Achtung Panzer! Armor Discussion Thread

[Oil exporting People]

From looking it up the T-34 had a top speed of 33 MPH and a 500 hp engine.
The Panzer III only 25 mph and 296 hp.

Indeed, but the Panzer III also had superior armor outside the frontal regions.

It was certainly slow. Panzer IV was not that great either, but did have a much better gun than most IIIs.

Indeed the Long 75s were better than the Long 50s, but they were not the awful things you are claiming they were. Their combat record as late as 1943 shows that.

And if the Panzer III was so great, why were they replaced and converted to other roles than tanks? Why did they and stop building the III and keep building the IV? Why were they already going to different tanks? Cleary the Germans thought it was inferior to newer models and inferior to the IV.

The same reason the Soviets moved from the T-34/76 to the T-34/85. New technologies were getting developed, and making both the 76 T-34 along with the Panzer III outdated. The point I've been making all along is that you claiming the Panzer III was outdated by 1939 and ineffective at challenging the T-34 is completely without merit.

The long 50mm was okay, but not great, hence why the Germans went to bigger guns. The short 50mm and 37mm were definitely obsolete. Hence why they were replaced as fast as possible.

The 50mm was more than sufficient into 1943, and I've already covered the others.

I agree the T-34 was not that great either. But again a lot goes into kill ratios beyond just which tank is better.

Yes, and unless you're saying the 1st and 5th Guards at Kursk were the amateurs of 1941, you can't explain away the Panzer III's performance in 1943.

Fact is the T-34 had a better gun, better armor, better speed. It was often used poorly and its crews poor. And yes earlier models especially did have major problems.

The Long 50mm was clearly of the same abilities as the Soviet gun, while the Panzer III had roughly equal or better armor by 1943. As for speed, it's useful, but not the be all , end all. Otherwise, why did the Soviets quit making their light tanks with high speeds in 1943/1944? And on the crews, again you're going to have to explain how two Guards Armies in 1943 were of the same poor abilities others were in 1941. Again, the combat record just doesn't add up to your allegations.

[Novus America]

From looking it up the T-34 had a top speed of 33 MPH and a 500 hp engine.
The Panzer III only 25 mph and 296 hp.

Indeed, but the Panzer III also had superior armor outside the frontal regions.

It was certainly slow. Panzer IV was not that great either, but did have a much better gun than most IIIs.

Indeed the Long 75s were better than the Long 50s, but they were not the awful things you are claiming they were. Their combat record as late as 1943 shows that.

And if the Panzer III was so great, why were they replaced and converted to other roles than tanks? Why did they and stop building the III and keep building the IV? Why were they already going to different tanks? Cleary the Germans thought it was inferior to newer models and inferior to the IV.

The same reason the Soviets moved from the T-34/76 to the T-34/85. New technologies were getting developed, and making both the 76 T-34 along with the Panzer III outdated. The point I've been making all along is that you claiming the Panzer III was outdated by 1939 and ineffective at challenging the T-34 is completely without merit.

The long 50mm was okay, but not great, hence why the Germans went to bigger guns. The short 50mm and 37mm were definitely obsolete. Hence why they were replaced as fast as possible.

The 50mm was more than sufficient into 1943, and I've already covered the others.

I agree the T-34 was not that great either. But again a lot goes into kill ratios beyond just which tank is better.

Yes, and unless you're saying the 1st and 5th Guards at Kursk were the amateurs of 1941, you can't explain away the Panzer III's performance in 1943.

Fact is the T-34 had a better gun, better armor, better speed. It was often used poorly and its crews poor. And yes earlier models especially did have major problems.

The Long 50mm was clearly of the same abilities as the Soviet gun, while the Panzer III had roughly equal or better armor by 1943. As for speed, it's useful, but not the be all , end all. Otherwise, why did the Soviets quit making their light tanks with high speeds in 1943/1944? And on the crews, again you're going to have to explain how two Guards Armies in 1943 were of the same poor abilities others were in 1941. Again, the combat record just doesn't add up to your allegations.

Just because the had the guards title tacked on does not necessarily make them awesome. It was overused. Thing is just because you have a better kill ratio does not mean your tanks are good or even better. Because a lot more goes into it than what tank is better one on one.

You cannot draw sweeping conclusions from a single point of data.

[Novus America]

Also it matters, especially when talking about tanks, if the weapon in question is a less sophisticated export version or the real deal.

