Objective vs Subjective Morality

[Cute Puppies]

Since the "Why do you believe in religion" thread began taking a turn towards whether religion or atheism had the moral high ground by measuring the destructive conflicts caused by each belief system, I thought it would be interesting to debate morals and whether they were objective or subjective. Hopefully this thread will be less aggressive, and instead host interesting debates.

Personally, I believe that morals are subjective - based off of cultural influences, the people around us, our own experiences, and the society we're born into. That's what I believe that one person may consider homosexuality immoral while I find it neutral, or why I consider stealing candy from a baby totally acceptable while others may contend that that's morally wrong.

[Farnhamia]

And your opinion?

[Cute Puppies]

And your opinion?

Personally, I believe morals are subjective. On another note, your red, bolded letters scare me.

EDIT: What about you?

[Genivaria]

And your opinion?

Personally, I believe morals are subjective. On another note, your red, bolded letters scare me.

EDIT: What about you?

That's the idea, thread OP's require their own opinion to start the thread off.

[VoVoDoCo]

First of all, this thread needs a poll.

Second of all, I'm an individualist. I believe that the moral and intellectual maximum begins and ends with the individual.

[Reformed Houn]

[Farnhamia]

And your opinion?

Personally, I believe morals are subjective. On another note, your red, bolded letters scare me.

EDIT: What about you?

I was speaking as Mod. You didn't notice the echo effect? Anyway, your opinion should be in the OP but it's okay as it is. I don't much care, honestly.

[Cute Puppies]

(Image)

blocked and reported

[Cute Puppies]

Personally, I believe morals are subjective. On another note, your red, bolded letters scare me.

EDIT: What about you?

I was speaking as Mod. You didn't notice the echo effect? Anyway, your opinion should be in the OP but it's okay as it is. I don't much care, honestly.

Oh, sorry. Ill add that.

[Reformed Houn]

(Image)

blocked and reported

You can't block me if I barricade myself in your house and spray paint morality on your refrigerator

[Farnhamia]

(Image)

blocked and reported

Okay ... you can't block anything in here, unless you mean putting him on your Foes list. And one picture is not spam.

@Reformed Huon: It may not be actionable but knock it off anyway. It adds nothing to the thread.

[Reformed Houn]

blocked and reported

Okay ... you can't block anything in here, unless you mean putting him on your Foes list. And one picture is not spam.

@Reformed Huon: It may not be actionable but knock it off anyway. It adds nothing to the thread.

Oh, I took it as a joke by them, apologies.

[Cute Puppies]

blocked and reported

Okay ... you can't block anything in here, unless you mean putting him on your Foes list. And one picture is not spam.

@Reformed Huon: It may not be actionable but knock it off anyway. It adds nothing to the thread.

Sorry, it was an inside joke with my friends - not a serious threat of blocking a person and reporting them to moderation.

[Genivaria]

There seems to be in our searching no sign of any external source of any 'objective' morality.
Perhaps there is something that can be based on near universal human characteristics like the ability to reason and empathy but that's as close to 'objective' as we're likely to get.

[Albrenia]

Far as I can tell there's no such thing as 'objective' morality. Those that claim to have it are just kidding themselves, since it's all subjective.

At least until we find some objective measurement or metric for it. Which means more than some bronze age book with several versions even within the multiple faiths.

[Bombadil]

I have an idea around objective morality in terms of 'do not steal', just that though it can be applied to 'do not steal a life', 'do not steal physical objects', but also 'do not steal a person's sense of self worth', any aggression is to 'not steal one's sense of security'.

I suspect it could further be applied to stealing unfair advantages and etc.

I mean there's no objective morality in its most specific sense but one could argue for a universal morality and term it objective in a broad sense.

[Cekoviu]

Morality is subjective, of course. That seems obvious to me, but I suppose I could see a religion-based case being made for objective morality.

