Self-ownership

[Arkolon]

He could have written an infinite different number of things. Because he wrote that, does that mean that that was his destiny? Was there another external mind that made that decision for him? If not, then it was free will.

No, he couldn't have

Before the action.

because he didn't write anything else

After the action.

See: how time works.

[Arkolon]

Eenie-meenie-miney-mo is predictable. If you start with A for "eenie", you will end up with D. If you start with B, you will have A, and so on. If I start the rhyme on A, then D, then C, then A, then B, etc, then I will continuously yield different results (assuming a choice of one of 4 cookies an hour)

Except that just means you are picking the cookie that is three to the left of the cookie you are to eat, rather than the cookie itself, and the replica still picks the same starting cookie as you.

No. If the replica does exactly everything I do, then it is me. The only way a replica brain could take the same cookies every single time as the real brain is if a) the brain is very, very lucky or b) it's the same person. If b, and there's a 99.9% chance it is, then you argument is invalid, because another "me" is still a "me", so it would still be my choice.

Come on, you're being ridiculous now. I feel like you're arguing just for the sake of arguing. This isn't even about self-ownership anymore. Would you care to start a thread yourself to prevent this one from being locked? I'll meet you there.

It's actually very much on topic. A large part of your argument for self-ownership appears to rest on the fact that people have free will (am I mistaken on this?). The whole point of the line of discussion was to establish that free will doesn't exist in the manner you require.

Actually, no, you're wrong again. You are, indeed, very mistaken. This thread is about proving the hylomorphic defense behind self-ownership, and has absolutely nothing to do with either free will or deterministic causality.

[Arkolon]

That's good, as it means I didn't wrongly describe hylomorphism. Hylomorphism is the idea of "relative matter", and that some things are made from others, but not all things are made from the very same thing. X is made of Y, but Z is not made of Y, and so on. The idea of property over the self comes more from Locke, and hylomorphism is an introduction into a bigger defense of Lockean self-ownership. Of course hylomorphism doesn't require minds. Ownership requires minds.

then we get back to why this is true and what a mind is.

A mind is that which can think; which can realise that one is self-aware.

For what to be true?

why A is X is A is made from X.
a chicken is made from an egg but an egg is not a chicken.

A chicken is not made up of eggs.

[Zottistan]

No. That doesn't follow at all. Your own mind is bound by causality. It was inevitable that you would decide to be "cheeseball" instead.

I never said there was an external mind, Strawman-maker.

That constitutes a choice. I had the choice to move my fingers to type whatever it was I typed. My fingers moved because of the reaction to stimuli caused elsewhere in the body, all originating in the brain, but what do you think caused the first domino to fall? Does it just happen magically? I had the free will to type what I typed, or anything else I could have typed.

The dominoes in the body were toppled by the dominoes in the brain. The dominoes in the brain were toppled by the dominoes in the sensory organs. The dominoes in the sensory organs were toppled by the dominoes in the external world. The dominoes in the external world have been toppling eachother and toppled by eachother as long as there have been things happening.

[Arkolon]

The situation is self-aware?

Where did I say that?

[...] there [...] exists a system that has total knowledge of that situation: the situation itself.

Does the situation know it "is"?

[Zottistan]

Except that just means you are picking the cookie that is three to the left of the cookie you are to eat, rather than the cookie itself, and the replica still picks the same starting cookie as you.

No. If the replica does exactly everything I do, then it is me. The only way a replica brain could take the same cookies every single time as the real brain is if a) the brain is very, very lucky or b) it's the same person. If b, and there's a 99.9% chance it is, then you argument is invalid, because another "me" is still a "me", so it would still be my choice.

If the replica is actually a replica, then yes, it is basically a you outside of you. An exact copy of you including the state of your brain and the situation you are in.

If you acknowledge that another you will always make the same choices as you, you're basically acknowledging that all your choices are predetermined and not based on free agency.

[Zottistan]

Where did I say that?

[...] there [...] exists a system that has total knowledge of that situation: the situation itself.

