Do you think that the U.S. will go to war with Iran in 2013?

[Obamacult]

First, do you have substantive and objective evidence to support your claim regarding Iran's nuke program?

As we (should have) learned from the Iraq debacle, it's called a general lack of proof that the Iranian nuclear program is close to testing a device. There's a reason why sensible people reject the "prove they're not <X>" argument as a matter of course.

And — BTW — compare the amount of "noise" we had coming from North Korea before their first test: We had all kinds of warnings that Pyonyang was close to testing a device before they did. Now consider the degree to which the DPRK is a closed society, and the degree to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is not.

The long and the short of it is that we'll know when they're close.

Second, it doesn't really matter who wins the election because the primary center of power is outside this office.

Yet the principal driver behind the current program was Ahmedinejad, who hoped that it would bring him political power; it didn't.

More that that, though, the outcome of the next election will tell us more about the direction the Supreme Leader wants to go, because he's unlikely to team up with another loose cannon; next time, Khamenei is going to want to see someone elected to the Presidency who's going to be more in line with his thinking. That makes the election an important signal.

Third, barring any change in the leadership situation in Pyongyang or Beijing, North Korea will NOT invade South Korea anytime soon. They are expected to engage in bluster and threats, but this is part and parcel of their foreign policy for decades. When they stopped bellowing and move military assets forward is when you need to start worrying. None of this has happened, hence your statement as hollow as the North Korean threats.

I don't expect them to move until late summer; it's the wrong time of year to act now.

Now let me ask you a question: Do you think the current political row in Washington — in which Democrats and Republicans can't agree on anything — creates a provocative impression of indecision and weakness in the eyes of foreign leaders?

For my part, I believe that it does.

1.Again, you have no proof to support your statement regarding the Iranian nuke program -- other than to offer unrelated and irrelevant anecdotes regarding Iraq and North Korea.

2. Nice observation, I agree, whomever is votedappointed the incoming president will better signal the thugocracy's policy goals going forward.

3. The impasse is Washington is primarily a function of economic issues that represent a survival level threat to the Republic. Moreover, our Constitutional Federal Republican system was NOT designed to solve or deal with economic issues (the responsibility of the states and individual citizens) -- in contrast, our central government was designed to address foreign policy issues.

And for the most part, the Congress and the majority of American people stand with the President on foreign policy and national defense.

Indeed, Obama's actions in Libya and Syria have been exemplary. The costs in AMerican blood and treasure to remove a brutal dictator in Libya was about 2 hours of federal govt. spending and a few skinned pilot knees. The cost in Syria has been negligent and may yet bear fruit -- in the very least a brutal anti-American despot will be drawn and quarter by his own people before all is said and done without costing the US a single life.

In sum, a foreign power or non-state interest that acts on the myth that American foreign policy is disjointed and politically prostrate -- does so at their peril.

[United Prefectures of Appia]

It's all about the oil, Lebowski! But if people insist on believing otherwise, then they need to take a step back and look at the big picture and trend here. All that propaganda beating the war drum on Iran in today's news will no doubt be very similar as what was scene in Iraq a decade ago.

[Anarchos]

Any day now.

It's only a matter of time.

[Alien Space Bats]

Again, you have no proof to support your statement regarding the Iranian nuke program -- other than to offer unrelated and irrelevant anecdotes regarding Iraq and North Korea.

Let me make this absolutely clear to you.

I don't have to prove that Iran doesn't have nukes.

I don't have to prove that Iran isn't close to having nukes.

People who say that Iran has nukes or is close to having nukes have to prove their claim. That's how these things work: The person or persons making the positive claim are required to substantiate it.

Naturally, I accept that you're entitled to be skeptical of my assertions that the DPRK will probably act against the ROK; that's a positive claim, and one I have to prove if I want it to be taken seriously. I also admit that the DPRK's behavior makes it harder, in so far as it gives the whole picture a "boy-who-cried-wolf" sheen. My suspicion, though, is that someday we're actually going to see that wolf.

But by the same token, claims that Iran is close to a bomb also need positive proof — and here, I think the record of nuclear weapons development suggests that we will see actual signs of something happening over there before the Islamic Republic has a testable device.

The impasse is Washington is primarily a function of economic issues that represent a survival level threat to the Republic. Moreover, our Constitutional Federal Republican system was NOT designed to solve or deal with economic issues (the responsibility of the states and individual citizens) -- in contrast, our central government was designed to address foreign policy issues.

While the economic problems we face are what make the crisis so pressing, I think the greater problem is that our system was never designed to handle partisan politics.

