World War 2 General Discussion Thread

[United Kingdom of Poland]

ok so everyone between him and Wavell were morons then.

Except from no.

so I take it you think diverting supplies and halting a successful attack to open up another theatre of war (not to mention actually make said theatre worst off then it was before) is a good idea even though that flies in the face of every major military school and piece of literature out there.

[Imperializt Russia]

Except from no.

so I take it you think diverting supplies and halting a successful attack to open up another theatre of war (not to mention actually make said theatre worst off then it was before) is a good idea even though that flies in the face of every major military school and piece of literature out there.

If it truly did, it would not have been done.
To reiterate - those theatres were won.

[United Kingdom of Poland]

so I take it you think diverting supplies and halting a successful attack to open up another theatre of war (not to mention actually make said theatre worst off then it was before) is a good idea even though that flies in the face of every major military school and piece of literature out there.

If it truly did, it would not have been done.
To reiterate - those theatres were won.

like if it was a better idea to finish off the BEF with the German tanks literally right behind them rather then wait 3 days while the Luftwaffe failed to cash the check Goering's pompous mouth wrote, the Germans would have done it.
Or if it was a better idea to ignore Stalingrad by bypassing it and continuing to their main objectives rather then losing hundreds of thousands in a city of no strategic value other than its name, the Germans would have done so.
Or if there was even the remotest possibility that the Germans might due the same thing in the Ardennes in 1944 that they did in 1940, the Allies would have placed more then two worn out divisions and two units fresh from the states to cover that spot and would have actually listened two them when they something strange was happening there....... You see where I'm going with this yet.

[Imperializt Russia]

Yes, what I see is "I am so much better than thousands of allied commanders with combat experience because of the benefit of seventy years' hindsight".

The Armchair General equivalent of the ITG.

[Rio Cana]

Found this newspaper from the NY Times with headline "GERMANS OCCUPY DENMARK, ATTACK OSLO"

It describes what happened. Seems the UK. got informed of the Danish invasion by the NY Times. Newspapers usually describe the details that are left out of the history books. The newspaper even says that the Germans said they invaded the neutral nations Danish and Norwegian in order to maintain there neutrality since the UK. PM was planning on invading them.

Article - http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/2489642/posts

[Goram]

so I take it you think diverting supplies and halting a successful attack to open up another theatre of war (not to mention actually make said theatre worst off then it was before) is a good idea even though that flies in the face of every major military school and piece of literature out there.

If it truly did, it would not have been done.
To reiterate - those theatres were won.

It didn't fly in the face of all military logic. Just a lot of them. Not every piece of literature either, I do seem to remember a few that suggested it wasn't all awful. One historian, I'm fairly sure, suggested Britain had to intervene to help justify and demonstrate the supposed ethical grounds on which it was opposing Hitler - not just to the British populace, but to the world at large. An attempt to get the Americans involved. Martin Van Crefelt, I remember for sure, makes the same point you do. Only from the other side. It drew Axis resources away as well, and ones they couldn't replace nearly as easily as the Allies. Remember, the British had literally millions of Empire troops to fall back on. Read a chapter of a book for a seminar once that suggested it also delayed Barbarossa. According to Wiki, not the best source I know (but it is footnoted), the British wanted to create a buffer zone between the Axis powers and Turkey - the only other state between said powers and the Mid East.

In all, maybe you're right. Maybe getting involved in Greece was a mistake. But it's not nearly so cut and dry as all that. Nothing ever is.

[Grand Russian Federation]

I really don't understand why the 6th army, after Uranus, was surrounded by millions of Soviet men who could've been doing much more elsewhere, such as deployed in a full-scale Operation Saturn or sent to crush the forces of Operation Winter Storm. IMO they should have just set up defenses and waited for the Germans to exhaust themselves in the Luftwaffe "supply" attempt. After Winter Storm the Germans didn't have any hope left, if they tried to escape the Stalingrad trap they would have been shredded in the cold.