Does the situation know it "is"?

"Knowledge" in this context obviously referring to 100% accurate data about everything in the system.

[Arkolon]

Give me a choice between two identical cookies. One to my right, and one to my left. I have to pick one. This is still my brain reacting to stimuli, and I accept that, but because there was no external force or mind making me take one particular cookies, there is a choice, and it is entirely up to me.

Give your brain the exact same choice between the exact same cookies, while it's in the exact same state, and it will choose the same cookie every time without fail. How could it not? It's processing the same information in the same way.

http://www.random.org/

From 1-100
First roll: 59
Second roll: 92

The source code has not changed even a single parenthesis, and yet there is still a 1/10,000 chance that the two numbers were the same.

[Arkolon]

No, it could not. If I get you to choose between five different identical cookies once every hour for 16 hours, the cookies are, 100%, your free will and of your own choice. That's 152.6 million different patterns you can take, through sixteen different sets of cookies A, B, C, D, and E, but knowing exactly which cookies someone could take? Are you into palmistry and crystal balls, too?

If I could view the state of your brain before every choice, I'd be able to predict which cookie you'd choose every time.

If I knew you were peeking, I would change my choice. How would you even view the state of my brain? What would you use? I feel like you're relying on "If I knew what you were going to pick, then I'd know what you'd pick", which is true, sure, but ridiculous.

[Arkolon]

That constitutes a choice. I had the choice to move my fingers to type whatever it was I typed. My fingers moved because of the reaction to stimuli caused elsewhere in the body, all originating in the brain, but what do you think caused the first domino to fall? Does it just happen magically? I had the free will to type what I typed, or anything else I could have typed.

The dominoes in the body were toppled by the dominoes in the brain. The dominoes in the brain were toppled by the dominoes in the sensory organs. The dominoes in the sensory organs were toppled by the dominoes in the external world. The dominoes in the external world have been toppling eachother and toppled by eachother as long as there have been things happening.

Can you tell the future?

[Zottistan]

If I could view the state of your brain before every choice, I'd be able to predict which cookie you'd choose every time.

If I knew you were peeking, I would change my choice. How would you even view the state of my brain? What would you use? I feel like you're relying on "If I knew what you were going to pick, then I'd know what you'd pick", which is true, sure, but ridiculous.

It doesn't matter how ludicrous it is. It's true. If I knew you knew I was peeking and were going to change your choice, which I would if I knew the state of your brain, I'd know which you'd pick. If you were going to try to trick me by choosing the one you were originally going to choose, I'd be able to predict that, too, because I'd be able to predict everything you were thinking.

[Arkolon]

No. If the replica does exactly everything I do, then it is me. The only way a replica brain could take the same cookies every single time as the real brain is if a) the brain is very, very lucky or b) it's the same person. If b, and there's a 99.9% chance it is, then you argument is invalid, because another "me" is still a "me", so it would still be my choice.

If the replica is actually a replica, then yes, it is basically a you outside of you. An exact copy of you including the state of your brain and the situation you are in.

If you acknowledge that another you will always make the same choices as you, you're basically acknowledging that all your choices are predetermined and not based on free agency.

Input: X
Formula: output = input
Output: X

By whom is the input decided? Input, by the way, is me, and output is the replica brain.

[Arkolon]

If I knew you were peeking, I would change my choice. How would you even view the state of my brain? What would you use? I feel like you're relying on "If I knew what you were going to pick, then I'd know what you'd pick", which is true, sure, but ridiculous.

It doesn't matter how ludicrous it is. It's true. If I knew you knew I was peeking and were going to change your choice, which I would if I knew the state of your brain, I'd know which you'd pick. If you were going to try to trick me by choosing the one you were originally going to choose, I'd be able to predict that, too, because I'd be able to predict everything you were thinking.

1. X is X
2. X
3. Therefore X

What have you proved? What are you trying to say?

