet, we don’t have any way to practically distinguish between them (as they “give the same results”); therefore, the pragmatist would conclude that such differences do (or ought) not actually form any part of our conception of the phenomena at issue. Hence the (prototypical) modern physicist’s fervent interest in contributions to our theoretical and experimental infrastructure: the potential production of some significant practical effect.

I note that advocates for some or another interpretation typically justify their preferences by appealing to aesthetic, affective, and/or economic parameters (i.e., because it “looks/sounds/feels” right, because it is parsimonious, etc.). I also note that the pragmatic maxim is nothing but the injunction not to countenance as “real” anything that is not (or else does not engender) a practical effect.

Ah. Forgive me, I'm not particularly familiar with some philosophical terminology (and am also an idiot). I don't think a change would occur in terms of my experience, but the supposed reality of other beings would be called into question. That something doesn't necessarily cause a difference in perception is no reason to discard it.

>”Solipsism: yes or no?”
>”There’s no way to tell.”
>”Pick anyway.”
>”With what warrant?”
It might seem like you have to answer this question. But really, you don’t. The answer doesn’t really matter, just as it doesn’t matter in the following exchange:
>”Gleebflark is blark: true or false?”
>”Define ‘gleebflark’ and ‘blark’.”
>”No.” (“They are not defined.”)
>*walks away*

[Novskya]

That's not a particularly strong debunking of the concept I've put forth. Assuming that you exist, it would follow that the reality I live in is objective (or itself within a reality that is objective), but I cannot say with certainty that you do. Until definitive proof is given for the existence of this reality, I'm sticking with epistemological solipsism.

Also, just because this annoys me:

Objective experience is possible only if the existence of such a real, objective world is presupposed from the outset rather than being seen as a matter of ex post facto discovery about the nature of things; we indispensably need that initial existential presupposition to make a start.Without a commitment from the very outset to a reality to serve as ground and object of our experience, its cognitive import will be lost. Only on this basis can we proceed evidentially with the exploration of the interpersonally public and objective domain of a physical world-order that we share in common.

I find your statement "or itself within a reality that is objective" to be relatively void. Possible worlds are both a philosophical oddity and a philosophical superfluity deserving to be seen in an Occamist perspective as items multiplied beyond necessity.

[Neutraligon]

Actually no that is not what I was pointing to at all. The definition of objective is "not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts." A god dictating morals is thus not objective because the god's opinions and feeling are what determine what those morals are and thus by definition it is subjective.

I have no idea how you got to the Euthyphro dilemma from my original comment. Next time try not to act as smug when responding. Oh also funny thing, this was my opinion even when I was a theist.

In theistic objective morality (whether it's divine command theory or whatever branch you want to consider), morality would be objective, not subjective. While I am not a theist, it is nonetheless the case that if the standard tri-omni god existed, his morality would be objective.

Since morality is how one's opinion on how society/people should interact with other living organisms, I disagree. Morality is by definition subjective, because it is opinion. Even if dictated to by on high, it is still the opinion of that god.

As an omnibenevolent entity, god is all-good, and therefore, it is analytic truth that whatever moral action god prescribes is just.

How does one determine the god is omnibenevolent without turning to one's own morality? And what is considered good is an opinion, in this case the opinion of the god. Still subjective.

You may think that god's morality is still subjective for the reason that you stated; god's moral prescriptions depend on god's "opinions and feelings". However, stricly speaking, god's moral prescriptions don't depend on god's opinions and feelings; they depend on his nature as an omnibenevolent entity.

Repeat as above, how do you make the decision that the god is omnibenevolent?

As Spinoza pointed out, some people tend to view god as a monarch, an entity embodied with absolute power that can change his decrees at any moment. The truth is, however, that god is constrained by the logic of his very nature. God couldn't invidiate himself.

Every thing in existence is constrained by the logic of their own nature.

[Cekoviu]

That's not a particularly strong debunking of the concept I've put forth. Assuming that you exist, it would follow that the reality I live in is objective (or itself within a reality that is objective), but I cannot say with certainty that you do. Until definitive proof is given for the existence of this reality, I'm sticking with epistemological solipsism.