Theoretically speaking, under certain conditions wouldn't even an older, inferior tank with an exceptionally well-drilled and experienced crew stand a chance of defeating a much more modern tank with an incompetent crew?

The better tank commanders and crews would know how to do more with less, and cultivate the conditions that would maximize their ability to compensate for their existing disadvantages. They would also have a much better understanding of armor tactics and how to use them effectively.

An incompetent crew can be lured into a textbook ambush, encircled, or otherwise forced to fight under conditions in which the advantage conferred by their superior armor and armament are much reduced. An idiot with a sophisticated toy is still an idiot. Plus, an incompetent crew will have a much poorer reaction speed. On a modern battlefield where "one shot, one kill" is the objective, this is a fatal shortcoming.

And if their morale or experience level is poor they may even abandon the tank and flee even if it's still in fighting condition and has only been damaged. This seems to be an especially common factor in some Middle Eastern wars, where slightly damaged but otherwise intact tanks are often videoed by triumphant insurgents who simply captured them when the crew members needlessly bailed out.

Exactly. The user is more important than the weapon itself.
German tanks were not that good for most of the war. But they used them much better at the beginning of the war.

[Novus America]

Not really, as the West was not attacking them militarily, and had no real interest in doing so. Even if they had not modified their armor doctrine the West would not have attacked. The West never planned to blitzkrieg the Soviets, simply to fight a defensive war IF the Soviets attacked first, and mostly with nuclear weapons.

And if that it the case than every military doctrinal change is "forced at gunpoint" as it is all in response to changing technology and requirements.

You're right, I forgot that the post war era was a time of absolute peace and deep, friendly relationships between the USSR and the West, and that everyone knew nobody was going to war again. The cold war never happened and nobody put any real money or effort into their conventional forces.

That's not how history works. You don't get to paint a brush of hindsight and assume what you know now somebody else did not think otherwise. We know both sides were extremely worried about the other side launching a conventional war, especially prior to the mid 1960s when he USSR was behind the West in nuclear capability. We know both sides expected it and prepared for it. Faced with a more efficient industrial approach the USSR was forced to wholesale abandon the concepts that they beat Germany with because unlike Germany the West was in a position to exploit those concepts. That's why there was a serious pairing down of in service machine types post war. Many of these machines were introduced or remained in service through the war because they were useful to the operational concepts of the time operational concepts that in detail were lacking.

Paranoia =/= forced at gunpoint. You used an inappropriate term. The Soviets were not forced to do anything. They simply adapted to changing circumstances.

Again by your argument every military decision is "force at gunpoint".

[Dostanuot Loj]

Paranoia =/= forced at gunpoint. You used an inappropriate term. The Soviets were not forced to do anything. They simply adapted to changing circumstances.

Again by your argument every military decision is "force at gunpoint".

Rational thinking related to defense against a known enemy =/= paranoia.

Again, you're debating the semantics on a figure of speech. "Forced at gunpoint" is a figure of speech to mean "under intense pressure". Technically yes, wartime decisions which are made under extreme pressure also count. The decision between using the atomic bomb and invading Japan would count.

The Soviets fought Germany with a flawed system. They knew it by the end of the wear, but it was irrelevant because the system was adequate for fighting Germany. They also knew that the system was inadequate against the industrialized, and far more efficient West, post war.

So it's an apt and appropriate figure of speech for a quick, pointed breakdown of the situation like I applied. If you would like an academic paper on the concept and its historical implementation between the major powers I can do that too. It will just have to go on the bottom of a long list of other things I have to do.

[Novus America]

Paranoia =/= forced at gunpoint. You used an inappropriate term. The Soviets were not forced to do anything. They simply adapted to changing circumstances.

Again by your argument every military decision is "force at gunpoint".

Rational thinking related to defense against a known enemy =/= paranoia.

Again, you're debating the semantics on a figure of speech. "Forced at gunpoint" is a figure of speech to mean "under intense pressure". Technically yes, wartime decisions which are made under extreme pressure also count. The decision between using the atomic bomb and invading Japan would count.

The Soviets fought Germany with a flawed system. They knew it by the end of the wear, but it was irrelevant because the system was adequate for fighting Germany. They also knew that the system was inadequate against the industrialized, and far more efficient West, post war.

