World War 2 General Discussion Thread

[The New Byzantine II]

Do you all remember the Battles of Khalkhin Gol in the battle event during the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars? If only the Soviets invaded Japan's possessions in China and Korea early..things will change.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

When comparing to today's events, it seems like history is repeating itself.

I mean, to what extent and in what context?
I'm always leery of making comparisons like that myself. History gets pretty unique once you get right down to the details.

Do you all remember the Battles of Khalkhin Gol in the battle event during the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars? If only the Soviets invaded Japan's possessions in China and Korea early..things will change.

Repulsing a few poorly-planned and piecemeal Japanese attacks isn't much next to full-on invading Japanese China by land.

[Islamic Meritocratic Transoxiana]

Weren't the Americans already supplying the British/Russians even before Pearl Harbor?

Yes, but that aid was very limited because the US was nominally neutral. PH resulted in the US joining the war, and thus, being able to step up the amount of aid given out.

Disagree. US destroyers were escorting convoys in the Atlantic before PH, and did exchange fire w/U-boats. Also, the destroyers-for-bases deal should not be overestimated in the Battle of the Atlantic. In fact, the US military increased a lot from when FDR got into office, building a very important core, including a peacetime draft, and quintupling the defence budget. Grant tanks didn't design themselves! Speaking of Grant tanks, Grants supplied through lend-lease (because the UK gov was broke) proved vital at El Alamein.

[Islamic Meritocratic Transoxiana]

When comparing to today's events, it seems like history is repeating itself.

Thank God, im not the only one that thinks this.

I disagree. What the appeasers were doing would be like signing a treaty legalizing Putin's territorial demands on Ukraine. (Though I think the US should have done more there) Or letting China invade the Philippines and doing nothing. (Though I also think the US could do more there)

[Brickistan]

I am always surprised that Joseph Kennedy doesn't get more criticism. He was a Nazi appeaser on a par with Neville Chamberlain.

Nazi appeaser. Sure he was, and so would you have been. Everyone has this idea that the British and French governments were stocked up with cowards who were unwilling to do anything about that nasty little Hitler roaming around Czechoslovakia. And at face value I can see why people think that, it's just a shame no one looks deeper than face value. You've got to remember that the politician of the day was alive during the Great War. The French had seen a million dead and a third of their country subjugated by the Germans for the second time in fifty odd years. Why would they ever want to go to war on that scale again? Why risk it for a country on the other side of Europe to fight a country that really hasn't done that much wrong yet? The simple answer is this; you wouldn't. You don't go charging off into another continental war, especially when you're Britain, 20 years after the worst war of all time, if you can possibly avoid it. Unless your Churchill, of course.

Perhaps appeasement was the wrong course to prevent war. Perhaps deterrence might have been a better option - but someone, I think AJP Taylor, notes that Chamberlain did a pretty good job of rearming Britain for self defence. Rearming for a continental war would, however, have been impossible. The 20's and 30's were plagued in cut backs in military spending, particularly on the Royal Navy. To rearm to challenge the Germans on the continent would have cost Britain more in resources and cash than she was willing or able to pay. Deterrence, I think, was a pretty infeasible option in 1938.

The fact of the matter is this. The idea that Chamberlain was a Nazi appeaser who ought to have gone to war in 1938 stems from a number of books written during the war or just after by Liberal/Labour MPs who wanted to bash Chamberlain's Conversative Party. Political point scoring, it seems to me. He was also attacked by Churchill post war. Mind you that's hardly surprising. Churchill succeeded Chamberlain, and more likely than not, wanted to paint himself as the all conquering saviour of Britain - delivering the country from the clutches of weak willed men like Chamberlain who'd have served us up to Hitler on a plate, no doubt.

Since the end of the war, a number of works have been released on the subject of Chamberlain and appeasement. With the benefit of documents made available by the British government and by taking a slightly more objective (mostly) view, a bit of a revisionist school has cropped up. And I'm inclined to believe it. Maybe he should have gone to war in 1938, but you and I can come to those decisions because we know what happens after Munich. We know Hitler didn't keep his word and we know what he was going to do. Chamberlain did not.

In short, Chamberlain was not the coward people make him out to be. Perhaps he got things wrong, but he does not deserve the criticism he got post war nor the criticism that popular history/the History Channel levels at him today.

Agreed.

I think people forget that while he did try to appease Hitler (always a good idea to avoid war if you ask me, but in this case futile) he did also start the preparations to bring Britain on a war footing. In a sense, he was stalling for time as Britain was in no condition to fight another war.