[Zottistan]

Give your brain the exact same choice between the exact same cookies, while it's in the exact same state, and it will choose the same cookie every time without fail. How could it not? It's processing the same information in the same way.

http://www.random.org/

From 1-100
First roll: 59
Second roll: 92

The source code has not changed even a single parenthesis, and yet there is still a 1/10,000 chance that the two numbers were the same.

Because it's processing different information. It's based on atmospheric noise.

[Zottistan]

The dominoes in the body were toppled by the dominoes in the brain. The dominoes in the brain were toppled by the dominoes in the sensory organs. The dominoes in the sensory organs were toppled by the dominoes in the external world. The dominoes in the external world have been toppling eachother and toppled by eachother as long as there have been things happening.

Can you tell the future?

If I knew the position of every particle in the universe and had a beyond ridiculous mathematical faculty, I could. If we ignore quantum mechanics.

[Arkolon]

http://www.random.org/

From 1-100
First roll: 59
Second roll: 92

The source code has not changed even a single parenthesis, and yet there is still a 1/10,000 chance that the two numbers were the same.

Because it's processing different information. It's based on atmospheric noise.

random() is random.

[Zottistan]

If the replica is actually a replica, then yes, it is basically a you outside of you. An exact copy of you including the state of your brain and the situation you are in.

If you acknowledge that another you will always make the same choices as you, you're basically acknowledging that all your choices are predetermined and not based on free agency.

Input: X
Formula: output = input
Output: X

By whom is the input decided? Input, by the way, is me, and output is the replica brain.

I don't get it. You just said the input was you.

[Arkolon]

Can you tell the future?

If I knew the position of every particle in the universe and had a beyond ridiculous mathematical faculty, I could. If we ignore quantum mechanics.

Doesn't an illusion of free will not function in the same way as actual free will? The impossibility of telling the future is close enough to 100% to be ignored.

[Zottistan]

It doesn't matter how ludicrous it is. It's true. If I knew you knew I was peeking and were going to change your choice, which I would if I knew the state of your brain, I'd know which you'd pick. If you were going to try to trick me by choosing the one you were originally going to choose, I'd be able to predict that, too, because I'd be able to predict everything you were thinking.

1. X is X
2. X
3. Therefore X

What have you proved? What are you trying to say?

That your thoughts and choices are inevitable reactions to stimuli that has been hypothetically predictable since the start of time.

[Arkolon]

Input: X
Formula: output = input
Output: X

By whom is the input decided? Input, by the way, is me, and output is the replica brain.

I don't get it. You just said the input was you.

Your entire argument is circular. Of course that, if we use that formula, output will always equal input. You have proved absolutely nothing.

[Zottistan]

Because it's processing different information. It's based on atmospheric noise.

random() is random.

Atmospheric noise is not random.

[Twilight Imperium]

Can you tell the future?

If I knew the position of every particle in the universe and had a beyond ridiculous mathematical faculty, I could. If we ignore quantum mechanics.

That's ridiculous, though. It's like saying you could walk to the Sun if you could ignore gravity, heat tolerance, and the lack of air in space.

You don't get to handwave away something that basic to prove your points.

[Zottistan]

If I knew the position of every particle in the universe and had a beyond ridiculous mathematical faculty, I could. If we ignore quantum mechanics.

Doesn't an illusion of free will not function in the same way as actual free will? The impossibility of telling the future is close enough to 100% to be ignored.

The illusion of free will has the same real-world applications of actual free will. But it isn't actual free will.

[Zottistan]

If I knew the position of every particle in the universe and had a beyond ridiculous mathematical faculty, I could. If we ignore quantum mechanics.

That's ridiculous, though. It's like saying you could walk to the Sun if you could ignore gravity, heat tolerance, and the lack of air in space.

You don't get to handwave away something that basic to prove your points.

Unless free will is based on influencing quantum mechanics, which is really, really unlikely, the point stands.

[Zottistan]

I don't get it. You just said the input was you.

Your entire argument is circular. Of course that, if we use that formula, output will always equal input. You have proved absolutely nothing.

The entire argument is that two brains in identical states will act in the same way. How could they not?