So it's an apt and appropriate figure of speech for a quick, pointed breakdown of the situation like I applied. If you would like an academic paper on the concept and its historical implementation between the major powers I can do that too. It will just have to go on the bottom of a long list of other things I have to do.

A figure of speech can be silly. And that one is for this case. The Soviets chose one method of adapting to changed circumstances. Which if they had not done would have made no difference.
The decision to move to MBTs was not a war time decision either.

[Dostanuot Loj]

Rational thinking related to defense against a known enemy =/= paranoia.

Again, you're debating the semantics on a figure of speech. "Forced at gunpoint" is a figure of speech to mean "under intense pressure". Technically yes, wartime decisions which are made under extreme pressure also count. The decision between using the atomic bomb and invading Japan would count.

The Soviets fought Germany with a flawed system. They knew it by the end of the wear, but it was irrelevant because the system was adequate for fighting Germany. They also knew that the system was inadequate against the industrialized, and far more efficient West, post war.

So it's an apt and appropriate figure of speech for a quick, pointed breakdown of the situation like I applied. If you would like an academic paper on the concept and its historical implementation between the major powers I can do that too. It will just have to go on the bottom of a long list of other things I have to do.

A figure of speech can be silly. And that one is for this case. The Soviets chose one method of adapting to changed circumstances. Which if they had not done would have made no difference.
The decision to move to MBTs was not a war time decision either.

You're losing track of your own argument.
The Soviets had a serious issue cutting down tank types. This followed WW2 with deep debates and quite a lot of infighting on what to do. The pre-war doctrine of specialized roles, and a multitude of these roles to boot, was strongly adhered to following the war. In the eyes of many Soviet generals, politicians and industrialists, it won the war. By 1949 there were serious debates, and more than a little political backstabbing about this subject.

By 1955, with the recent death of Stalin, the political purging of de-Stalinization, and the re-rise in favour of Zhukov (One of the biggest named proponents of universal armour applications) the USSR had begun. Those who had begun to identify flaws in the wartime situation began to replace Stalin-era personnel.

Your entire argument is that the Soviets did not review Western tank production concepts and conclude (correctly) that their existing practices would leave them at a severe disadvantage in a potential conflict. Your argument further hinges on the idea that there was no real threat of conventional conflict. We know the first case to be completely untrue (They very much did this as I keep saying), and the second case is argument of hind sight to change historical narrative. The second case would be bad history at best, and manipulation of reality for personal gain at worse, since we know the Soviets expected a conventional war and prepared for it.

[Novus America]

A figure of speech can be silly. And that one is for this case. The Soviets chose one method of adapting to changed circumstances. Which if they had not done would have made no difference.
The decision to move to MBTs was not a war time decision either.

You're losing track of your own argument.
The Soviets had a serious issue cutting down tank types. This followed WW2 with deep debates and quite a lot of infighting on what to do. The pre-war doctrine of specialized roles, and a multitude of these roles to boot, was strongly adhered to following the war. In the eyes of many Soviet generals, politicians and industrialists, it won the war. By 1949 there were serious debates, and more than a little political backstabbing about this subject.

By 1955, with the recent death of Stalin, the political purging of de-Stalinization, and the re-rise in favour of Zhukov (One of the biggest named proponents of universal armour applications) the USSR had begun. Those who had begun to identify flaws in the wartime situation began to replace Stalin-era personnel.

Your entire argument is that the Soviets did not review Western tank production concepts and conclude (correctly) that their existing practices would leave them at a severe disadvantage in a potential conflict. Your argument further hinges on the idea that there was no real threat of conventional conflict. We know the first case to be completely untrue (They very much did this as I keep saying), and the second case is argument of hind sight to change historical narrative. The second case would be bad history at best, and manipulation of reality for personal gain at worse, since we know the Soviets expected a conventional war and prepared for it.

No. That is not what I am saying. Obviously the Soviets adapted to changing circumstances.
Adapting to a change is not "at gun point". Especially when it is to be better able to launch an offensive.

And there was no war going on. Decisions made after WWII were not war time decisions.

And there was no risk of conventional war unless the Soviets started it as the west after 1945 did not have sufficient conventional forces for an offense.

And even the Soviets could easily see that western forces in Europe were much smaller than theirs.

[Chinevion]

i love how the germans made a tank that could run on wood for training.

[Dostanuot Loj]

No. That is not what I am saying. Obviously the Soviets adapted to changing circumstances.