You might argue that slapping Hitler down at the earliest opportunity would have saved millions. And there might be some truth to that. But hindsight is such a wonderful thing...

[Grenartia]

When comparing to today's events, it seems like history is repeating itself.

I mean, to what extent and in what context?
1. I'm always leery of making comparisons like that myself. History gets pretty unique once you get right down to the details.

Do you all remember the Battles of Khalkhin Gol in the battle event during the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars? If only the Soviets invaded Japan's possessions in China and Korea early..things will change.

2. Repulsing a few poorly-planned and piecemeal Japanese attacks isn't much next to full-on invading Japanese China by land.

1. Well, as far as unwillingness to go to war with an entity hell bent on war against you, see the US and allies vs ISIS.

2. Plus, from a Soviet POV, they didn't want to be carrying the burden on two fronts.

[Grenartia]

Yes, but that aid was very limited because the US was nominally neutral. PH resulted in the US joining the war, and thus, being able to step up the amount of aid given out.

Disagree. 1. US destroyers were escorting convoys in the Atlantic before PH, and did exchange fire w/U-boats. 2. Also, the destroyers-for-bases deal should not be overestimated in the Battle of the Atlantic. 3. In fact, the US military increased a lot from when FDR got into office, building a very important core, including a peacetime draft, and quintupling the defence budget. Grant tanks didn't design themselves! Speaking of Grant tanks, Grants supplied through lend-lease (because the UK gov was broke) proved vital at El Alamein.

1. Yes, because of U-boats harrassing shipping. Just because the US deployed destoryers to escort convoys to a trading partner that was in a state of war, does not mean the US wasn't neutral (even if it was Allied-leaning).

2. It skirted the bounds of neutrality, but still didn't actually break them.

3. Which is not inherently a sign of non-neutrality. In fact, it can be argued that during a war, military buildups are necessary for even neutral parties, if for literally no other reason than to prevent any warring party from forcibly annexing/invading/attacking/pressuring the nation to violate neutrality, etc.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

1. Well, as far as unwillingness to go to war with an entity hell bent on war against you, see the US and allies vs ISIS.

I don't see that as comparable whatsoever.
First, the Western Allies weren't launching drones strikes and more-or-less perpetual air campaigns against Germany in 1938. That's functionally indistuinguishable from war, these days.
Second, ISIS is not a nation-state, however much it pretends to be one. It has no capacity or interest in governing, not really, and the same sorts of diplomatic/military analogues that were present with Germany back then do not apply here.
Third, the prospect of fighting a modern asymmetrical war is a fundamentally different decision than fighting a cleanly defined war was back then. Those wars seem to have died out with the Gulf War. You're not really making analogous sets of decisions. Their frame of reference for war back then was WW1; ours is Iraq - fundamentally different circumstances with fundamentally different impacts on society.

We ran whole units back in Poli Sci on the idea of the "syllogistic misperception" in international politics, which basically amounts to making bad decisions based on past situations that are perceived to be functionally similar. Vietnam is the big example of this "America has a bigger and more advanced military than Vietnam, America beat Japan in jungle fighting, America saved South Korea, so America MUST logically be able to hold South Vietnam against the North if we only try hard enough and apply the old tactics well enough".

For my final project, I specifically ran an analysis of this with regard to the Falklands War as to how the junta made the decision to invade - they did it from making the same kinds of deductive judgments regarding past British colonial policy (specifically the Suez Crisis of 1956), their perceived level of American support, and their perceived "toughness" in comparison to the British. all of these made sense in their heads, but the obsession with past parallels and precedents basically blinded them to the present realities. They were trying to use precedent and wishful thinking to argue their way out of reality, I suppose.
I guess that made me suspicious of the whole "history is cyclical and everything's the same as it always has been" school of thinking.

ANYWAYS THIS IS WW2

Yes, but that aid was very limited because the US was nominally neutral. PH resulted in the US joining the war, and thus, being able to step up the amount of aid given out.

Disagree. US destroyers were escorting convoys in the Atlantic before PH, and did exchange fire w/U-boats.

Which didn't really compare to the active efforts the US Navy and Air Force went to after the German declaration of war to actively hunt U-boats (although thattook forever to get working), nor did it compare to the intensification of Lend-Lease after the US was attacked.
The answer to the question of "was the US supplying the USSR/Britain?" being "yes, but in a limited way compared to what would come when war actually started" is still entirely correct.

