Would Germany have won the war if Hitler did not invade Rus

[Zakuvia]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the only reason Germany lost to Russia was because Hitler got scared (or greedy) and forgot Napoleons law? Never fight the Vodkastanians in Winter.

[Breadknife]

Again, no. Aside from the fact that German amphibious landing craft wasn't capable of such long distances, the notion alone - that an invasion fleet with millions of troops could have traveled all the way up to Scotland unnoticed by the British home fleet - is absurd.

And look at a terrain map of the UK. Zoom in on Scotland. Oh dear. There's a reason why the Clans held out so long against the English and even lowland Scottish forces sent against them.

Landing anywhere beyond Berwick would give problems. Aberdeen landings could have led down to Glasgow and round to Edinburgh, but with a few pinches (sticking to the coast through Stonehaven, and then there's Sterling). Inverness? Pfah! Wick or Thurso? Assuming the attackers get a foothold (unlikely, but let us fly that particular fancy for a moment), then what do they then do with the whole Great Glen acting as a barrier to further progress? (I'm not even going to consider the West Coast or the various Isles. At worst, to the UK and its war efforts, you get a Channel Islands situation, which might have shut down some of the Shetland Bus missions.)

I'm not entirely sure what personnel were there, in the war, but especially in the Borders (I'm vastly more familiar with there than the extreme north) I can point you at some WW2-era defensive positions, now blended into the landscape, that I wouldn't have wanted to come up against as an invading (or even invaded) force trying to traverse the area, even if it was 'just' gamekeepers, ghillies and fishermen answering the call to resist the enemy. (And either they or the 'others' in the vicinity would almost certainly have been Home Guard battalion 201, or their ilk!)

(There's even substantial pillbox defences sighted high up in the Welsh hills, I know from various sojourns down that way, which might make for an even more nonsensical place for an ambibious landing. Imagine by-pasng Cornwall (for obvious coastal difficulties) and perhaps going through the St George's Channel (or coming in from the top end, into the Irish Sea, waving at the foreign nationals interned in the Manx holiday camps, on the way past), landing anywhere from Aberystwyth to Llanelli and then having to cross the Beacons/etc to get anywhere sensible. It was a horrible tactical decision for the napoleonic French (not helped in that they got scared off by Welsh women), but with mid-20thC war-prepared Britain it would have been a meatgrinder...)

[Lemanrussland]

I do not think so. Why then sign a treaty with Germany to split Poland between themselves. In reality, the Russians just wanted there old territories back and a buffer zone between themselves and the rest of Europe.

no, stalin was getting ready for an attack. That's part of the reason his troops demolished in the opening stages of Barbarossa. his troops were caught out in offensive formations.

I disagree with this view (basically peddled by one man, Suvorov), it has very little in the way of an evidentiary basis, and rests mostly on weak circumstantial evidence. Stalin forward deployed his troops out of the Stalin line, because he wanted to make better use of the territories he had worked to obtain throughout 1939, 1940, and 1941. This caused problems. They were too far forward deployed from their supply dumps and centers of communication, and were close enough that any attack by fast maneuvering German forces would certainly result in them being outflanked and enveloped. Stalin however had filled the officer corps with politically pliable yes men, who dared not question any of his orders, and thus he wasn't exposed to much serious criticism by his officers.

Another point which causes people to assume that the Soviets were preparing to attack was their political and doctrinal bias to offensive warfare. This had existed throughout the 30s, and was mostly based on the works of people like Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Vladimir Triandafillov, who wrote extensively on the economic necessity of an offensive oriented doctrine, based on deep striking attacks and maneuver, which sought to facilitate a "simultaneous blow throughout the entire depth of the enemy's operational defense", using a combination of mechanized exploitation forces and air forces (including airborne forces). They theorized that the Soviet Union was not economically capable of supporting an attritional war. This doctrinal bias for attack is not really solid proof of an intent by Stalin to attack Germany in 1941 (despite what Suvorov would have you believe).

I think his opinions are more due to his political stance (he's an ardent anti-Communist), rather than any real academic position. His books are not very well cited (his original was not even cited at all, until people complained enough, and then he made a half-assed attempt to back up his fantastic claims) and full of factual errors (example, he claimed conscription was only started in 1939, when it had been instituted since 1925; he also claimed the A-40 was developed as part of Stalin's offensive plans, despite development on that tank only starting in December 1941).

He basically tried to shift the blame for the war from the Nazis to the Soviets (whom he hated).

