New Chalcedon wrote:Consider the (hypothetical) case of an Australian public-works contract about to be awarded: typically done on a low-viable-bid basis, with competitors putting in sealed bids. Because most company managers are happy enough to chat about such things over their "secure" emails, the NSA knows what the "low bid" for each of the Australian firms is as of the day before the bidding process is closed - an impecunious NSA officer approaches a contact of his in an American company which already does some work in Australia, and "lets slip" the amount of the current low bid in exchange for a consideration.
Et voila, the Australian subsidiary of that American company puts in a slightly lower bid, and gets the work - not because they bid honestly and well, but because they had access to information their Australian competitors didn't have. The now extremely pecunious NSA officer decides to keep an eye out for similar information to repeat the process, and everyone's happy except the Australian firm that got left out in the cold because of the corruption.
It took me less than a minute to envision such a scenario - I'm sure that it, and possibly worse, is happening on a routine basis given the government/corporate revolving door that is the US bureaucracy. And unless something's done, the only viable solution will be to simply ban US companies from operating in Australia altogether.
That's an absolutely absurd scenario, given the NSA's large independence and separation from the revolving door (as well as the Intelligence Community's insulation in general) not to mention the disciplinary and/or legal consequences such an employee would face.