That must be what you are saying because otherwise you are ignoring a number of facts to continue a pointless argument in semantics.

Adapting to a change is not "at gun point". Especially when it is to be better able to launch an offensive.

Adapting to change under pressure is the definition of the figure of speech used. Regardless of that change being better or worse for any given set of criteria. Rapid change being driven by external pressure as opposed to gradual change from internal pressure is the very definition of the figure of speech used.

And there was no war going on. Decisions made after WWII were not war time decisions.

At what point did I say the decision was made during the war? The underlying issue was recognized during the war, and the decision was made post-war. This has been consistently noted in every post so far.

And there was no risk of conventional war unless the Soviets started it as the west after 1945 did not have sufficient conventional forces for an offense.

Yes, that is why US forces increased in Germany four-fold between 1948 and 1952.
The French and British pumped up their forces 1949-1954.
The West German military was reformed.
And to top all of that off, the Soviets had a fraction of the available nuclear weapons to the US, and far less capability to deploy them. NATO could have blasted their way through Soviet forces with a fraction of the conventional troops. In fact this was the plan, and exactly what the Soviets feared.

You seem to think the Soviets believed there was no possibility of a war with the West, and yet this is completely untrue.

And even the Soviets could easily see that western forces in Europe were much smaller than theirs.

They could also see the rapid buildup. They could also see the qualitative superiority. They could also see the fact that the US actually had deployable nuclear weapons in any quantity.

[Novus America]

No. That is not what I am saying. Obviously the Soviets adapted to changing circumstances.

That must be what you are saying because otherwise you are ignoring a number of facts to continue a pointless argument in semantics.

Adapting to a change is not "at gun point". Especially when it is to be better able to launch an offensive.

Adapting to change under pressure is the definition of the figure of speech used. Regardless of that change being better or worse for any given set of criteria. Rapid change being driven by external pressure as opposed to gradual change from internal pressure is the very definition of the figure of speech used.

And there was no war going on. Decisions made after WWII were not war time decisions.

At what point did I say the decision was made during the war? The underlying issue was recognized during the war, and the decision was made post-war. This has been consistently noted in every post so far.

And there was no risk of conventional war unless the Soviets started it as the west after 1945 did not have sufficient conventional forces for an offense.

Yes, that is why US forces increased in Germany four-fold between 1948 and 1952.
The French and British pumped up their forces 1949-1954.
The West German military was reformed.
And to top all of that off, the Soviets had a fraction of the available nuclear weapons to the US, and far less capability to deploy them. NATO could have blasted their way through Soviet forces with a fraction of the conventional troops. In fact this was the plan, and exactly what the Soviets feared.

You seem to think the Soviets believed there was no possibility of a war with the West, and yet this is completely untrue.

And even the Soviets could easily see that western forces in Europe were much smaller than theirs.

They could also see the rapid buildup. They could also see the qualitative superiority. They could also see the fact that the US actually had deployable nuclear weapons in any quantity.

Criticizing a figure of speech is semantics of course.
I was saying your figure of speech was wrong. Not saying the Soviets did not adapt when the obviously did.
And no, "at gun point" does not mean merely "under pressure".

Also the US did a massive draw down after WWII. The US Army in 1948 was a joke.
General Bradley said it "could not fight its way out of a paper bag."
There was a build up in the 50s, but this primarily focused on the Navy and Air Force. Western tank hoards pouring into the Soviet Union was not a credible threat as said hoards did not exist.

And this was a lot due to the Korean War.
And the Soviets knew this. The west was defensive in attitude.

Sure the west had overwhelming nuclear superiority in the 50s. But did not pose a large CONVENTIONAL threat. Nukes were the threat. Not western tanks charging at Moscow.

The West would have just nuked Moscow IF the Soviets had attacked. And never tried to send ground forces to occupy it.

[Dostanuot Loj]

Criticizing a figure of speech is semantics of course.

If you want to get technical like below: It's not. Semantics is the meaning of the term itself, either literal or interpreted by the users of language.

I was saying your figure of speech was wrong. Not saying the Soviets did not adapt when the obviously did.
And no, "at gun point" does not mean merely "under pressure".

Except as a figure of speech the statement is a non-literal interpretation. In the decades I have been using English that is the very meaning such a figure of speech has had. In my native location, and across the anglophone world where I have traveled. To be forced to do something under external pressure.