As much as I like our Constitution, if total partisan opposition to the other side on any and all issues is going to become the "new normal", then we will need a new Constitution. The current one simply doesn't afford those who win elections enough leeway to actually govern in the wake of their victory at the ballot box.

I don't care much for Parliamentary systems, but at least they have the advantage of allowing the winning party the power to govern. If hyperpartisanship is to be the rule going forward — and I suspect it is — then we'd probably be better off with such a system. Given our historical preferences for Federalism, a strong and independent Presidency, and guarantees of our fundamental human rights, I'd recommend taking the German Constitution and then (maybe) grafting a French-style Presidency onto it (I would have said the French system, but it has no sense of Federalism at all to it, so if we went that way, we'd have to build in some measure of State autonomy — the inverse of what we'd face with the German Constitution).

And for the most part, the Congress and the majority of American people stand with the President on foreign policy and national defense.

Indeed, Obama's actions in Libya and Syria have been exemplary. The costs in AMerican blood and treasure to remove a brutal dictator in Libya was about 2 hours of federal govt. spending and a few skinned pilot knees. The cost in Syria has been negligent and may yet bear fruit -- in the very least a brutal anti-American despot will be drawn and quarter by his own people before all is said and done without costing the US a single life.

In sum, a foreign power or non-state interest that acts on the myth that American foreign policy is disjointed and politically prostrate -- does so at their peril.

I would agree (to a point; today's GOP seems to want to disagree over foreign policy — but they can't figure out how to do it and get away with it)... but perceptions matter a great deal, and I wonder whether (and which) foreign governments really "get us" enough to understand that distinction. This is one reason Russia doesn't bother me as much as it bothers most conservatives: I believe the Russians pretty much understand just where our limits are and which lines not to cross (would that Americans understood the same of Russians!). I also suspect that China has a pretty good idea of how things work over here, and while we might not understand China as well as I'd like us to, I think we do have a pretty good sense of where to step and where not to step (that, in part, is because the Chinese have a very definite way of communicating such things in no uncertain terms).

But North Korea? I'm just not sure how aware of our nuances they really are. Iran and the whole Arab world fall into that same category, as well (with some notable exceptions, like Jordan. Morocco, and the Gulf States [or at least their ruling elites; the "Arab street", not so much...]).

Oh, yeah, the French, too — but I can't imagine any kind of world in which the U.S. and France were ever enemies. Quarreling relatives, maybe...

[Farnhamia]

Notgonnahappen.

This.

[Rodainia]

Besides, I think we'll probably be to busy in Korea after the DPRK invades the ROK this August.

Why August?

[Alien Space Bats]

Besides, I think we'll probably be to busy in Korea after the DPRK invades the ROK this August.

Why August?

Late summer would be the ideal season for an attack; it minimizes problems with soft ground and rain for off-road armored operations and maximizes foliage against air strikes. But most importantly, it forces any potential Allied counterattack after reinforcement into the fall, when increasing rain and ground fog would hamper operations. The idea is for the PKA to either execute an effective smash-and-grab to overrun as much of the peninsula as possible and then — if the offensive falls short of rolling all the way down its length — delay a riposte long enough to either get a cease-fire in place or a negotiated settlement that gives the DPRK a bigger share of the pie when the shooting stops.

That, or shoves the Allied counteroffensive back into spring, giving the PKA the maximum possible time to dig in before that counteroffensive begins.

[Krasny-Volny]

Harold Coyle thought it was possible...back when there was a Soviet Union.

[New England and The Maritimes]

Why August?

Late summer would be the ideal season for an attack; it minimizes problems with soft ground and rain for off-road armored operations and maximizes foliage against air strikes. But most importantly, it forces any potential Allied counterattack after reinforcement into the fall, when increasing rain and ground fog would hamper operations. The idea is for the PKA to either execute an effective smash-and-grab to overrun as much of the peninsula as possible and then — if the offensive falls short of rolling all the way down its length — delay a riposte long enough to either get a cease-fire in place or a negotiated settlement that gives the DPRK a bigger share of the pie when the shooting stops.

That, or shoves the Allied counteroffensive back into spring, giving the PKA the maximum possible time to dig in before that counteroffensive begins.

From what I've seen and heard, the DPRK air defense system is stuck in the mid 60s and falling to pieces, and the rest of their equipment is marginally better. I don't think their "offensive" will make any headway at all past the DMZ, not in the face of ROK's modern armor and air force, let alone American air dominance and naval support. The major threats from a Korean war are 1. Letting loose with all that artillery along the border straight on Seoul, and 2. Potential nuclear attacks which may or may not be defensible.