[Breadknife]

Well quite and yes. You point being what exactly? Misunderstanding the reality? Enigma? The fucking Poles broke Enigma 19 fucking 32...fucks sake save me from fucking amateurs.

Probably already dealt with (if anyone bothered to reply to your unwarranted profanity), but the Poles do indeed get credit for getting a handle on Enigma, but you can't just "crack it once, and read it forever more" with changing daily codes. That's why BP needed the "Bombe-racks" to help speed up the clever people who were good at crosswords, amongst other things. (Especially once additional rotors/etc were added, supposedly making things a lot more complicated, though you've also got people silly enough to stick to formulaic phrasing in the "weather code" messages.)

[Breadknife]

All I'm reading here is a bunch of whining. Boo fucking hoo.

(Your flag does not match your posting style. You might want to change one or other of them.)

[United Kingdom of Poland]

no, stalin was getting ready for an attack. That's part of the reason his troops demolished in the opening stages of Barbarossa. his troops were caught out in offensive formations.

I disagree with this view (basically peddled by one man, Suvorov), it has very little in the way of an evidentiary basis, and rests mostly on weak circumstantial evidence. Stalin forward deployed his troops out of the Stalin line, because he wanted to make better use of the territories he had worked to obtain throughout 1939, 1940, and 1941. This caused problems. They were too far forward deployed from their supply dumps and centers of communication, and were close enough that any attack by fast maneuvering German forces would certainly result in them being outflanked and enveloped. Stalin however had filled the officer corps with politically pliable yes men, who dared not question any of his orders, and wasn't exposed to much serious criticism by his officers.

Another point which causes people to assume that the Soviets were preparing to attack was their political and doctrinal bias to offensive warfare. This had existed throughout the 30s, and was mostly based on the works of people like Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Vladimir Triandafillov, who wrote extensively on the economic necessity of an offensive oriented doctrine, based on deep striking attacks and maneuver, which sought to facilitate a "simultaneous blow throughout the entire depth of the enemy's operational defense", using a combination of mechanized exploitation forces and air forces (including airborne forces). They theorized that the Soviet Union was not economically capable of supporting an attritional war. This doctrinal bias for attack is not really solid proof of an intent by Stalin to attack Germany in 1941 (despite what Suvorov would have you believe).

I think his opinions are more due to his political stance (he's an ardent anti-Communist), rather than any real academic position. His books are not very well cited (his original was not even cited at all, until people complained enough, and then he made a half-assed attempt to back up his fantastic claims) and full of factual errors (example, he claimed conscription was only started in 1939, when it had been instituted since 1925; he also claimed the A-40 was developed as part of Stalin's offensive plans, despite development on that tank only starting in December 1941).

He basically tried to shift the blame for the war from the Nazis to the Soviets (whom he hated).

yes 41 is laughable but from a psychological standpoint &historical standpoint the idea of the two keeping that pact is a very big stretch.
Hitler and Stalin are almost duplicates of each other psychologically, being both power hungry and paranoid (in Stalin's case being a borderline schizophrenic) Stalin was also to be frank, an opportunistic bastard. He only invaded Poland after it was clear to even the poles that they had lost, only attacked Japan after US/commonwealth forces had all but dropped the atomic bombs, and was more then willing to conveniently develop "supply problems whenever the came near a major resistance area (see the Warsaw uprising). Even the Pact itself only came about after the western allies had rejected Stalin's attempts to be allies with them. The pact was born only out of convenience for Germany (who wanted to avoid a two front war at that stage of the game) and out of desperation for the Soviets (who had their backs to a the wall diplomatically speaking) the result was that neither one trusted the other any farther then their bombers could reach. the eastern front was going to happen, Stalin would have ultimately would have invaded out of paranoia and Hitler never really considered the pact to be anything other then a stopgap to keep the Soviets at bay.

[Costa Alegria]

Well there is also that the Germans would have control of the only access point into the Med from the Atlantic.

Depends on whether or not the Spanish would have allowed German troops to get there in the first place. Franco was sympathetic to Hitler and Mussolini for their assistance during the Civil War, but I don't think he'd wanted to have risked allowing German troops into Spain to attack Gibraltar, as much as he would have liked to. But I doubt Gibraltar would have come under Axis attack or even occupation even in an alternate reality.

Meaning that the UK and her allies would have been faced with a huge problem of supporting the British Army in Egypt.