Also the US did a massive draw down after WWII. The US Army in 1948 was a joke.

And a massive draw up from 1949 to 1955. Massive.

General Bradley said it "could not fight its way out of a paper bag."

That's nice.
And in 1949-1952 the US went from one active division to four in Germany, the British doubled their forces, the French doubled their forces. By 1955 these numbers on all accounts more than doubled again, plus those twelve brand new German divisions which were forming.

There was a build up in the 50s, but this primarily focused on the Navy and Air Force. Western tank hoards pouring into the Soviet Union was not a credible threat as said hoards did not exist.

Who ever said tank hoards? You know warfare is not fought like video games right? The Soviets, understanding how the concept of frontage works, realized that their pre-war and wartime concepts of tank specialization and development were flawed, and under pressure from an increasingly efficient industrialized opponent whom they expected to fight, changed their practices. This is the literal sense of what I said.
Also the build up was across the board, that's why US forces jumped so dramatically.

And this was a lot due to the Korean War.

Due to tensions from the Korean war. Specific buildup for the Korean War is separate.

And the Soviets knew this. The west was defensive in attitude.

That's why we have their own documents from the time discussing the threat of the West? Why we have their own plans for a defensive fight against the West? Why the entire cold war happened?

Sure the west had overwhelming nuclear superiority in the 50s. But did not pose a large CONVENTIONAL threat. Nukes were the threat. Not western tanks charging at Moscow.

This is not how nuclear war worked until the 1960s. There was no difference between the nuclear and conventional threat until the ability to strike long range with impunity became a thing. This is also not how warfare works. The Soviets knew, like every other military power, that nuclear weapons are a really really good force multiplier. And force multipliers are really good at letting smaller forces to the things you think need a larger force.

Second to this, and perhaps more importantly, nowhere here has the need been to drive on Moscow. When did I ever say that? when did it ever come in? Western forces in Germany were poised to take East Germany back, as well as some of the other Soviet satellite states. And they were in a position both numerically and in terms of quality to do so. The Soviets knew this.

The West would have just nuked Moscow IF the Soviets had attacked. And never tried to send ground forces to occupy it.

You can say this but it doesn't make it true. A potential war between the two, at all stages, would have been a massive ground war.

[Novus America]

Criticizing a figure of speech is semantics of course.

If you want to get technical like below: It's not. Semantics is the meaning of the term itself, either literal or interpreted by the users of language.

I was saying your figure of speech was wrong. Not saying the Soviets did not adapt when the obviously did.
And no, "at gun point" does not mean merely "under pressure".

Except as a figure of speech the statement is a non-literal interpretation. In the decades I have been using English that is the very meaning such a figure of speech has had. In my native location, and across the anglophone world where I have traveled. To be forced to do something under external pressure.

Also the US did a massive draw down after WWII. The US Army in 1948 was a joke.

And a massive draw up from 1949 to 1955. Massive.

General Bradley said it "could not fight its way out of a paper bag."

That's nice.
And in 1949-1952 the US went from one active division to four in Germany, the British doubled their forces, the French doubled their forces. By 1955 these numbers on all accounts more than doubled again, plus those twelve brand new German divisions which were forming.

There was a build up in the 50s, but this primarily focused on the Navy and Air Force. Western tank hoards pouring into the Soviet Union was not a credible threat as said hoards did not exist.

Who ever said tank hoards? You know warfare is not fought like video games right? The Soviets, understanding how the concept of frontage works, realized that their pre-war and wartime concepts of tank specialization and development were flawed, and under pressure from an increasingly efficient industrialized opponent whom they expected to fight, changed their practices. This is the literal sense of what I said.
Also the build up was across the board, that's why US forces jumped so dramatically.

And this was a lot due to the Korean War.

Due to tensions from the Korean war. Specific buildup for the Korean War is separate.

And the Soviets knew this. The west was defensive in attitude.

That's why we have their own documents from the time discussing the threat of the West? Why we have their own plans for a defensive fight against the West? Why the entire cold war happened?

Sure the west had overwhelming nuclear superiority in the 50s. But did not pose a large CONVENTIONAL threat. Nukes were the threat. Not western tanks charging at Moscow.

This is not how nuclear war worked until the 1960s. There was no difference between the nuclear and conventional threat until the ability to strike long range with impunity became a thing. This is also not how warfare works. The Soviets knew, like every other military power, that nuclear weapons are a really really good force multiplier. And force multipliers are really good at letting smaller forces to the things you think need a larger force.

