Hindenburgia wrote:Talonis wrote:'twould mean as it says. If the commerce passes state borders, it is by definition interstate.
It didn't go into ninety pages of specifications because that would've been hell for those making it, and they knew they couldn't anticipate every mode of moving object X from point A to B. Heck, we've got atomic teleporters now, and who saw that coming in 1776?
Except that is not a sufficiently precise interpretation of it. Take the following cases, which I am getting from here:Congress passes a law prohibiting ships carrying explosives from traveling a short stretch of the Mississippi. Although the restricted portion of the river is entirely within a single state, Congress may regulate this channel of interstate commerce in accordance with the Commerce Clause.The commerce never passed a state border, yet it still falls well within Congress's power to regulate the "channels of interstate commerce" as the site puts it.Imagine that Congress, relying on its Commerce Clause powers, establishes the National Vehicle Testing Service (NVTS) and empowers it to “regulate and enforce vehicular safety measures.” After determining that the driving conditions in Colorado were unique to the nation, given the annual snowfall levels, NVTS passes a regulation requiring all vehicles in Colorado be equipped with snow tires year-round. Even if a car is manufactured entirely within Colorado and used exclusively in the state, the NVTS regulation would apply to that vehicle and would be valid under the Commerce Clause.Again, the commerce never passed a border, yet I'd doubt you'd say Congress doesn't have the power to do this. The site refers to this as regulation of the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce".
That which the site refers to as "articles of interstate commerce" would explicitly fall under your definition.
Now, there is one more category that Congress is recognized as being able to regulate under the commerce clause. The site I used earlier refers to this as the regulation of "activities which have a substantial effect on interstate commerce". Pulling from this page:In 1824 the Supreme Court decided its first major Commerce Clause case in Gibbons v. Ogden 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). Gibbons and Ogden were competitors both operating steamboats which ran from New York to New Jersey. Ogden was granted a monopoly by the New York legislature and requested, and was issued, an injunction from the state of New York against Gibbons’ competing steamboat business. The Supreme Court found the injunction was invalid because it conflicted with a federal statute. The authority for the federal statute itself came from the Commerce Clause. The case is important because the New York injunction was not to be enforced in any state other than New York, and so it might appear that the federal statute here should not reach into the state. The Court found, however, that the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to pass acts which would have an effect within a single state so long as the activity regulated had some commercial connection with another state. Otherwise, Congressional power to act in some cases would be only illusory, as a state could prevent a federal law from having full force and effect.
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Crucial here are the words "substantial relation," as we are now on the verge of a rule of law: When intrastate commerce has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, Congress may regulate the activity pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
EXAMPLE: Frank operates a fireworks store in Southernstate. The fireworks he purchases from his suppliers are made entirely within Southernstate from materials found locally in the state. Despite the modern trend toward even the smallest of shop owners selling online across state lines, Frank sells only from his storefront. In other words, everything Frank does is intrastate. In an effort to end the increasingly heated price war among fireworks retailers, Congress passes a law establishing minimum prices for fireworks. Frank is fined for violating the law, and defends himself claiming the law exceeds Congress’ constitutional powers as the activity regulated is entirely intrastate.
What would be the result in the Frank’s Fireworks case above? The view taken by the Court today would be that Congress is fully within the bounds of the Commerce Clause.
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In NLRB the Court found Commerce Clause power to regulate the unfair labor practices of Jones & Laughlin Steel which manufactured steel and iron in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, employing approximately 10,000 workers at that location. Jones & Laughlin also owned mines in two other states and shipped “a large portion of its finished product across state lines.” The Court noted “the principle that an industrial dispute having the necessary effect of substantially burdening commerce would be within the control power of Congress,” and that “the scope of the control power extends to recurring evils which in their totality constitute a burden on interstate commerce.”
In NLRB both principles apply. First, a strike or other industrial dispute involving the 10,000 workers at this steel plant could surely have an effect on interstate commerce. Second, the “recurring evils” of the unfair practices, even absent a major dispute, would have a cumulative effect. Similarly, returning to Frank’s Fireworks; if enough individuals were to sell fireworks the way Frank does, there would be a cumulative effect on interstate commerce, even though each participant is engaging in solely intrastate business.
EXAMPLE: Frank’s Fireworks has been thriving for the past two years. People from nearby Southeasternstate have started stopping by his Spark Shack on their way through Southernstate. In addition, Other fireworks shops in Southernstate and Southeasternstate have started to use Frank’s business model and sell only locally produced fireworks in an effort to sidestep federal legislation. Clearly, at some point, this intrastate activity will affect interstate sales of fireworks by those who comply with the federal law. The intrastate activity can be regulated as a means of enforcing the federal statute.
Which finally concludes with:From Lopez and Morrison we can finally glimpse a somewhat reliable rule of law as it stands today: The Commerce Clause will support federal regulation of commercial or economic activity which has a substantial effect on interstate commerce or which in the aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but the effects of noneconomic activity can not be aggregated this way in order to fall under Commerce Clause power.
EXAMPLE: Following extensive studies, Congress finds that the high-powered dryers used by many hair salons emit harmful gases which exacerbate people’s allergies, causing them to travel less frequently to certain areas of the country where their increasingly-sensitive allergies are affected. In response, Congress passes a law under which every hair salon will be limited in the amount of time they run their dryers any given month. Because the activity is certainly within the meaning of “commerce,” and because in the aggregate the activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, this statute would likely be upheld.
EXAMPLE: In a shocking discovery, a Congressional study shows that high-school students are favorably impacted by the clothes their teachers wear and often seek to copy them. Equally surprisingly, the study found that an inordinate number of high-school teachers wear imported European designer clothing. The study found that this has had a significant effect on the interstate sales of American made clothing. In an effort to reverse this harmful effect on the American clothing industry, Congress enacts a statute banning all teachers from wearing imported clothing. Although the aggregate effect on interstate commerce is substantial, and although there is a commercial activity involved at a certain level (the teachers must buy the clothes at some point), the activity itself of wearing the clothes is noncommercial, and the statute is too similar to Lopez and Morrison to be upheld.
Your definition doesn't address these aspects either way, so it would require further interpretation. This is the case with the rest of the US Constitution, too - the document itself was intended to be short and simple enough for the average person to find it comprehensible (something which was/is not the case for most other countries, both then and now), with the trade-off being that it would need extensive interpretation to work in practice. This is why the Supreme Court was given the task of interpreting it.
Those aren't powers given to the federal government, those are overreaches by the federal government into things over which it was never given legal authority.