Past that, the biggest danger MAY be prolonged guerilla conflict inside the DPRK, but then remember that the Nazis tried opening the arsenals in their last days and Berlin sure as hell wasn't an open war zone in June 1945.

[Obamacult]

Again, you have no proof to support your statement regarding the Iranian nuke program -- other than to offer unrelated and irrelevant anecdotes regarding Iraq and North Korea.

Let me make this absolutely clear to you.

I don't have to prove that Iran doesn't have nukes.

I don't have to prove that Iran isn't close to having nukes.

People who say that Iran has nukes or is close to having nukes have to prove their claim. That's how these things work: The person or persons making the positive claim are required to substantiate it.

Naturally, I accept that you're entitled to be skeptical of my assertions that the DPRK will probably act against the ROK; that's a positive claim, and one I have to prove if I want it to be taken seriously. I also admit that the DPRK's behavior makes it harder, in so far as it gives the whole picture a "boy-who-cried-wolf" sheen. My suspicion, though, is that someday we're actually going to see that wolf.

But by the same token, claims that Iran is close to a bomb also need positive proof — and here, I think the record of nuclear weapons development suggests that we will see actual signs of something happening over there before the Islamic Republic has a testable device.

The impasse is Washington is primarily a function of economic issues that represent a survival level threat to the Republic. Moreover, our Constitutional Federal Republican system was NOT designed to solve or deal with economic issues (the responsibility of the states and individual citizens) -- in contrast, our central government was designed to address foreign policy issues.

While the economic problems we face are what make the crisis so pressing, I think the greater problem is that our system was never designed to handle partisan politics.

As much as I like our Constitution, if total partisan opposition to the other side on any and all issues is going to become the "new normal", then we will need a new Constitution. The current one simply doesn't afford those who win elections enough leeway to actually govern in the wake of their victory at the ballot box.

I don't care much for Parliamentary systems, but at least they have the advantage of allowing the winning party the power to govern. If hyperpartisanship is to be the rule going forward — and I suspect it is — then we'd probably be better off with such a system. Given our historical preferences for Federalism, a strong and independent Presidency, and guarantees of our fundamental human rights, I'd recommend taking the German Constitution and then (maybe) grafting a French-style Presidency onto it (I would have said the French system, but it has no sense of Federalism at all to it, so if we went that way, we'd have to build in some measure of State autonomy — the inverse of what we'd face with the German Constitution).

And for the most part, the Congress and the majority of American people stand with the President on foreign policy and national defense.

Indeed, Obama's actions in Libya and Syria have been exemplary. The costs in AMerican blood and treasure to remove a brutal dictator in Libya was about 2 hours of federal govt. spending and a few skinned pilot knees. The cost in Syria has been negligent and may yet bear fruit -- in the very least a brutal anti-American despot will be drawn and quarter by his own people before all is said and done without costing the US a single life.

In sum, a foreign power or non-state interest that acts on the myth that American foreign policy is disjointed and politically prostrate -- does so at their peril.

I would agree (to a point; today's GOP seems to want to disagree over foreign policy — but they can't figure out how to do it and get away with it)... but perceptions matter a great deal, and I wonder whether (and which) foreign governments really "get us" enough to understand that distinction. This is one reason Russia doesn't bother me as much as it bothers most conservatives: I believe the Russians pretty much understand just where our limits are and which lines not to cross (would that Americans understood the same of Russians!). I also suspect that China has a pretty good idea of how things work over here, and while we might not understand China as well as I'd like us to, I think we do have a pretty good sense of where to step and where not to step (that, in part, is because the Chinese have a very definite way of communicating such things in no uncertain terms).

But North Korea? I'm just not sure how aware of our nuances they really are. Iran and the whole Arab world fall into that same category, as well (with some notable exceptions, like Jordan. Morocco, and the Gulf States [or at least their ruling elites; the "Arab street", not so much...]).

Oh, yeah, the French, too — but I can't imagine any kind of world in which the U.S. and France were ever enemies. Quarreling relatives, maybe...

My only challenges to your post are the following:

1) Our Constitutional system was intentionally designed to be confrontational and partisan. Under this -- no single faction could gain a critical mass of power over the rest of society. Hence, coercive power was intentionally decentralized, balanced, and limited and made transparent. However, when the federal govt. starting interfering in the economic affairs of the nation -- this intentionally dysfunctional system has become a liability (no pun intended). The solution is to remove the federal govt. from mismanagement, distraction and corruption associated with economic responsibilities best left to the individual states or the citizen. Government that governs closest to the people, governs best.