[Neutraligon]

Morality is subjective, of course. That seems obvious to me, but I suppose I could see a religion-based case being made for objective morality.

I can really only think of one where it would be subjective. Any religion that has a god dictating it would still be subjective.

[New Emeline]

I think some aspects are subjective, while others lean more towards the objective side. However, morality being subjective to me does not mean it is meaningless.

[Novskya]

It seems to me that many people are conflating what is truly moral vs what is percieved moral. Personally, I believe in non-relative morals (considering that I am a deontologist.) I mostly stem my non-relative system from the fact that things are good-in-itself as:
1.) Whenever one acts, it is necessarily with some good in mind, as one intends to do some sort of good by committing to an action. Whether or not the action is good, creates good, or achieves the good intended is not the point, but rather the fact in itself that one acts for a good.
2.) All of our actions intend to realize some sort of end, the result that we call good. In this the end becomes the good, however the source of the good is placed by the agent, and so this value judgement is agent-relative.
3.) When one acts to achieve an end, the end is done in order to commit to another further end. For example, I buy a car so I can get around with greater convenience, so I can more readily convene with friends, so we can share camaraderie, etc.
4.) The notion of achieving an end for another end implies a hierarchy of ends, where the initial end becomes a mere means for the next end. By the relegation of the initial end to a means, a superior value is given the end further down the chain.
5.) There must be an end to the chain of ends or else which reach an incomprehensible chain of ends ad infinitum. This final end is an end-in-itself, in which the end is reached purely for its own sake and not for the sake of another end.
6.) All people's ends are for the achievement of the end-in-itself, and therefore an end valued by all. If we look at the notion of this hierarchy, it is appropriate to label the end-in-itself the highest good, as it is at the top of all hierarchies and one that cannot be superseded.
7.) The end-in-itself is Good.

The implication is that Good (in the context of Aristotle, a virtue) has inherent value and that it is a cornerstone of metaethical structures. What "Good" is a question that must be answered by the ethicist, and the interpretations have generally been what creates all the major ethical theories throughout history. It is thereby irrational to think of values as anything other than good in-itself (from which we can derive ethical theories from that are not based on subjective values.)

When a person calls one thing good he seeks it; and when one calls a thing bad, he wishes to avoid it. These usages can be split into areas of which things are sought as means to some further end and those which they seek as good as ends in themselves. Of course, this is not to say that ends are applicable to all. For example, a starving man finds food as a "good" whilst an overweight man sees it as "bad". In order for something to be good, it is to be "good without qualification" (as Kant puts it). For something to be "good without qualification", it has to not act as a "good" for one end and "bad" for another. It must be sought as good totally independently of serving as a means to something else; it must be "good in-itself" (see above as to justification for why). Furthermore, while one thing may be good as means relative to a particular end, that "end" becomes a "means" relative to some other "end".

It is to be noted that for something to be absolutely and universally good, it has to be good within every instance of its occurrence. All those which people call "good" (whatever that may be) can become bad if the will which one uses it is bad. That is, if we were to imagine a bad person (i.e. one who willed or wanted to do evil) in which who has all traits in which we might call "good" (such as intelligence, wit, pride, etc), then these very traits would make only that much worse his will to do what is wrong. Thus, for something to be "good", it has to be done out of Good Will.

Many facts of reality have inherent normative claims coming off of them. Organisms have ends built into them by the virtue of their structures. So, the denial of one's own teleology through some form of nihilism is rising from convolutions which problems rise up when discussing justification of our beliefs with our propositions. We can derive normative claims from the concepts of man. My bro Quine addresses this issue of emotivism which is based on a strong empiricism which leaves us with a bad theory of concepts.

What this all seems like to me is a failure to see beyond the normative claims and y'all not having an axiological anchor because you either weren't able to ground yourselves in a realist framework, even if it is secular like the utilitarians. Utilitarianism is a main choice amongst a lot of people but most ppl fall into apathy and this disconnect into moral anti-realism. First. because they are uninformed on their personal and local level and secondly due to the sociocultural conditions.