Also, the destroyers-for-bases deal should not be overestimated in the Battle of the Atlantic.

IIRC from his books, Churchill said that the deal saved Britain from serious, WW1-level sub catastrophe for at least a few months.
I'll look up his exact words later.

What about Duke of Windsor, formerly King Edward VIII? Can we actually counted him as a Nazi sympathizer? Or it was just an act?

This is a really interesting question. There's a fascinating book called Princes At War that explores the issue of where exactly the Duke of Windsor's sympathies were (and goes into a lot of interesting detail about the Dukes of Gloucester and Kent, Edward's youngest surviving brothers, who are more obscure in America).
My belief was that the GErmans would likely have attempted to use Edward if they had actually seriously tried their hand at taking control of Britain. Whether Edward would consent to have been used in such a way is up for debate. His sympathizing was absolutely not an act - and when coupled with his absolutely fearsome sense of entitlement when it came to family matters, King George decided that he really couldn't risk allowing Edward to ever come back to Britain.

I doubt we'll ever find a smoking gun - like some sworn document from Edward to Hitler saying he'd be happy to help an invasion and be the puppet King - but the Royal Family thought that that was a serious risk, and a lot of high-up Germans thought it was a smashing idea.

[Goram]

Also, the destroyers-for-bases deal should not be overestimated in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Why not?

[The Two Jerseys]

I am always surprised that Joseph Kennedy doesn't get more criticism. He was a Nazi appeaser on a par with Neville Chamberlain.

Wasn't Henry Ford another sympathiser? Ah well I associate Kennedy with the Cold War and his assassination.

Wrong Kennedy. Joe Kennedy was JFK's father.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

Wasn't Henry Ford another sympathiser? Ah well I associate Kennedy with the Cold War and his assassination.

Wrong Kennedy. Joe Kennedy was JFK's father.

And Joe Jr. was JFK's ill-fated elder brother who died in a bizarre semi-suicide bombing mission over France.

[The Empire of Pretantia]

Wrong Kennedy. Joe Kennedy was JFK's father.

And Joe Jr. was JFK's ill-fated elder brother who died in a bizarre semi-suicide bombing mission over France.

And JFK had back problems.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

And Joe Jr. was JFK's ill-fated elder brother who died in a bizarre semi-suicide bombing mission over France.

And JFK had back problems.

(My connection was that they were both named Joe Kennedy. It wasn't an entirely random factoid, if that's your insinuation )

[The Empire of Pretantia]

And JFK had back problems.

(My connection was that they were both named Joe Kennedy. It wasn't an entirely random factoid, if that's your insinuation )

I insinuate nothing. I state nothing but the facts.

[The Krogan]

Yes, but that aid was very limited because the US was nominally neutral. PH resulted in the US joining the war, and thus, being able to step up the amount of aid given out.

Disagree. US destroyers were escorting convoys in the Atlantic before PH, and did exchange fire w/U-boats. Also, the destroyers-for-bases deal should not be overestimated in the Battle of the Atlantic. In fact, the US military increased a lot from when FDR got into office, building a very important core, including a peacetime draft, and quintupling the defence budget. Grant tanks didn't design themselves! Speaking of Grant tanks, Grants supplied through lend-lease (because the UK gov was broke) proved vital at El Alamein.

U.S. commitment to the Atlantic theater was basic at best, they focused most of their maritime resources to the Pacific theater, I think anyway, I do seem to remember reading there being some tensions in Navy command about this or something. Also they didn't adopt the use of convoy tactics for quite a while, thinking that solo ships spread out over a vast area would mean more would get through basically. They also didn't contribute destroyers to convoy protection during the earlier years of the war; that was left up to the Canadians and British to figure out.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

Disagree. US destroyers were escorting convoys in the Atlantic before PH, and did exchange fire w/U-boats. Also, the destroyers-for-bases deal should not be overestimated in the Battle of the Atlantic. In fact, the US military increased a lot from when FDR got into office, building a very important core, including a peacetime draft, and quintupling the defence budget. Grant tanks didn't design themselves! Speaking of Grant tanks, Grants supplied through lend-lease (because the UK gov was broke) proved vital at El Alamein.

U.S. commitment to the Atlantic theater was basic at best,

Uh...basic in comparison to what? The US wasn't even at war yet, so comparing their force commitments to Britain or Germany doesn't seem equitable.
And besides, given how US ships were sinking and being sunk by German U-boats for months in advance of war, I think it was safe to say that the US was doing all it reasonably could.

they focused most of their maritime resources to the Pacific theater, I think anyway, I do seem to remember reading there being some tensions in Navy command about this or something.