Well not exactly. The British still had control over the Suez and some control over the Indian Ocean meaning it could have supplied an army with foodstuffs and material from Australia and bolstered troop numbers with fresh troops from the Middle East.

With Malta under German control....which would have been a lot easier to accomplish without British convoys supporting the island, the air war might have been a decisive factor in the North African campaigns.

Malta under Axis control would have given the Royal Navy some difficulties in operating in the Med. They'd have been able to carry out limited raids, assuming of course the Italians had picked up the courage to use their naval force more than they did.

[Lemanrussland]

I disagree with this view (basically peddled by one man, Suvorov), it has very little in the way of an evidentiary basis, and rests mostly on weak circumstantial evidence. Stalin forward deployed his troops out of the Stalin line, because he wanted to make better use of the territories he had worked to obtain throughout 1939, 1940, and 1941. This caused problems. They were too far forward deployed from their supply dumps and centers of communication, and were close enough that any attack by fast maneuvering German forces would certainly result in them being outflanked and enveloped. Stalin however had filled the officer corps with politically pliable yes men, who dared not question any of his orders, and wasn't exposed to much serious criticism by his officers.

Another point which causes people to assume that the Soviets were preparing to attack was their political and doctrinal bias to offensive warfare. This had existed throughout the 30s, and was mostly based on the works of people like Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Vladimir Triandafillov, who wrote extensively on the economic necessity of an offensive oriented doctrine, based on deep striking attacks and maneuver, which sought to facilitate a "simultaneous blow throughout the entire depth of the enemy's operational defense", using a combination of mechanized exploitation forces and air forces (including airborne forces). They theorized that the Soviet Union was not economically capable of supporting an attritional war. This doctrinal bias for attack is not really solid proof of an intent by Stalin to attack Germany in 1941 (despite what Suvorov would have you believe).

I think his opinions are more due to his political stance (he's an ardent anti-Communist), rather than any real academic position. His books are not very well cited (his original was not even cited at all, until people complained enough, and then he made a half-assed attempt to back up his fantastic claims) and full of factual errors (example, he claimed conscription was only started in 1939, when it had been instituted since 1925; he also claimed the A-40 was developed as part of Stalin's offensive plans, despite development on that tank only starting in December 1941).

He basically tried to shift the blame for the war from the Nazis to the Soviets (whom he hated).

yes 41 is laughable but from a psychological standpoint &historical standpoint the idea of the two keeping that pact is a very big stretch.
Hitler and Stalin are almost duplicates of each other psychologically, being both power hungry and paranoid (in Stalin's case being a borderline schizophrenic) Stalin was also to be frank, an opportunistic bastard. He only invaded Poland after it was clear to even the poles that they had lost, only attacked Japan after US/commonwealth forces had all but dropped the atomic bombs, and was more then willing to conveniently develop "supply problems whenever the came near a major resistance area (see the Warsaw uprising). Even the Pact itself only came about after the western allies had rejected Stalin's attempts to be allies with them. The pact was born only out of convenience for Germany (who wanted to avoid a two front war at that stage of the game) and out of desperation for the Soviets (who had their backs to a the wall diplomatically speaking) the result was that neither one trusted the other any farther then their bombers could reach. the eastern front was going to happen, Stalin would have ultimately would have invaded out of paranoia and Hitler never really considered the pact to be anything other then a stopgap to keep the Soviets at bay.

I also think war was pretty much inevitable. For economic and political reasons, the relationship between the USSR and Germany was not sustainable. For one, being dependent on the Soviet Union for strategic materials like oil was unacceptable for Germany, and the Soviet Union would only grow stronger in relation to Germany economically and militarily as time went on. Hitler also believed that the British were continuing to resist his peace overtures because of hope placed in the Soviet Union. This combined with the personalities of the leaders and the ideological antagonism made war almost a certainty, but it was not imminent in 1941. Come 1943 or so, I think the chances of a Soviet preemptive attack are much higher.

[Mostrov]

This is actually quite an interesting thread; and I have a little to add.

To start with I am of the opinion that the Germans could have 'won' but it would not be world domination, mere hegemony over Europe from the Spanish Border to the AAA line (or at least slowly advancing towards it). I might elaborate on a scenario that makes this possible further on however it's quite lengthy.