(Do I get bonus points for being the first non-moral relativist?)

[Cute Puppies]

*sNiP*
(Do I get bonus points for being the first non-moral relativist?)

No. Negative points.

Jokes aside, that's honestly a fascinating perspective and I appreciate you sharing it. I never heard of non-moral relativism, but it sounds very interesting.

[VoVoDoCo]

It seems to me that many people are conflating what is truly moral vs what is percieved moral. Personally, I believe in non-relative morals (considering that I am a deontologist.) I mostly stem my non-relative system from the fact that things are good-in-itself as:
1.) Whenever one acts, it is necessarily with some good in mind, as one intends to do some sort of good by committing to an action. Whether or not the action is good, creates good, or achieves the good intended is not the point, but rather the fact in itself that one acts for a good.
2.) All of our actions intend to realize some sort of end, the result that we call good. In this the end becomes the good, however the source of the good is placed by the agent, and so this value judgement is agent-relative.
3.) When one acts to achieve an end, the end is done in order to commit to another further end. For example, I buy a car so I can get around with greater convenience, so I can more readily convene with friends, so we can share camaraderie, etc.
4.) The notion of achieving an end for another end implies a hierarchy of ends, where the initial end becomes a mere means for the next end. By the relegation of the initial end to a means, a superior value is given the end further down the chain.
5.) There must be an end to the chain of ends or else which reach an incomprehensible chain of ends ad infinitum. This final end is an end-in-itself, in which the end is reached purely for its own sake and not for the sake of another end.
6.) All people's ends are for the achievement of the end-in-itself, and therefore an end valued by all. If we look at the notion of this hierarchy, it is appropriate to label the end-in-itself the highest good, as it is at the top of all hierarchies and one that cannot be superseded.
7.) The end-in-itself is Good.

The implication is that Good (in the context of Aristotle, a virtue) has inherent value and that it is a cornerstone of metaethical structures. What "Good" is a question that must be answered by the ethicist, and the interpretations have generally been what creates all the major ethical theories throughout history. It is thereby irrational to think of values as anything other than good in-itself (from which we can derive ethical theories from that are not based on subjective values.)

When a person calls one thing good he seeks it; and when one calls a thing bad, he wishes to avoid it. These usages can be split into areas of which things are sought as means to some further end and those which they seek as good as ends in themselves. Of course, this is not to say that ends are applicable to all. For example, a starving man finds food as a "good" whilst an overweight man sees it as "bad". In order for something to be good, it is to be "good without qualification" (as Kant puts it). For something to be "good without qualification", it has to not act as a "good" for one end and "bad" for another. It must be sought as good totally independently of serving as a means to something else; it must be "good in-itself" (see above as to justification for why). Furthermore, while one thing may be good as means relative to a particular end, that "end" becomes a "means" relative to some other "end".

It is to be noted that for something to be absolutely and universally good, it has to be good within every instance of its occurrence. All those which people call "good" (whatever that may be) can become bad if the will which one uses it is bad. That is, if we were to imagine a bad person (i.e. one who willed or wanted to do evil) in which who has all traits in which we might call "good" (such as intelligence, wit, pride, etc), then these very traits would make only that much worse his will to do what is wrong. Thus, for something to be "good", it has to be done out of Good Will.

Many facts of reality have inherent normative claims coming off of them. Organisms have ends built into them by the virtue of their structures. So, the denial of one's own teleology through some form of nihilism is rising from convolutions which problems rise up when discussing justification of our beliefs with our propositions. We can derive normative claims from the concepts of man. My bro Quine addresses this issue of emotivism which is based on a strong empiricism which leaves us with a bad theory of concepts.

What this all seems like to me is a failure to see beyond the normative claims and y'all not having an axiological anchor because you either weren't able to ground yourselves in a realist framework, even if it is secular like the utilitarians. Utilitarianism is a main choice amongst a lot of people but most ppl fall into apathy and this disconnect into moral anti-realism. First. because they are uninformed on their personal and local level and secondly due to the sociocultural conditions.