That was a part of a much bigger dispute about exactly where US priorities should be aligned - either in Europe or Asia. Europe was eventually picked because Germany was regarded as a more immediately dangerous threat than Japan, in addition to the need to ensure that Lend-Lease kept going to the USSR and Britain.

Also they didn't adopt the use of convoy tactics for quite a while, thinking that solo ships spread out over a vast area would mean more would get through basically. They also didn't contribute destroyers to convoy protection during the earlier years of the war; that was left up to the Canadians and British to figure out.

The convoy thing is basically true. it took both the British and Americans a long time to realize that centralization was the key to moving ships around, not leaving them to go it alone.
That second part is absolutely not true - US destroyers were escorting convoys long before the War even started, much less after. The first US warship sunk in WW2 was escorting Atlantic convoys.

[United Kingdom of Poland]

1. Well, as far as unwillingness to go to war with an entity hell bent on war against you, see the US and allies vs ISIS.

I don't see that as comparable whatsoever.
First, the Western Allies weren't launching drones strikes and more-or-less perpetual air campaigns against Germany in 1938. That's functionally indistuinguishable from war, these days.
Second, ISIS is not a nation-state, however much it pretends to be one. It has no capacity or interest in governing, not really, and the same sorts of diplomatic/military analogues that were present with Germany back then do not apply here.
Third, the prospect of fighting a modern asymmetrical war is a fundamentally different decision than fighting a cleanly defined war was back then. Those wars seem to have died out with the Gulf War. You're not really making analogous sets of decisions. Their frame of reference for war back then was WW1; ours is Iraq - fundamentally different circumstances with fundamentally different impacts on society.

We ran whole units back in Poli Sci on the idea of the "syllogistic misperception" in international politics, which basically amounts to making bad decisions based on past situations that are perceived to be functionally similar. Vietnam is the big example of this "America has a bigger and more advanced military than Vietnam, America beat Japan in jungle fighting, America saved South Korea, so America MUST logically be able to hold South Vietnam against the North if we only try hard enough and apply the old tactics well enough".

For my final project, I specifically ran an analysis of this with regard to the Falklands War as to how the junta made the decision to invade - they did it from making the same kinds of deductive judgments regarding past British colonial policy (specifically the Suez Crisis of 1956), their perceived level of American support, and their perceived "toughness" in comparison to the British. all of these made sense in their heads, but the obsession with past parallels and precedents basically blinded them to the present realities. They were trying to use precedent and wishful thinking to argue their way out of reality, I suppose.
I guess that made me suspicious of the whole "history is cyclical and everything's the same as it always has been" school of thinking.

ANYWAYS THIS IS WW2

Disagree. US destroyers were escorting convoys in the Atlantic before PH, and did exchange fire w/U-boats.

Which didn't really compare to the active efforts the US Navy and Air Force went to after the German declaration of war to actively hunt U-boats (although thattook forever to get working), nor did it compare to the intensification of Lend-Lease after the US was attacked.
The answer to the question of "was the US supplying the USSR/Britain?" being "yes, but in a limited way compared to what would come when war actually started" is still entirely correct.

Also, the destroyers-for-bases deal should not be overestimated in the Battle of the Atlantic.

IIRC from his books, Churchill said that the deal saved Britain from serious, WW1-level sub catastrophe for at least a few months.
I'll look up his exact words later.

What about Duke of Windsor, formerly King Edward VIII? Can we actually counted him as a Nazi sympathizer? Or it was just an act?

This is a really interesting question. There's a fascinating book called Princes At War that explores the issue of where exactly the Duke of Windsor's sympathies were (and goes into a lot of interesting detail about the Dukes of Gloucester and Kent, Edward's youngest surviving brothers, who are more obscure in America).
My belief was that the GErmans would likely have attempted to use Edward if they had actually seriously tried their hand at taking control of Britain. Whether Edward would consent to have been used in such a way is up for debate. His sympathizing was absolutely not an act - and when coupled with his absolutely fearsome sense of entitlement when it came to family matters, King George decided that he really couldn't risk allowing Edward to ever come back to Britain.

I doubt we'll ever find a smoking gun - like some sworn document from Edward to Hitler saying he'd be happy to help an invasion and be the puppet King - but the Royal Family thought that that was a serious risk, and a lot of high-up Germans thought it was a smashing idea.