Several things to note, the reason the German's invaded Russia was economic, because to beat the Western Allies they needed resources to do so which they lacked, bereft of a colonial empire and without the blessings of an entire continent such as America. The soviets were actually beatable in my mind, although you need several different focuses in the economy and production of the nation. So it was necessary for the Germans to invade the soviets due to both ideology and the fact that they needed to gain the resources, otherwise they would be running on empty; as their wartime economy was one that was strictly run on plunder.

Now the main criterion for this is 'beating' the British or at least alleviating the threat of a two front war long enough for the Germans to win in the east. Anyone who thinks that its possible to actually do so via direct invasion is, simply put, wrong - it was absolutely logistically impossible to do so. However its more than possible that the Battle of Britain could have been one, the Luftwaffe had material supremacy and for a time technical supremacy of the British. If there was a different leadership (Goering gets shot or dies in a plane crash; ironically enough without that single man was the western allies biggest boon, he was so utterly incompetent and bad at what he did) and different focuses it might have been possible to actually gain air supremacy and more importantly, strangle Britain.
A particularly nasty solution to this is a concentrated attempt at shipping through aerial mining and naval bombing in concert with U-boats, and if combined with attempts at bombing factories that control production of several critical air components (whether by chance or design) they might win the Battle of Britain; and if you were to ask anyone who was present at the time it was certainly a close run thing.
There was actually an attempt at mining the ports and it was huge in its effect, and if it were continued it might have choked Britain utterly.

Another thing that might improve the chances of the Germans in general was a more competent intelligence service, internally they actually had very little in the way of 'leaks' most of the leaks were actually through collaborators in occupied nations; but it would greatly help the Nazi's if they had an effective foreign intelligence service that wasn't riddled with people already compromised; I've heard that Canaris was actually someone who was already compromised; but the whole thing was really quite incompetent and if it was changed it would have greatly helped.

Its worth noting that many people tend to view the war with the benefit of hindsight, but the mood on the ground shows that it was actually quite a close run thing.

[Rubiconic Crossings V2 rev 1f]

Well quite and yes. You point being what exactly? Misunderstanding the reality? Enigma? The fucking Poles broke Enigma 19 fucking 32...fucks sake save me from fucking amateurs.

Probably already dealt with (if anyone bothered to reply to your unwarranted profanity), but the Poles do indeed get credit for getting a handle on Enigma, but you can't just "crack it once, and read it forever more" with changing daily codes. That's why BP needed the "Bombe-racks" to help speed up the clever people who were good at crosswords, amongst other things. (Especially once additional rotors/etc were added, supposedly making things a lot more complicated, though you've also got people silly enough to stick to formulaic phrasing in the "weather code" messages.)

Welcome to NSG. Profanity is never unwarranted. Don't like it? Tough shit.

Indeed the Poles deserve credit. Which is rather what I indicated. Especially in the manner in which they not only got their hands on the machine but also how they disassembled it and reassembled it in an incredibly short period of time. I'm not entirely sure if my recollection is correct but I seem to remember reading it was done within 24 or 36 hours.

Yes codes can change and such...but if your machine has been compromised and you don't know it, and you are reliant on human beings to perform repetitive tasks, there will inevitable be repetitions that make code breaking easier. Not only the weather reports but also daily reports from field units to HQ contained repeated codes because the operators did not advanace the rotors. Yes the Germans added another rotor eventually. By this time though we knew how it worked. It was really more a case of number crunching, hence the bombes and eventually Colossus.

All I'm reading here is a bunch of whining. Boo fucking hoo.

(Your flag does not match your posting style. You might want to change one or other of them.)

You are not the first to be wrong. You certainly won't be the last.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

Probably already dealt with (if anyone bothered to reply to your unwarranted profanity), but the Poles do indeed get credit for getting a handle on Enigma, but you can't just "crack it once, and read it forever more" with changing daily codes. That's why BP needed the "Bombe-racks" to help speed up the clever people who were good at crosswords, amongst other things. (Especially once additional rotors/etc were added, supposedly making things a lot more complicated, though you've also got people silly enough to stick to formulaic phrasing in the "weather code" messages.)

Welcome to NSG. Profanity is never unwarranted. Don't like it? Tough shit.

(Your flag does not match your posting style. You might want to change one or other of them.)

You are not the first to be wrong. You certainly won't be the last.

Having a bad few days, RC?

[Risottia]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the only reason Germany lost to Russia was because Hitler got scared (or greedy) and forgot Napoleons law? Never fight the Vodkastanians in Winter.

That's not Napoleon's law. Napoleon's law is "don't invade Russia, period".