Also, just because this annoys me:

Objective experience is possible only if the existence of such a real, objective world is presupposed from the outset rather than being seen as a matter of ex post facto discovery about the nature of things; we indispensably need that initial existential presupposition to make a start.Without a commitment from the very outset to a reality to serve as ground and object of our experience, its cognitive import will be lost. Only on this basis can we proceed evidentially with the exploration of the interpersonally public and objective domain of a physical world-order that we share in common.

I find your statement "or itself within a reality that is objective" to be relatively void. Possible worlds are both a philosophical oddity and a philosophical superfluity deserving to be seen in an Occamist perspective as items multiplied beyond necessity.

Mate, is it possible that you could dumb down the vocabulary juuust a bit so that I'm not trying to respond to what is effectively gibberish to me?

[36 Camera Perspective]

Neutraligon:

Your definition of "morality" is too vague and carries a great deal of philosophical baggage with it. Morality pertains to something much more specific than how people and society interact with other living organisms. Morality does not pertain to any kind of action (or interaction, as you prefer to call it) between people, society, and other living organisms, but to actions by moral agents that contain moral content., and to determining what kind of entities are worthy of moral consideration, if any.

Of course, if you define morality as "one's opinion", then morality will turn out to be an opinion. The whole question of the thread is whether or not morality can be defined in this way in the first place. The question at hand is "Can moral prescriptions be mind-independently true?", so defining morality as "one's opinion" simply begs the question.

You ignored my distinction between a moral prescription that flows from god's nature and a moral prescription that's just an opinion, forcing me to reiterate it once more. You are using the word "opinion" rather loosely. God's moral prescriptions are not his "opinion". God's moral prescriptions are necessarily true given his omnibenevolent and omniscient nature; therefore, they are certainly not "opinions", which 1) can be changed, and 2) aren't facts that even purport to describe the world. An opinion is essentially a whim, a preference, an inclination, a temporary idea of something. This hardly describes a prescription stemming from the logical necessity of one's nature.

How does one determine that god is omnibenevolent? In the same way that one determines the principle of non-contradiction, or that all bachelors are unmarried; these are all analytic truths that already belong in our conception of what god would be like if he existed. These are a priori analytic truths.

Everything is constrained by the logic of its own nature, but not in the same sense as god. God is constrained by his perfection; he can't do something imperfectly. As a human being, I am constrained by my imperfection; my will can foolishly surpass what my reason offers me. We are constrained in an equivocal sense. Additionally, other things are also constrained by external objects, whereas god is not.

[New Emeline]

Also, just because this annoys me:

Objective experience is possible only if the existence of such a real, objective world is presupposed from the outset rather than being seen as a matter of ex post facto discovery about the nature of things; we indispensably need that initial existential presupposition to make a start.Without a commitment from the very outset to a reality to serve as ground and object of our experience, its cognitive import will be lost. Only on this basis can we proceed evidentially with the exploration of the interpersonally public and objective domain of a physical world-order that we share in common.

I find your statement "or itself within a reality that is objective" to be relatively void. Possible worlds are both a philosophical oddity and a philosophical superfluity deserving to be seen in an Occamist perspective as items multiplied beyond necessity.

Mate, is it possible that you could dumb down the vocabulary juuust a bit so that I'm not trying to respond to what is effectively gibberish to me?

Prime example of using academic language to exclude instead of include. Tsk tsk.

[36 Camera Perspective]

That's not a particularly strong debunking of the concept I've put forth. Assuming that you exist, it would follow that the reality I live in is objective (or itself within a reality that is objective), but I cannot say with certainty that you do. Until definitive proof is given for the existence of this reality, I'm sticking with epistemological solipsism.

Also, just because this annoys me:

Objective experience is possible only if the existence of such a real, objective world is presupposed from the outset rather than being seen as a matter of ex post facto discovery about the nature of things; we indispensably need that initial existential presupposition to make a start.Without a commitment from the very outset to a reality to serve as ground and object of our experience, its cognitive import will be lost. Only on this basis can we proceed evidentially with the exploration of the interpersonally public and objective domain of a physical world-order that we share in common.

I find your statement "or itself within a reality that is objective" to be relatively void. Possible worlds are both a philosophical oddity and a philosophical superfluity deserving to be seen in an Occamist perspective as items multiplied beyond necessity.

Conceiving of possible worlds, however, is exactly what allows us to presuppose things about the external world a priori, as you called on us to do. By conceiving of all possible ways in which an object can be given to us in experience, we can determine what will belong to it a priori, namely that it will appear in space and time.