Imagine, if Rostov-on-Don was recaptured and the Caucasus was cut off, then that would be a HUUUUGE disaster for the Germans, they would be unable to cross into Crimea with the limited amount of ships they have in the Black Sea.

[Goram]

I really don't understand why the 6th army, after Uranus, was surrounded by millions of Soviet men who could've been doing much more elsewhere, such as deployed in a full-scale Operation Saturn or sent to crush the forces of Operation Winter Storm. IMO they should have just set up defenses and waited for the Germans to exhaust themselves in the Luftwaffe "supply" attempt. After Winter Storm the Germans didn't have any hope left, if they tried to escape the Stalingrad trap they would have been shredded in the cold.

Imagine, if Rostov-on-Don was recaptured and the Caucasus was cut off, then that would be a HUUUUGE disaster for the Germans, they would be unable to cross into Crimea with the limited amount of ships they have in the Black Sea.

So the Soviets ought to have ignored a force of, what, 300,000 and left them to chill in Stalingrad?

[Grand Russian Federation]

I really don't understand why the 6th army, after Uranus, was surrounded by millions of Soviet men who could've been doing much more elsewhere, such as deployed in a full-scale Operation Saturn or sent to crush the forces of Operation Winter Storm. IMO they should have just set up defenses and waited for the Germans to exhaust themselves in the Luftwaffe "supply" attempt. After Winter Storm the Germans didn't have any hope left, if they tried to escape the Stalingrad trap they would have been shredded in the cold.

Imagine, if Rostov-on-Don was recaptured and the Caucasus was cut off, then that would be a HUUUUGE disaster for the Germans, they would be unable to cross into Crimea with the limited amount of ships they have in the Black Sea.

So the Soviets ought to have ignored a force of, what, 300,000 and left them to chill in Stalingrad?

Their supply situation was deteriorating fast, and they really didn't have any possibility of escaping, so yeah, instead of pushing from all sides, there should just be either a defensive line around the pocket, or a thrust to cut off their airfields, or airstrikes on their airstrips and that's it.
They would starve to death.

[United Kingdom of Poland]

I really don't understand why the 6th army, after Uranus, was surrounded by millions of Soviet men who could've been doing much more elsewhere, such as deployed in a full-scale Operation Saturn or sent to crush the forces of Operation Winter Storm. IMO they should have just set up defenses and waited for the Germans to exhaust themselves in the Luftwaffe "supply" attempt. After Winter Storm the Germans didn't have any hope left, if they tried to escape the Stalingrad trap they would have been shredded in the cold.

Imagine, if Rostov-on-Don was recaptured and the Caucasus was cut off, then that would be a HUUUUGE disaster for the Germans, they would be unable to cross into Crimea with the limited amount of ships they have in the Black Sea.

actually in all likelihood if the 6th army had been given the go ahead to attempt an escape they probably would have gotten out. Remember Manstien managed to get within 50 miles of the pocket. Also Manstien's offensive is the reason the soviets kept reinforcing the area around the pocket. literally everyone not named Hitler expect Paulus to tell Hitler "screw you" and pull up shop.

[Grenartia]

Invade across the Straits of Dover. *nod*

"It's exactly what they'd suspect! Therefore, it's what they will least expect!"

Do what we did with misinforming them about Calais, except with Normandy!

[Grand Russian Federation]

I really don't understand why the 6th army, after Uranus, was surrounded by millions of Soviet men who could've been doing much more elsewhere, such as deployed in a full-scale Operation Saturn or sent to crush the forces of Operation Winter Storm. IMO they should have just set up defenses and waited for the Germans to exhaust themselves in the Luftwaffe "supply" attempt. After Winter Storm the Germans didn't have any hope left, if they tried to escape the Stalingrad trap they would have been shredded in the cold.