The Soviets kicked German butt continuously from winter '42-'43 through spring '45. That's also two summers to you.

[The Peoples Republic of Kevtopia]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the only reason Germany lost to Russia was because Hitler got scared (or greedy) and forgot Napoleons law? Never fight the Vodkastanians in Winter.

The Peoples Republic of Kevtopia!!

[Risottia]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the only reason Germany lost to Russia was because Hitler got scared (or greedy) and forgot Napoleons law? Never fight the Vodkastanians in Winter.

The Peoples Republic of Kevtopia!!

Don't spam.

[Costa Alegria]

That's not Napoleon's law. Napoleon's law is "don't invade Russia, period".

The Soviets kicked German butt continuously from winter '42-'43 through spring '45. That's also two summers to you.

1943 is my pick for the year the Germans actually began their retreat towards Berlin. Citadel was pretty much the point when the Soviets gain the upper hand in incentive and momentum.

[Rubiconic Crossings V2 rev 1f]

Well there is also that the Germans would have control of the only access point into the Med from the Atlantic.

Depends on whether or not the Spanish would have allowed German troops to get there in the first place. Franco was sympathetic to Hitler and Mussolini for their assistance during the Civil War, but I don't think he'd wanted to have risked allowing German troops into Spain to attack Gibraltar, as much as he would have liked to. But I doubt Gibraltar would have come under Axis attack or even occupation even in an alternate reality.

Meaning that the UK and her allies would have been faced with a huge problem of supporting the British Army in Egypt.

Well not exactly. The British still had control over the Suez and some control over the Indian Ocean meaning it could have supplied an army with foodstuffs and material from Australia and bolstered troop numbers with fresh troops from the Middle East.

With Malta under German control....which would have been a lot easier to accomplish without British convoys supporting the island, the air war might have been a decisive factor in the North African campaigns.

Malta under Axis control would have given the Royal Navy some difficulties in operating in the Med. They'd have been able to carry out limited raids, assuming of course the Italians had picked up the courage to use their naval force more than they did.

Yeah...I was predicating that on Franco acquiescing towards the Nazis. This is the thing with "what if'" scenarios. One could say that there could have been a good chance that Hitler could have cowed Franco into allowing his troops to use Spanish soil, or even a wholesale invasion of Spain (which would have been an incredibly rash thing to do and perhaps would have ended the war even more quickly due to the need of resources and manpower). Without Gib the UK would not have been able to run its submarines as effectively as it did.

To quote The Chief of Staff of the DAK, Fritz Bayerlein:

We should have taken Alexandria and reached the Suez Canal had it not been for the work of your submarines

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_M ... er_1942.29 <- below the third paragraph

My point as it were that if the Germans had both Malta and Gib the UK would not have been able to run convoys carrying supplies and arms from the UK. Which was the major route for this stuff into the Med. With control of Gib you have effectively blocked off the Med from the Atlantic. With Malta under your control you essentially have control of the air. After all Rommel himself said that:

without Malta the Axis was lost in North Africa.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_M ... _War_II%29 <- second paragraph

Because Malta gave the UK a base to intercept Nazi supplies to the Italians and Germans.

Yes there were troops in the Mid East as well as supply routes. I've been trying to find some references on how the 8th Army (as well as the Americans I assume) were supplied from the Mid East. So I will concede that at this moment that I am not sure how effective such lines are or would be. Same with shipping from Australia. Although I would make a guess that they (Aus and NZ) were more concerned with the Japanese at the time.

Indeed the Italians could have been more...adventurous. I guess though that the Italians were wary of the Beauforts stationed on Malta. Then again the Italians did play a big part in the interception of Operation Vigorous and Harpoon with surface ships and a large number of torpedo bombers.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_M ... et_convoys < third paragraph

Still at the end of the day this is all conjecture.

[Rubiconic Crossings V2 rev 1f]

Welcome to NSG. Profanity is never unwarranted. Don't like it? Tough shit.



You are not the first to be wrong. You certainly won't be the last.

Having a bad few days, RC?

Perfectly fine thank you. Baiting me does not assist your case by the way.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

Depends on whether or not the Spanish would have allowed German troops to get there in the first place. Franco was sympathetic to Hitler and Mussolini for their assistance during the Civil War, but I don't think he'd wanted to have risked allowing German troops into Spain to attack Gibraltar, as much as he would have liked to. But I doubt Gibraltar would have come under Axis attack or even occupation even in an alternate reality.