Second to this, and perhaps more importantly, nowhere here has the need been to drive on Moscow. When did I ever say that? when did it ever come in? Western forces in Germany were poised to take East Germany back, as well as some of the other Soviet satellite states. And they were in a position both numerically and in terms of quality to do so. The Soviets knew this.

The West would have just nuked Moscow IF the Soviets had attacked. And never tried to send ground forces to occupy it.

You can say this but it doesn't make it true. A potential war between the two, at all stages, would have been a massive ground war.

Sorry, just because you have misused the phrase before does not mean you are not misusing it.
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/at+gunpoint

It means an actual threat of being immediately harmed if you do not.
Not merely "external pressure". What evidence do you have of your use being correct?

It certainly does not mean adapting to ordinary changes in circumstances.

Soviet plans marked as "defensive" where completely offensive. They lied. Calling something defensive does not make it so.

And oh 4 divisions? And how many did the Soviets have?

The US military capability at the time was not designed for large scale offenses. It was built around destroying incoming Soviet columns. And the US did not have a massive ground force in Europe. 4 divisions is NOT massive.

And I have not seen any US battle plan from the time calling for a massive ground invasion of the Soviet Union. As it would have been uncessary. The objective was to stop Soviet attacks. Not take Moscow.

[Germanic Templars]

Opinions on the Kugelpanzer?

My opinion: A tank that makes me question, like a few of their tanks do already, what the hell were they thinking when they made it?

[The Empire of Pretantia]

Opinions on the Kugelpanzer?

(Image)

My opinion: A tank that makes me question, like a few of their tanks do already, what the hell were they thinking when they made it?

Not a tank.

[Novus America]

Opinions on the Kugelpanzer?

(Image)

My opinion: A tank that makes me question, like a few of their tanks do already, what the hell were they thinking when they made it?

Problem is we know little about it. The Soviets and now Russians treat history as a combination of propaganda and state secret.

[The Empire of Pretantia]

Opinions on the Kugelpanzer?

(Image)

My opinion: A tank that makes me question, like a few of their tanks do already, what the hell were they thinking when they made it?

Problem is we know little about it. The Soviets and now Russians treat history as a combination of propaganda and state secret.

What are you implying?

[Novus America]

Problem is we know little about it. The Soviets and now Russians treat history as a combination of propaganda and state secret.

What are you implying?

I am not implying anything. Just pointing out access to the vehicle has been extremely restricted and that outside experts have not be permitted to investigate it closely. And little information about it has been realeased. So we do not know that much about it.

It is just a historical curiosity. But Russia and the Soviets have a history of secrecy for the sake of secrecy. And paranoia.

[The Empire of Pretantia]

What are you implying?

I am not implying anything. Just pointing out access to the vehicle has been extremely restricted and that outside experts have not be permitted to investigate it closely. And little information about it has been realeased. So we do not know that much about it.

I was hoping you would say you were implying something sky, like it was used to fight the Morlocks.

[Novus America]

I am not implying anything. Just pointing out access to the vehicle has been extremely restricted and that outside experts have not be permitted to investigate it closely. And little information about it has been realeased. So we do not know that much about it.

I was hoping you would say you were implying something sky, like it was used to fight the Morlocks.

Nothing so interesting. They guard everything at the museum pretty heavily, even old M48s.
It is just the Russian military culture. Keep everything secret. Even if you have no good reaso too.

[Dostanuot Loj]

Sorry, just because you have misused the phrase before does not mean you are not misusing it.
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/at+gunpoint

Because you quote a literal definition for a non-literal figure of speech.

It means an actual threat of being immediately harmed if you do not.
Not merely "external pressure". What evidence do you have of your use being correct?

Once again, you seem to misunderstand what a non-literal meaning is.

It certainly does not mean adapting to ordinary changes in circumstances.

Industrial revolution and operational concept revision are not ordinary changes. They are not done at a whim. And they were not done by the Soviets because they felt like it.

Soviet plans marked as "defensive" where completely offensive. They lied. Calling something defensive does not make it so.

Is your entire argument here that historians, military theorists, and other academic and military professionals can't look at a plan and know what its goals, objectives, and details are by reading it, but instead rely entirely on it being labeled "offensive" or "defensive"?

You are really saying they are that dumb?