Imagine, if Rostov-on-Don was recaptured and the Caucasus was cut off, then that would be a HUUUUGE disaster for the Germans, they would be unable to cross into Crimea with the limited amount of ships they have in the Black Sea.

actually in all likelihood if the 6th army had been given the go ahead to attempt an escape they probably would have gotten out. Remember Manstien managed to get within 50 miles of the pocket. Also Manstien's offensive is the reason the soviets kept reinforcing the area around the pocket. literally everyone not named Hitler expect Paulus to tell Hitler "screw you" and pull up shop.

If they tried to escape, they would most probably be cut down in the snow. They would have to tread 50 miles through freezing weather, hungry, some even starving, through Soviet resistance, abandoning their positions in the city and heading into surrounding soviet forces. While there might be a few survivors who slip out, the huge majority would be destroyed, freeing up tons of soviet soldiers who will proceed to try and cut off the Caucasus army group.

[United Kingdom of Poland]

actually in all likelihood if the 6th army had been given the go ahead to attempt an escape they probably would have gotten out. Remember Manstien managed to get within 50 miles of the pocket. Also Manstien's offensive is the reason the soviets kept reinforcing the area around the pocket. literally everyone not named Hitler expect Paulus to tell Hitler "screw you" and pull up shop.

If they tried to escape, they would most probably be cut down in the snow. They would have to tread 50 miles through freezing weather, hungry, some even starving, through Soviet resistance, abandoning their positions in the city and heading into surrounding soviet forces. While there might be a few survivors who slip out, the huge majority would be destroyed, freeing up tons of soviet soldiers who will proceed to try and cut off the Caucasus army group.

mind you said Soviet resistance had to strip all the heavy weapons from the line facing Stalingrad in order to stop Manstein and would now be getting hit by 300,000 soldiers, every piece of equipment still running, and every available aircraft the Luftwaffe could muster.

[Grand Russian Federation]

If they tried to escape, they would most probably be cut down in the snow. They would have to tread 50 miles through freezing weather, hungry, some even starving, through Soviet resistance, abandoning their positions in the city and heading into surrounding soviet forces. While there might be a few survivors who slip out, the huge majority would be destroyed, freeing up tons of soviet soldiers who will proceed to try and cut off the Caucasus army group.

mind you said Soviet resistance had to strip all the heavy weapons from the line facing Stalingrad in order to stop Manstein and would now be getting hit by 300,000 soldiers, every piece of equipment still running, and every available aircraft the Luftwaffe could muster.

Less than 300,000 soldiers that would have to first break through Soviet defensive lines, while they would be attacked from the north and east, and then sustain an advance through at least 50 km in the freezing cold, all while being parried by Soviet forces. You can be sure all available soviet forces in the area would try to halt their advance.

Anywhere they try to advance, they are going to be advancing into Soviet defensive positions, in waist high snow, in sub-zero temperatures, with little-to-nothing in the way of air, artillery, or armored support. And even once they get through the Soviet defensive positions facing inwards to the pocket, they are going to be continuously assailed by counterattacks from Soviet armored forces which they will be horribly vulnerable too strung out on the open steppe. And we are talking having to walk at least a distance of 65 km (the closest Manstein ever managed to get). This is something men who are dropping dead from starvation in increasing numbers are going to have quite a bit of difficulty doing.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

Except from no.

so I take it you think diverting supplies and halting a successful attack to open up another theatre of war (not to mention actually make said theatre worst off then it was before) is a good idea even though that flies in the face of every major military school and piece of literature out there.

Let's go to June of 1940.
The BEF has just evacuated Dunkirk. The British are off the Continent ENTIRELY. There's no way to directly engage the German Army whatsoever at that point, given that the British are clearly years and years (and several superpower buddies) away from having the kind of strength needed to come back.
You now have a grand total of one land front actually facing the enemy - one avenue with which to go on the offensive and engage. That's in Egypt. Should the British have just sat at home for four years doing nothing and waiting for the Americans to come bail them out?
Fighting in Africa and Egypt made absolute sense. Italy is a more difficult call to make - some historians say it was a total waste because 250k Germans managed to tie down roughly 1 million Allied soldiers, but then again...the Allies could afford that kind of expenditure more easily than the Germans could. It's a difficult call to make.