Well not exactly. The British still had control over the Suez and some control over the Indian Ocean meaning it could have supplied an army with foodstuffs and material from Australia and bolstered troop numbers with fresh troops from the Middle East.



Malta under Axis control would have given the Royal Navy some difficulties in operating in the Med. They'd have been able to carry out limited raids, assuming of course the Italians had picked up the courage to use their naval force more than they did.

Yeah...I was predicating that on Franco acquiescing towards the Nazis. This is the thing with "what if'" scenarios. One could say that there could have been a good chance that Hitler could have cowed Franco into allowing his troops to use Spanish soil, or even a wholesale invasion of Spain (which would have been an incredibly rash thing to do and perhaps would have ended the war even more quickly due to the need of resources and manpower). Without Gib the UK would not have been able to run its submarines as effectively as it did.

To quote The Chief of Staff of the DAK, Fritz Bayerlein:

We should have taken Alexandria and reached the Suez Canal had it not been for the work of your submarines

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_M ... er_1942.29 <- below the third paragraph

My point as it were that if the Germans had both Malta and Gib the UK would not have been able to run convoys carrying supplies and arms from the UK. Which was the major route for this stuff into the Med. With control of Gib you have effectively blocked off the Med from the Atlantic. With Malta under your control you essentially have control of the air. After all Rommel himself said that:

without Malta the Axis was lost in North Africa.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_M ... _War_II%29 <- second paragraph

Because Malta gave the UK a base to intercept Nazi supplies to the Italians and Germans.

Yes there were troops in the Mid East as well as supply routes. I've been trying to find some references on how the 8th Army (as well as the Americans I assume) were supplied from the Mid East. So I will concede that at this moment that I am not sure how effective such lines are or would be. Same with shipping from Australia. Although I would make a guess that they (Aus and NZ) were more concerned with the Japanese at the time.

Indeed the Italians could have been more...adventurous. I guess though that the Italians were wary of the Beauforts stationed on Malta. Then again the Italians did play a big part in the interception of Operation Vigorous and Harpoon with surface ships and a large number of torpedo bombers.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_M ... et_convoys < third paragraph

Still at the end of the day this is all conjecture.

Except that the Gib/Malta route was by no means the primary route for convoys going to North Africa, due to the fact that you'd be in ridiculously close quarters with the Italian Air Force and Navy.
As seen here (http://www.naval-history.net/xAH-WSConvoys03-1940.htm), a major way was literally around Africa via Freetown, Cape Town, Mombasa, and through the Red Sea. Losing Malta or Gib would be a major loss to British offensive capacity, and it'd be annoying and inefficient to convoys but they'd still definitely be able to send them. I can't imagine blockading Gibraltar from the Atlantic end would have been impossible for the RN.

Having a bad few days, RC?

Perfectly fine thank you. Baiting me does not assist your case by the way.

I fucking apologize for fucking seeming like I was fucking baiting you.
Seriously, you kinda don't have any ground to stand on, there.

[Baiynistan]

National Socialism was too destructive for it to last much longer than it actually did, whether Hitler had coveted his pal Jo's playground or not. I think a more decisive factor in the mapping of Fascist Europe and beyond would have been if the Allies did not finally receive America's aid. Without US intervention, the Western Front might have buckled and Hitler might have calmed down enough to give up on Russia and the Baltics in the East and consolidate his power in Western occupied states.

[The Blaatschapen]

Perfectly fine thank you. Baiting me does not assist your case by the way.

I fucking apologize for fucking seeming like I was fucking baiting you.
Seriously, you kinda don't have any ground to stand on, there.

Cool down.

This particular tangent is not constructive to the discussion. It stops here.

The Blaatschapen - NS Moderator

[Risottia]

That's not Napoleon's law. Napoleon's law is "don't invade Russia, period".

The Soviets kicked German butt continuously from winter '42-'43 through spring '45. That's also two summers to you.

1943 is my pick for the year the Germans actually began their retreat towards Berlin. Citadel was pretty much the point when the Soviets gain the upper hand in incentive and momentum.

You shouldn't underestimate the beating the Nazis and their allies took on the Volga at Stalingrad in winter '43. Citadel was the last Nazi attempt at a great offensive, and the Soviets proved they had a superior understanding of strategy by dismantling it bit by bit.