2) North Korea is a defacto vassal of China -- it would collapse in a fortnight without constant Chinese support. If you want to learn the direction of N. Korean foreign policy -- look to Beijing. North Korean provocations could be eliminated by applying pressure on China.

3) It is the duty of the opposition party to constantly question and challenge the policies of the leadership. Hence, democrat opposition to the war in Iraq was patriotic and necessary, if not misguided. Similarly, republican party criticisms of the recent 'undeclared' conflict in Libya was justified if only because it held the executive branch accountable.

4) We don't need to change the Constitution, only return to it as our founding fathers envisioned:

“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation and foreign commerce. ... The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives and liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of the State.”― James Madison

[United Dependencies]

That, or shoves the Allied counteroffensive back into spring, giving the PKA the maximum possible time to dig in before that counteroffensive begins.

Does foliage really make that much of a difference in this day and age?

and

Why does the counteroffensive have to start on the southern part of the penninsula?

[Alien Space Bats]

Does foliage really make that much of a difference in this day and age?

Given the number of ways to mask and deceive infrared systems, and given that ground radar still isn't perfect, it's a factor.

Why does the counteroffensive have to start on the southern part of the penninsula?

We don't have a large enough amphibious/airmobile insertion capacity to stage another Inchon.

---

To the rest of you, my next question is this: Do you think the DPRK knows they're as outclassed as you say they are?

[Alien Space Bats]

Our Constitutional system was intentionally designed to be confrontational and partisan.

Confrontational, yes. Partisan, I'm not so sure.

I think that the authors of the Constitution expected representatives to stand for the interests of their districts and States, rather than organizing into ideologically motivated Parties of the sort we have today. They certainly expected differences of opinion and controversy, and as a consequence they created a system that requires compromise.

But what we have today — in the form of two great National Parties whose ideological bent is so strong that in some cases deviation from the Party line gets you drummed out of office by your own side — is very much contrary to the spirit and design of the Constitution.

In particular, I doubt they foresaw the likelihood of one Party completely sabotaging the workings of the government just for the sake of creating a failure that they could then use as a weapon against their adversaries at the polls. The ability to completely logjam government, to the point of making it shut down altogether, is not something I have ever heard anyone suggest the Framers to have even remotely contemplated. There just does not seem to be a lot of evidence that they ever expected anyone to use organized political power to play the role of Samson in the Temple.

[New England and The Maritimes]

Does foliage really make that much of a difference in this day and age?

Given the number of ways to mask and deceive infrared systems, and given that ground radar still isn't perfect, it's a factor.

Why does the counteroffensive have to start on the southern part of the penninsula?

We don't have a large enough amphibious/airmobile insertion capacity to stage another Inchon.

---

To the rest of you, my next question is this: Do you think the DPRK knows they're as outclassed as you say they are?

I think the population might believe their propaganda, but at minimum KJU has been outside of Pyongyang and can process the fact that everywhere else on earth is better equipped than his nation. I'm not sure on the military, but I can't believe anyone with formal training as an officer would have difficulty understanding that they are not going to be able to break a battle line that is not only the same size but far better equipped and supplied and supported.

Even if they did, I don't see how this would necessarily "distract" the US, since any kind of confrontation would wind up with Northern units being overrun and routed in detail within the month if not the week, and the rest of the war would be about occupation and chasing down guerrillas, which the US probably wouldn't need to lend manpower to as much as technical and moral support. I mean in the mid 60s this would have been a nightmare scenario, but now it seems like it's a major annoyance and will result in a lot of initial deaths and then the lengthy, torturous, incredibly expensive unification process would basically be forced by the realities of the situation.

[Kintuckistan]

I hope not. Twelve years of war is more than enough.

[Maurepas]

No, I don't think so. If and when Israel and Iran come to blows I think there'll be a lot of people in Washington who'll really want to.

But if anything good came from Iraq, it's that those guys lost all their credibility, and our appetite for war has been pretty well satiated.

[Wamitoria]

Probably not. I don't think the Guardian Council actually wants war.

Besides, I think we'll probably be to busy in Korea after the DPRK invades the ROK this August.

What makes you think that this will happen?

[Maurepas]

Probably not. I don't think the Guardian Council actually wants war.

Besides, I think we'll probably be to busy in Korea after the DPRK invades the ROK this August.