[United Kingdom of Poland]

so I take it you think diverting supplies and halting a successful attack to open up another theatre of war (not to mention actually make said theatre worst off then it was before) is a good idea even though that flies in the face of every major military school and piece of literature out there.

Let's go to June of 1940.
The BEF has just evacuated Dunkirk. The British are off the Continent ENTIRELY. There's no way to directly engage the German Army whatsoever at that point, given that the British are clearly years and years (and several superpower buddies) away from having the kind of strength needed to come back.
You now have a grand total of one land front actually facing the enemy - one avenue with which to go on the offensive and engage. That's in Egypt. Should the British have just sat at home for four years doing nothing and waiting for the Americans to come bail them out?
Fighting in Africa and Egypt made absolute sense. Italy is a more difficult call to make - some historians say it was a total waste because 250k Germans managed to tie down roughly 1 million Allied soldiers, but then again...the Allies could afford that kind of expenditure more easily than the Germans could. It's a difficult call to make.

no, but Britain failed to secure North Africa when it was easy and in turn had to spend two more years, thousands of lives, and millions of dollars in equipment to do so, not to mention almost losing Egypt in the process. My problem isn't that they went to Greece, its that they didn't finish what they had started (the complete removal of Italian and by extension axis forces in North Africa) and left their position criminally undermanned to do so. You don't go looking for more fires until after you put the one your dealing with out first.

[Sun Wukong]

I could of taken those beaches without a single casualty.

.... riiiiiiight

Tell me your glorious and non faulty invasion plan on wise and illustrious Keyboard field Marshall.

It's simple: we lower the world's oceans until the beaches are out of range of German artillery. Then, we send in Liam Neeson.

[Baltenstein]

.... riiiiiiight

Tell me your glorious and non faulty invasion plan on wise and illustrious Keyboard field Marshall.

It's simple: we lower the world's oceans until the beaches are out of range of German artillery. Then, we send in Liam Neeson.

He was busy saving Jews from Ralph Fiennes in Krakow during World War 2.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

no, but Britain failed to secure North Africa when it was easy

I mean, this is the definition of "hindsight" right here. Operation Compass was carried out by a force no larger than about three divisions, which had to be marched across half of the North African rim to get to where they were going. Huge portions of that force had to be diverted to administer all the cities and the hundreds of thousands of prisoners they were taking. I can assure you that Britain was sparing absolutely nobody in trying to send as much as possible to Africa that could be cut away from home defense. There's letter after letter in Churchill's autobio trying to strategize how to move as many troops as possible from every corner of the Empire - down to the battalion level - to Africa as fast as possible. Convoys were incredibly risky, given that the Italian fleet was still active and powerful, and could only be sent intermittently.

and in turn had to spend two more years, thousands of lives, and millions of dollars in equipment to do so,

You seem to be under the impression that Churchill got the CIGS together in Feb of 1941 and said "hey guys, this Africa thing is a gas - what if we just keep the party going for another two years?"
The African forces were worn to the bone when they'd finished Compass. They'd been fighting for six solid months at the very far end of a very long line of supply. Greece had literally just flared up, and the Home Forces were stretched to the limit trying to maintain some semblance of an organized army at home for whatever eventuality while also getting the Med what it needed. Couple this with the fact that Britain never had much manpower relative to the other great powers to begin with, had an ancient hatred of conscription, and had to maintain a massive fleet and presences across the largest empire the world has ever known...

not to mention almost losing Egypt in the process. My problem isn't that they went to Greece, its that they didn't finish what they had started (the complete removal of Italian and by extension axis forces in North Africa) and left their position criminally undermanned to do so.

"Criminally" undermanned? That's an interesting turn of phrase.
They didn't have the luxury of turning around to deal with Greece and the rest of the world whenever they wanted. Germany was in Greece, right then. There was also a serious invasion scare in Britain at almost the exact same time that Compass slowed down and the Afrika Korps was arriving in Libya, which created a new factor that had to be contended with.