[Rubiconic Crossings V2 rev 1f]

Except that the Gib/Malta route was by no means the primary route for convoys going to North Africa, due to the fact that you'd be in ridiculously close quarters with the Italian Air Force and Navy.
As seen here (http://www.naval-history.net/xAH-WSConvoys03-1940.htm), the main way was literally around Africa via Freetown, Cape Town, Mombasa, and through the Red Sea. Losing Malta or Gib would be a major loss to British offensive capacity, but they'd still be able to run convoys. I can't imagine blockading Gibraltar from the Atlantic end would have been impossible for the RN.

True. I've been trying to find more info re convoys. By the way...the link you posted...that only covers four months of sailings. From Aug 1940 to December 1940. I'm looking for something more comprehensive, covering from the start of the North Africa campaigns (which your link covers)...June 1940 to the end...May 1943. Any ideas?

I admit to having forgotten about the Cape route. Mea culpa.

From the German perspective the need to have Malta would have been to prevent UK interdiction of their supply routes as well as giving Rommel and the Italian armies in North Africa far more comprehensive air cover. Not sure that being in close quarters with the Italian air force and navy is an issue given that they did run successful combined actions.

By the RN not having GIb it would have meant that the Germans and Italians would have had pretty much free reign across the Med in terms of supply routes. I'm not sure that the RN could have blockaded Gib...given that Gib is pretty much a fortress, has an airfield and the Germans would have been more than happy to run their own subs from there. Would the RN really want to place what would be essentially a sitting duck around Gib? Would the RN have enough airpower to take out the runway at Gib? No...blockading Gib would have accomplished nothing but the sinking of valuable RN warships.

Having a bad few days, RC?

Perfectly fine thank you. Baiting me does not assist your case by the way.

I fucking apologize for fucking seeming like I was fucking baiting you.
Seriously, you kinda don't have any ground to stand on, there.[/quote]

Well you are claiming the moral (so to speak) high ground...not me. Hence it not assisting your case. Simplz

[The Tiger Kingdom]

EDIT: Nvm, weird formatting leading to accidental double-post.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

Except that the Gib/Malta route was by no means the primary route for convoys going to North Africa, due to the fact that you'd be in ridiculously close quarters with the Italian Air Force and Navy.
As seen here (http://www.naval-history.net/xAH-WSConvoys03-1940.htm), the main way was literally around Africa via Freetown, Cape Town, Mombasa, and through the Red Sea. Losing Malta or Gib would be a major loss to British offensive capacity, but they'd still be able to run convoys. I can't imagine blockading Gibraltar from the Atlantic end would have been impossible for the RN.

True. I've been trying to find more info re convoys. By the way...the link you posted...that only covers four months of sailings. From Aug 1940 to December 1940. I'm looking for something more comprehensive, covering from the start of the North Africa campaigns (which your link covers)...June 1940 to the end...May 1943. Any ideas?

That info is really freaking hard to find. I've tried before. I haven't been very lucky.

I admit to having forgotten about the Cape route. Mea culpa.
From the German perspective the need to have Malta would have been to prevent UK interdiction of their supply routes as well as giving Rommel and the Italian armies in North Africa far more comprehensive air cover. Not sure that being in close quarters with the Italian air force and navy is an issue given that they did run successful combined actions.

They also ran some pretty bloody ones, like the Pedestal run.

By the RN not having GIb it would have meant that the Germans and Italians would have had pretty much free reign across the Med in terms of supply routes. I'm not sure that the RN could have blockaded Gib...given that Gib is pretty much a fortress, has an airfield and the Germans would have been more than happy to run their own subs from there. Would the RN really want to place what would be essentially a sitting duck around Gib? Would the RN have enough airpower to take out the runway at Gib? No...blockading Gib would have accomplished nothing but the sinking of valuable RN warships.

Which I suppose would be a possibility only in the case of Franco outright siding with Hitler and declaring war. Elsewise, the Germans actually holding Gibraltar and making use of the fortifications, docks, and airfields would have been really hard.

Well you are claiming the moral (so to speak) high ground...not me. Hence it not assisting your case. Simplz

I'm pretty sure Blaat was clear about stopping this whole line on both our parts.
So let's both do that.

[The Archregimancy]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the only reason Germany lost to Russia was because Hitler got scared (or greedy) and forgot Napoleons law? Never fight the Vodkastanians in Winter.

That's not Napoleon's law. Napoleon's law is "don't invade Russia, period".

Unless your name's Batu Khan.