What makes you think that this will happen?

And even if it did, why would we be involved? North Korea doesn't stand a chance against the better equipped and supplied South Koreans.

[Wamitoria]

Probably not. I don't think the Guardian Council actually wants war.


What makes you think that this will happen?

And even if it did, why would we be involved? North Korea doesn't stand a chance against the better equipped and supplied South Koreans.

Assuming said attack occurs without enough warning, Seoul will be devastated and American soldiers will be killed. That alone will get us involved.

Also, American troops probably want to blow off some steam beating the ever-loving shit out of the only unambiguously evil regime left in the world.

[Scupin]

No. Sanctions will effectively collapse the Iranian Government in the end. The youth of Iran is quite liberal. The government's day are numbered.

True, however, I think that the Iranian Government may become so desparate to hold onto its power that it will do anything to keep it. Including a war with Israel.

The red text. It's the stupidity of that logic. I mean what, are you expecting the Iranians to say "Gee, we need to do something to keep our government intact from this resistance movement that wants to chop our balls off. Maybe instead of focusing our efforts within our own country, we should go over and kill these motherfuckers instead!!"


Of course, if they do say that then this will be my reaction:

[Xanixi]

I doubt it. Not unless shit gets real worse, real quick.

And I sincerely doubt that Congress is going to pass another Selective Service act for Iran.

[Delator]

We don't have a large enough amphibious/airmobile insertion capacity to stage another Inchon

By my estmates, total US military air and sea lift capacity is around 62,000 combat troops.

Now granted, that's EVERY Amphibious Landing vessel and large transport aircraft, and a fair portion of those aircraft are needed for airlift in Afghanistan and couldn't be utilized, but it is not unreasonable to me to expect that we could stage a landing of about 25 to 30 thousand troops. Less than Inchon, but not significantly so, and our naval and air support capacity has drastically improved.

We could pull that off with our Wasps and our Whidbey Islands and some additional airlift, which still leaves plenty of capacity unused.

Now I don't expect we'll have to do a combat landing in any second Korean conflict. I think we'll be able to send any necessary support safely to Pusan from Japan without fear of interdiction by North Korea.

However, I have to doubt your claim that we can't stage another major landing. In fact, that seems to be one thing the Navy and Marines are more than ready for.

[Seleucas]

Smart weapon technology developed at a cost of tens of billions of dollars specifically designed and motivated by the most humane and benevolent hegemon in recent history will insure that far fewer than a 'few thousand deaths' will occur. In most cases, the US military will signal to the enemy when and where attacks will occur to avert innocent deaths (the Israelis do the same thing when able).

Iraq War cost 4,800 lives, Afghanistan War cost 3,200 lives. Iran is far more prepared than Saddam and a bunch of terrorists in caves. A few thousand is a fair estimate.

Second, the exercise in Libya was conducted at a cost of less than 2 hours of federal spending. A somewhat more technical and expanded effort in Iran wouldn't cost much more. The real costs occur with supporting ground operations and nation building --- and that is not going to happen in Iran.

Says who?

That's leaving aside the number of innocent people who would be killed in Iran depending on how aggressive the US is in attacking that nation, which in Afghanistan and Iraq has been far more than the number of coalition deaths.

[Alien Space Bats]

We don't have a large enough amphibious/airmobile insertion capacity to stage another Inchon

By my estmates, total US military air and sea lift capacity is around 62,000 combat troops.

Now granted, that's EVERY Amphibious Landing vessel and large transport aircraft, and a fair portion of those aircraft are needed for airlift in Afghanistan and couldn't be utilized, but it is not unreasonable to me to expect that we could stage a landing of about 25 to 30 thousand troops. Less than Inchon, but not significantly so, and our naval and air support capacity has drastically improved.

We could pull that off with our Wasps and our Whidbey Islands and some additional airlift, which still leaves plenty of capacity unused.

Most of the capacity you reference here is provided by large fixed-wing aircraft, which need an nice, long operational runway. Take those out of the equation, and the initial lift capacity is much, much lower.

Granted, that capacity matters: It gives the U.S. the capacity to stage the airborne/airmobile equivalent of an amphibious landing. If the spearhead force can grab and secure a suitable airfield, those air transport elements can pour troops into the resultant bridgehead with considerable rapidity.

The thing is, the initial spearhead has to be secured with smaller vehicles (helicopters and hovercraft), and right now we'd probably be hard-pressed to be able send in more than a brigade to get things rolling. So unless we could be certain that our aerial interdiction efforts were sufficient to prevent a KPA riposte, such an incursion (whether by sea or by air) would be extremely risky.