You don't go looking for more fires until after you put the one your dealing with out first.

That's not how war works. You don't have time to sit back and get all your ducks in a row while your enemy politely waits for you to make your move; you either act with what you have or get rolled over. Sometimes, you just get rolled anyways.
Again, you seem to be thinking that Churchill had access to the Big WW2 Script where everything was laid out plain and simple, and then arbitrarily decided to do things the hard way.

[Imperializt Russia]

Let's go to June of 1940.
The BEF has just evacuated Dunkirk. The British are off the Continent ENTIRELY. There's no way to directly engage the German Army whatsoever at that point, given that the British are clearly years and years (and several superpower buddies) away from having the kind of strength needed to come back.
You now have a grand total of one land front actually facing the enemy - one avenue with which to go on the offensive and engage. That's in Egypt. Should the British have just sat at home for four years doing nothing and waiting for the Americans to come bail them out?
Fighting in Africa and Egypt made absolute sense. Italy is a more difficult call to make - some historians say it was a total waste because 250k Germans managed to tie down roughly 1 million Allied soldiers, but then again...the Allies could afford that kind of expenditure more easily than the Germans could. It's a difficult call to make.

no, but Britain failed to secure North Africa when it was easy and in turn had to spend two more years, thousands of lives, and millions of dollars in equipment to do so, not to mention almost losing Egypt in the process. My problem isn't that they went to Greece, its that they didn't finish what they had started (the complete removal of Italian and by extension axis forces in North Africa) and left their position criminally undermanned to do so. You don't go looking for more fires until after you put the one your dealing with out first.

Rommel got within a hundred miles of Suez, his objective.
He was then halted, pushed back, encircled and his forces destroyed.

[Helghast Imperial Republic]

then explain all his actions in the med.

What about them? The Allies won in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. The Axis were put in a strangehold by the Royal Navy, particularly submarine operations that, amongst other factors, basically gelded the Afrika Korps.

Actually the Italian Regia Marina managed to get more than 80% of supplies to North Africa.
The Italians won that battle.

[Imperializt Russia]

What about them? The Allies won in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. The Axis were put in a strangehold by the Royal Navy, particularly submarine operations that, amongst other factors, basically gelded the Afrika Korps.

Actually the Italian Regia Marina managed to get more than 80% of supplies to North Africa.
The Italians won that battle.

Not really since, you know, they lost.

[Rio Cana]

no, but Britain failed to secure North Africa when it was easy and in turn had to spend two more years, thousands of lives, and millions of dollars in equipment to do so, not to mention almost losing Egypt in the process. My problem isn't that they went to Greece, its that they didn't finish what they had started (the complete removal of Italian and by extension axis forces in North Africa) and left their position criminally undermanned to do so. You don't go looking for more fires until after you put the one your dealing with out first.

Rommel got within a hundred miles of Suez, his objective.
He was then halted, pushed back, encircled and his forces destroyed.

Now that must have been infuriating. So close but no doing. The same thing happened to the Germans when it came to Moscow. The Germans got within a distance of 72 KM. (45 miles) from Moscow. So close but no doing

[Goram]

Actually the Italian Regia Marina managed to get more than 80% of supplies to North Africa.
The Italians won that battle.

Not really since, you know, they lost.

And that only 80% made it though, if that number is accurate. Hardly good, seeing as your losing, on average, 20% of the force every time to try to push a convoy though. Not only does that deprive North Africa of 20% of the supplies they needed, but you lose one in every five ships sent out. That's not even close to sustainable for the Italians. The British with their massive merchant marine might have handled that level of loss for a while. Surely not the Italians. Definitely not a win, if you ask me.

[Imperializt Russia]

IIRC by the end of the North Africa campaign the Germans were down to like 30-40% supplies reaching units. Maybe a lot landed in port, but it didn't reach the Afrika Korps.