I wouldn't go that far on the destroyers. If I'm not mistaken weren't most of them derelict hulks that could basically thank this deal for saving them from the scrap yard.

[Grenartia]

1. Well, as far as unwillingness to go to war with an entity hell bent on war against you, see the US and allies vs ISIS.

I don't see that as comparable whatsoever.
First, the Western Allies weren't launching drones strikes and more-or-less perpetual air campaigns against Germany in 1938. That's functionally indistuinguishable from war, these days.
Second, ISIS is not a nation-state, however much it pretends to be one. It has no capacity or interest in governing, not really, and the same sorts of diplomatic/military analogues that were present with Germany back then do not apply here.
Third, the prospect of fighting a modern asymmetrical war is a fundamentally different decision than fighting a cleanly defined war was back then. Those wars seem to have died out with the Gulf War. You're not really making analogous sets of decisions. Their frame of reference for war back then was WW1; ours is Iraq - fundamentally different circumstances with fundamentally different impacts on society.

We ran whole units back in Poli Sci on the idea of the "syllogistic misperception" in international politics, which basically amounts to making bad decisions based on past situations that are perceived to be functionally similar. Vietnam is the big example of this "America has a bigger and more advanced military than Vietnam, America beat Japan in jungle fighting, America saved South Korea, so America MUST logically be able to hold South Vietnam against the North if we only try hard enough and apply the old tactics well enough".

For my final project, I specifically ran an analysis of this with regard to the Falklands War as to how the junta made the decision to invade - they did it from making the same kinds of deductive judgments regarding past British colonial policy (specifically the Suez Crisis of 1956), their perceived level of American support, and their perceived "toughness" in comparison to the British. all of these made sense in their heads, but the obsession with past parallels and precedents basically blinded them to the present realities. They were trying to use precedent and wishful thinking to argue their way out of reality, I suppose.
I guess that made me suspicious of the whole "history is cyclical and everything's the same as it always has been" school of thinking.

ANYWAYS THIS IS WW2

I hereby consider myself Tiggered.

[Goram]

Disagree. US destroyers were escorting convoys in the Atlantic before PH, and did exchange fire w/U-boats.

Which didn't really compare to the active efforts the US Navy and Air Force went to after the German declaration of war to actively hunt U-boats (although thattook forever to get working), nor did it compare to the intensification of Lend-Lease after the US was attacked.
The answer to the question of "was the US supplying the USSR/Britain?" being "yes, but in a limited way compared to what would come when war actually started" is still entirely correct.

Also, the destroyers-for-bases deal should not be overestimated in the Battle of the Atlantic.

IIRC from his books, Churchill said that the deal saved Britain from serious, WW1-level sub catastrophe for at least a few months.
I'll look up his exact words later.

What about Duke of Windsor, formerly King Edward VIII? Can we actually counted him as a Nazi sympathizer? Or it was just an act?

This is a really interesting question. There's a fascinating book called Princes At War that explores the issue of where exactly the Duke of Windsor's sympathies were (and goes into a lot of interesting detail about the Dukes of Gloucester and Kent, Edward's youngest surviving brothers, who are more obscure in America).
My belief was that the GErmans would likely have attempted to use Edward if they had actually seriously tried their hand at taking control of Britain. Whether Edward would consent to have been used in such a way is up for debate. His sympathizing was absolutely not an act - and when coupled with his absolutely fearsome sense of entitlement when it came to family matters, King George decided that he really couldn't risk allowing Edward to ever come back to Britain.

I doubt we'll ever find a smoking gun - like some sworn document from Edward to Hitler saying he'd be happy to help an invasion and be the puppet King - but the Royal Family thought that that was a serious risk, and a lot of high-up Germans thought it was a smashing idea.

I've always been under the impression that Edward was reasonably pro-German, and was certainly seen as being pro-German by the Germans. I remember reading in some book somewhere, admittedly some time ago, that Speer considered Edward's abdication to be quite a blow Germany as he thought it would worsen Anglo-German relations. The Americans were worried about it, enough to have surveillance on him whenever he was on US soil. Some of the stuff he said post-war also seems a bit dodgy. He denied being Pro-Nazi in his autobiography though, going so far as to bash Hitler. Mind you, he published it after the war so he's hardly likely to say "Oh yes, that Hitler was a decent chap".

As you say, there'll be no smoking gun. Unless there's something in Royal Archive that's not been released to the public yet. We shall have to wait and see.