(Do I get bonus points for being the first non-moral relativist?)

I don't really see a compelling argument in here in favor of deontological, action based, or objective ethics tho.

You even say it in there that for something to be objectively good, it'd have to be good as perceived by everyone. That seems to contradict the claim that you're a non-moral relativist.

[Novskya]

There seems to be in our searching no sign of any external source of any 'objective' morality.
Perhaps there is something that can be based on near universal human characteristics like the ability to reason and empathy but that's as close to 'objective' as we're likely to get.

*Chuckles* Well actually...

Any principle which can be "universalized" is one which can be held to apply to all persons when it does not contradict themselves, or have no "inconsistencies", due to the fact that to be a rational being is to act such that you avoid inconsistencies. A great deal of this system relies on what it means to act on these inconsistencies. The intent of this is to eliminate acting on any principles which would clearly involve outrageously immoral conduct. For example, if I were to act on my own pleasure in which it causes harm to others, then doing such is immoral as it is inconsistent. The reason being is that if applied to everyone, then if everyone acts on their own pleasure, even if it causes harms to others, then it would cause harm to me and thereby cause an "inconsistency" with the principle. Another one would be to act on the principle that I may break my promises whenever it is convenient to do so, would, if universalized, mean everyone could do so. The practice of promise making would then quickly loose its very purpose which is to secure a commitment on which one can depend. To act on such a principle, then, would be "inconsistent" with the very practice of making promises. The method of this is thus the means by which we figure out what our moral duties are, where a duty would have to categorical (applicable to all moral agents) and imperative.

[Novskya]

No. Negative points.

i do the same to relativists

I don't really see a compelling argument in here in favor of deontological, action based, or objective ethics tho.

lmao. That wasn't something for deontology or "action based" (whatever that means. I mean the entire time I was arguing from the standpoint that ethics is evaluation of the formation of intention but ok). I believe you ignored the point of "good in itself", which in itself disproves subjectivity as what is "good" is universal (albeit I never defined as to what exactly is good here)

You even say it in there that for something to be objectively good, it'd have to be good as perceived by everyone. That seems to contradict the claim that you're a non-moral relativist.

???
Uh, yeah you definitely misunderstood what I said. For something to be objectively good, it has to be good in all occurrences (i.e. it's good in all instances.) To avoid further confusion, lemme explain what it means to act "out of good will." To act out of good will is to act out of duty, i.e. act out of a moral agent does a particular action not because of what it produces (its consequences) in terms of human experience, but because he or she recognizes by reasoning that it is morally the right thing to do and thus regards him or herself as having a moral duty or obligation to do that action. One may get the feeling of pleasure out of doing something right, but to act morally is not to act out of that but out of understanding for knowing it is a right thing to do. A rational being does what is morally right because he recognizes himself as having a moral duty to do so rather than for anything he or she may get out of it.

But why is it that actions done for one end can not have moral worth? As our moral duties are applicable to all beings, then one's likes and dislikes must be independent of one's moral duty. From this, we can conclude from this idea of what is to act rational, it is thereby irrational to act on any principle which does not which does not apply to all others equally. Reason dictates that the act we are morally obligated to do is one which is motivated by adherence to a principle which could, without inconsistency, be held to apply to any (and all) rational agents.

[Novskya]

NB: When I speak of "objective" morality, I'm not saying that everyone exhibits the same perception of morality. What I mean when I speak of "objective" morality is that morality is not dependent on the states of a being. What is right and wrong is right and wrong, independent of one's view on it. For example, murder is wrong and remains wrong even though another person perceives it as right. I believe I addressed this in my first post here by saying "many people are conflating what is truly moral vs what is percieved moral". Your perceptions of what is moral differs while what is truly moral remains the same.