Think about that for a second, because you are making sweeping accusations related to academic and professional integrity.

And oh 4 divisions? And how many did the Soviets have?

Yes, four more US divisions. Also four more UK/Commonwealth divisions, and six more French divisions. On top of the existing one each US and UK divisions and two French divisions already stationed there as part of the drawdown. That is, between 1950 and 1955 going from four divisions in West Germany to eighteen divisions. Plus Corps assets, and so on and so on. And this is before we get the other twelve divisions the West Germans are in the middle of raising.

The Soviets at this point? Had massively downsized from 27 equivalent capability formations (Soviet Corps are essentially NATO divisions at this point. This would change in the 1960s and 1970s) to a whopping eleven. In response to NATO buildup (From 4 to 18 divisions), the Soviets dumped another 10 corps and started rebuilding the East German military. The Soviets lost numerical superiority in Germany after 1949 when they made major downsizing due to treaty obligations.

The US military capability at the time was not designed for large scale offenses. It was built around destroying incoming Soviet columns. And the US did not have a massive ground force in Europe. 4 divisions is NOT massive.

Five maneuver divisions, plus Corps assets, nuclear munitions, and all else. Oh, and the rest of NATO forces in Germany. Yes, that is massive.

And I have not seen any US battle plan from the time calling for a massive ground invasion of the Soviet Union. As it would have been uncessary. The objective was to stop Soviet attacks. Not take Moscow.

I have not seen any Soviet plan to invade Europe, despite your attempts to claim otherwise by stating they lied (Your claim was false BTW).
Of course none of that is relevant since until about 1960 the issue is only a divided Germany. We are talking very explicitly about the confrontation ideologically which led to things like the Berlin Wall.

Also you will be keen to note when you go through Wikipedia and google to argue back, that we are specifically talking the period of 1948-1960. Quoting plans from the 1960s, or 1970s, will do you no good.

I was hoping you would say you were implying something sky, like it was used to fight the Morlocks.

Nothing so interesting. They guard everything at the museum pretty heavily, even old M48s.
It is just the Russian military culture. Keep everything secret. Even if you have no good reaso too.

This would be because it's not a museum. Or was not until the 21st century. It is constantly referred to as one, but it has always been (and still is) a military reference collection. It is not there for public eyes, and never was. There has been a growing movement in the last two decades to open it to the public more, and that is fantastic, but it is a very different facility from Bovington for example.

Also, we know pretty much as much about it as any Soviet or Russian did. The files have been public for 20+ years. The issue is not that the Russians are "secretive", it's that they don't know anything about it either.

[Husseinarti]

Thats because its on a fucking military base that conducts secretive stuff still. It kind of fell into the idea of a tank museum as a secondary role

They also probably don't want fuckers messing with some of the one-of-a-kind tanks.

I bet if you try to dick around with an F-104 at the US Air Force Museum they'd get pretty pissed, or, you go mess with the stuff at the exhibits they have on base.

Wow, imagine that, fucking with stuff is bad.

[Novus America]

Thats because its on a fucking military base that conducts secretive stuff still. It kind of fell into the idea of a tank museum as a secondary role

They also probably don't want fuckers messing with some of the one-of-a-kind tanks.

I bet if you try to dick around with an F-104 at the US Air Force Museum they'd get pretty pissed, or, you go mess with the stuff at the exhibits they have on base.

Wow, imagine that, fucking with stuff is bad.

Actually the US Air Force museum is quite willing to invite in outside experts to look at stuff. Sure they will not just let any tourist mess with it, but work with outside historians.
While the Russians refuse to even release pictures of the insides or rear of that ball tank thingy. Is a picture of the inside too much to ask for?

[The Empire of Pretantia]

Thats because its on a fucking military base that conducts secretive stuff still. It kind of fell into the idea of a tank museum as a secondary role

They also probably don't want fuckers messing with some of the one-of-a-kind tanks.

I bet if you try to dick around with an F-104 at the US Air Force Museum they'd get pretty pissed, or, you go mess with the stuff at the exhibits they have on base.

Wow, imagine that, fucking with stuff is bad.

Actually the US Air Force museum is quite willing to invite in outside experts to look at stuff. Sure they will not just let any tourist mess with it, but work with outside historians.
While the Russians refuse to even release pictures of the insides or rear of that ball tank thingy. Is a picture of the inside too much to ask for?

It's where the museum keeps their Miller Lite.