About the destroyers, the fact that it's Churchill saying that they saved Britain from a WWI style catastrophe really is a bit telling. It took four months to negotiate the deal, and Churchill was a driving force behind it - even if he wasn't keen on the overall idea of swapping British bases for obsolete American destroyers. Given how invested in the negotiations he was, he's hardly likely to go "yeah, bit of a shit deal really" after the war. He had a legacy to build, after all. Personally, I don't see how the deal saved Britain at all. These were fifty ships (although you could make the argument that the navy was short of escorts and something is better than nothing), that were obsolete and in pretty bad nick. I'd say that the only real importance of trading fifty ships for British bases in the Caribbean was to set the ground work for Lend-Lease.

[Seraven]

I found a link to the news that Edward was, if he's still a king and being supportive to Nazi, would let Nazi to bombed Britain and then blame the bombing to "Jews and Reds".

But I decided to not posting it since it was from RT, which was labeled as kind of Russian propaganda news, though not all of RT are for propaganda.

http://www.rt.com/uk/265951-nazi-sympathizer-king-uk/

But it was researched by UK-German based Karina Urbach.

[L Ron Cupboard]

I am always surprised that Joseph Kennedy doesn't get more criticism. He was a Nazi appeaser on a par with Neville Chamberlain.

SNIP

My post was about Joe Kennedy, your post ignores him entirely.

[Goram]

SNIP

My post was about Joe Kennedy, your post ignores him entirely.

Yup. Because I'm British and know bugger all about US diplomats. British PMs and their post-war legacy/misconceptions on the other hand...

[Costa Fierro]

Do you all remember the Battles of Khalkhin Gol in the battle event during the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars? If only the Soviets invaded Japan's possessions in China and Korea early..things will change.

Why? The Soviets weren't interested in a war with Japan and vice versa. The Japanese were content committing crimes against humanity in China and the Soviets were quite happy being slaughtered by the thousand in Finland.

[The Conez Imperium]

EDIT: Also, someone was talking about the most important battle of WWII. I'll see your Stalinngrad and raise you one Battle of the Atlantic/Artic naval operations.

I'm going to have to say Battle of Moscow.

It was the first German defeat of this large scale, and forced them to change from an offensive to a stationary positional front, which ended up being their downfall. Majin Germany did not have the resource or logistical capabilities to fight a war longer than a single summer season, which Moscow provided.

As a Redditor argued

Personally, I'd say they won the war at Kurks, or perhaps at Bagration.

Barbarossa destroyed the German ability to make a front-wide strategic offensive.

Fall Blau (including Stalingrad) destroyed the German ability to make a grand strategic offensive.

Kursk destroyed the German ability to make a strategic offensive.

Bagration destroyed the German ability to make a strategic defence.

I think that's an interesting interpretation.

[Costa Fierro]

I'm going to have to say Battle of Moscow.

It was the first German defeat of this large scale, and forced them to change from an offensive to a stationary positional front, which ended up being their downfall. Majin Germany did not have the resource or logistical capabilities to fight a war longer than a single summer season, which Moscow provided.

As a Redditor argued

Personally, I'd say they won the war at Kurks, or perhaps at Bagration.

Barbarossa destroyed the German ability to make a front-wide strategic offensive.

Fall Blau (including Stalingrad) destroyed the German ability to make a grand strategic offensive.

Kursk destroyed the German ability to make a strategic offensive.

Bagration destroyed the German ability to make a strategic defence.

I think that's an interesting interpretation.

Well, when you think about it, Barbarossa really didn't achieve what it was set out to do, which was destroy the Soviet Union. The German High Command hadn't prepared an invasion of that scale and across such a vast front at that point...the Battle for France was the largest German invasion and the largest German engagement prior to Barbarossa. It could be argued that Barbarossa showed the weakness in the German planning, although I personally think it just boils down to German arrogance more than anything.

Of course, Hitler's increased interference in German strategic planning pretty much ended all hopes of the Nazis having an effective high command system that wasn't overridden by Hitler's increasingly inane and downright moronic orders and selection of strategic targets.

It's interesting though that the Redditor claimed that Fall Blau and Stalingrad destroyed the German ability to make a grand strategic offensive. I would put the blame not on the planning but on the insistence of Hitler to attack Stalingrad rather than concentrate the biggest push south towards the Caucasus and the oilfields beyond. The only planning blunder the German commanders made was relying on the Romanians to hold the flanks rather than putting German forces on the flanks.