All of which brings us to another important point: The American people have grown accustomed to wars with a low body count; we're used to seeing our soldiers killed at a rate of no more than a dozen at a time. Any renewed Korean conflict is going to produce a death toll that positively dwarfs those sorts of minuscule death rates; it's going to be a profound political shock to a country that doesn't seem to believe that Americans can die in large numbers due to hostile military operations any more.

How we respond to such a shock is anybody's guess. If the first few days of the way cost us a few thousand soldiers' lives (which is quite possible), we could recoil from the loss and demand that the President bring our people home.

Or we could become outraged at the loss and demand that the President glass North Korea.

Either way, I doubt the reaction will be rational.

[Obamacult]

By my estmates, total US military air and sea lift capacity is around 62,000 combat troops.

Now granted, that's EVERY Amphibious Landing vessel and large transport aircraft, and a fair portion of those aircraft are needed for airlift in Afghanistan and couldn't be utilized, but it is not unreasonable to me to expect that we could stage a landing of about 25 to 30 thousand troops. Less than Inchon, but not significantly so, and our naval and air support capacity has drastically improved.

We could pull that off with our Wasps and our Whidbey Islands and some additional airlift, which still leaves plenty of capacity unused.

Most of the capacity you reference here is provided by large fixed-wing aircraft, which need an nice, long operational runway. Take those out of the equation, and the initial lift capacity is much, much lower.

Granted, that capacity matters: It gives the U.S. the capacity to stage the airborne/airmobile equivalent of an amphibious landing. If the spearhead force can grab and secure a suitable airfield, those air transport elements can pour troops into the resultant bridgehead with considerable rapidity.

The thing is, the initial spearhead has to be secured with smaller vehicles (helicopters and hovercraft), and right now we'd probably be hard-pressed to be able send in more than a brigade to get things rolling. So unless we could be certain that our aerial interdiction efforts were sufficient to prevent a KPA riposte, such an incursion (whether by sea or by air) would be extremely risky.

All of which brings us to another important point: The American people have grown accustomed to wars with a low body count; we're used to seeing our soldiers killed at a rate of no more than a dozen at a time. Any renewed Korean conflict is going to produce a death toll that positively dwarfs those sorts of minuscule death rates; it's going to be a profound political shock to a country that doesn't seem to believe that Americans can die in large numbers due to hostile military operations any more.

How we respond to such a shock is anybody's guess. If the first few days of the way cost us a few thousand soldiers' lives (which is quite possible), we could recoil from the loss and demand that the President bring our people home.

Or we could become outraged at the loss and demand that the President glass North Korea.

Either way, I doubt the reaction will be rational.

First, the USA is not going to commit conventional ground troops in either N. Korea or Iran.

Second, the N. Korean military capability is not much different than Iraq which was armed with backward Soviet era weaponry led by a highly static and politically prostrate command structure. Moreover, your dealing with an army of automatons, albeit highly trained automatons, who would not have the tactical wherewithal to respond to changes and challenges within a dynamic battlefield.

Third, a ground war with N. Korea would be executed with absolute air dominance that represents a significant force multiplier that reduces casualties to a level consistent to what occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fourth, the US military would primarily provide air and logistic support with a sprinkling of special operations forces and perhaps a Marine expeditionary force in reserve. This is primarily because the S. Korean military is highly capable and would take the lead in any conventional ground operation against Pyonyang. Hence, US casualties in the event of a ground war would be very light.

Fifth, the risk from Iran does not require a ground campaign to eradicate. Iran is a risk to export terrorism and proliferate fissile weaponry, technology and material. Hence, all that needs to be done is to bomb the shit out of a very focused target set -- suspected nuke sites and political centers. More likely, a few standoff missiles directed against critical technological and manufacturing facilities associated with Iran's nuke program would be sufficient to set back the program months, if not years. Probably more important would be the message to Iran from the West that nuke capability was not acceptable. A rational Iranian leadership would bellow and posture for a while, probably launch some missiles at Israel or perhaps some US targets, but they would back down in the long term.

Sixth, if Iran continue to support terrorist groups abroad, then the US could be provided material support and weaponry to violent nationalist groups in and around Iran to begin the process of using force to discipline and distract the Iranian regime with asymmetrical attacks against Iranian political, economic and military centers of power. This coupled with sanctions would bring the dysfunctional thugocracy to its knees without a single US combat casualty.