[Novus America]

Sorry, just because you have misused the phrase before does not mean you are not misusing it.
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/at+gunpoint

Because you quote a literal definition for a non-literal figure of speech.

It means an actual threat of being immediately harmed if you do not.
Not merely "external pressure". What evidence do you have of your use being correct?

Once again, you seem to misunderstand what a non-literal meaning is.

It certainly does not mean adapting to ordinary changes in circumstances.

Industrial revolution and operational concept revision are not ordinary changes. They are not done at a whim. And they were not done by the Soviets because they felt like it.

Soviet plans marked as "defensive" where completely offensive. They lied. Calling something defensive does not make it so.

Is your entire argument here that historians, military theorists, and other academic and military professionals can't look at a plan and know what its goals, objectives, and details are by reading it, but instead rely entirely on it being labeled "offensive" or "defensive"?

You are really saying they are that dumb?

Think about that for a second, because you are making sweeping accusations related to academic and professional integrity.

And oh 4 divisions? And how many did the Soviets have?

Yes, four more US divisions. Also four more UK/Commonwealth divisions, and six more French divisions. On top of the existing one each US and UK divisions and two French divisions already stationed there as part of the drawdown. That is, between 1950 and 1955 going from four divisions in West Germany to eighteen divisions. Plus Corps assets, and so on and so on. And this is before we get the other twelve divisions the West Germans are in the middle of raising.

The Soviets at this point? Had massively downsized from 27 equivalent capability formations (Soviet Corps are essentially NATO divisions at this point. This would change in the 1960s and 1970s) to a whopping eleven. In response to NATO buildup (From 4 to 18 divisions), the Soviets dumped another 10 corps and started rebuilding the East German military. The Soviets lost numerical superiority in Germany after 1949 when they made major downsizing due to treaty obligations.

The US military capability at the time was not designed for large scale offenses. It was built around destroying incoming Soviet columns. And the US did not have a massive ground force in Europe. 4 divisions is NOT massive.

Five maneuver divisions, plus Corps assets, nuclear munitions, and all else. Oh, and the rest of NATO forces in Germany. Yes, that is massive.

And I have not seen any US battle plan from the time calling for a massive ground invasion of the Soviet Union. As it would have been uncessary. The objective was to stop Soviet attacks. Not take Moscow.

I have not seen any Soviet plan to invade Europe, despite your attempts to claim otherwise by stating they lied (Your claim was false BTW).
Of course none of that is relevant since until about 1960 the issue is only a divided Germany. We are talking very explicitly about the confrontation ideologically which led to things like the Berlin Wall.

Also you will be keen to note when you go through Wikipedia and google to argue back, that we are specifically talking the period of 1948-1960. Quoting plans from the 1960s, or 1970s, will do you no good.

Nothing so interesting. They guard everything at the museum pretty heavily, even old M48s.
It is just the Russian military culture. Keep everything secret. Even if you have no good reaso too.

This would be because it's not a museum. Or was not until the 21st century. It is constantly referred to as one, but it has always been (and still is) a military reference collection. It is not there for public eyes, and never was. There has been a growing movement in the last two decades to open it to the public more, and that is fantastic, but it is a very different facility from Bovington for example.

Also, we know pretty much as much about it as any Soviet or Russian did. The files have been public for 20+ years. The issue is not that the Russians are "secretive", it's that they don't know anything about it either.

You have still yet to demonstrate how you non-literal meaning is appropriate. A non-literal meaning does not mean you can just apply any figure of speech to any circumstance.

Sure that phrase can be used when doing something under duress but not literally at gun point.
But does not apply to normal military modernization.

And obviously historians know plans falsely claimed to be defensive like this one are in fact offensive.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Day ... iver_Rhine

While I have none from the 50s or 60s, the Russians have not declassified anything yet, we only know what other countries have released.

But we do know the west had no plans to take significant amounts of Russian territory or take Moscow.

And in 1948 after the drawdown the Soviets still had 2.8 MILLION men and over ONE HUNDRED DIVSIONS.
It was not until the 80s that NATO could even muster more than a tiny fraction of Soviet numbers.

Not enough for a large offensive, which was never planned.

As far the ball tank thing, the Russians at least know what the rear, and interior look like. Yet they refuse to release that information. It is a historical curiosity, so it warrants further study and there is no reason pictures of the rear and interior cannot be released.