Did the South have a right to secede?

[Seleucas]

Secession is really just the easy way out and in the end can cause more problems that it "solves". I think that if a state becomes disenfranchised with the way the country is being runned then they should just put forth some effort in trying to change the way things are being run in the country and solve them diplomatically.

When two men are about to come to blows, it is best that they separate.

Which makes preventing secession ironic, in that one side threatens to strike the other for trying to avoid the upcoming fight.

[Xsyne]

And in WWII the CSA joins the Axis, giving them access to a vast amount of natural resources and giving them a much better chance at victory. No thanks.

Seriously doubt this. France and England were the Confederacy's biggest supporters, Hitler wanted to centralize Germany by suppressing separatists in Bavaria etc. (i.e., the exact opposite of what the Confederacy was trying to do- Hitler even said he thought Lincoln was his favorite president), and the Confederacy had notable Jewish people in its ranks such as Judah P. Benjamin. Besides, why would the Confederacy even want to get involved in a conflict on the other side of the pond?

I'm not sure telling the CSA to go fuck itself makes France and Britain its biggest supporters. If it does, that's kind of pathetic.

By the way, the Confederacy was perfectly happy suppressing separatists. They just weren't happy that the Union had the nerve to not fellate them. Recall that the CSA started the war. Recall that the CSA invaded the Union and attempted to conquer it by force.

[Beringovia]

Where does it say that in the Constitution? "Beat us and you get to leave."

Per the US Constitution, they did not have the right to secede. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not allow for secession in Texas v. White.

Texas v. White merely restated what had previously been decided in Grant v. Lee.

[Distruzio]

By the way, the Confederacy was perfectly happy suppressing separatists.

A sad misrepresentation of actual truth. Tennessee and Alabama had no problem suppressing separatists. Virginia allowed West Virginia to go relatively free of harassment. In fact, the only state to suffer despotism (not counting the draft) at the hands of the Confederacy was Georgia, and that wasn't to prevent secession but to enforce quotas and prohibitions at the ports.

Recall that the CSA invaded the Union and attempted to conquer it by force.

When?

[Distruzio]

Texas v. White merely restated what had previously been decided in Grant v. Lee.

Oh the irony!

[Keronians]

Texas v. White merely restated what had previously been decided in Grant v. Lee.

Oh the irony!

Yeah, it is pretty hypocritical for a nation founded upon secession to then ban secession.

It is also ironic to see the blatant disregard for the Declaration of Independence.

[The Truth and Light]

Oh the irony!

Yeah, it is pretty hypocritical for a nation founded upon secession to then ban secession.

It is also ironic to see the blatant disregard for the Declaration of Independence.

It{s ironic when you don't consider every factor.

[Rhutlandia]

By the way, the Confederacy was perfectly happy suppressing separatists.

A sad misrepresentation of actual truth. Tennessee and Alabama had no problem suppressing separatists. Virginia allowed West Virginia to go relatively free of harassment. In fact, the only state to suffer despotism (not counting the draft) at the hands of the Confederacy was Georgia, and that wasn't to prevent secession but to enforce quotas and prohibitions at the ports.

Recall that the CSA invaded the Union and attempted to conquer it by force.

When?

The firing upon Fort Sumpter? The first military act was by the CSA when they attacked Fort Sumpter.

[Distruzio]

The firing upon Fort Sumpter? The first military act was by the CSA when they attacked Fort Sumpter.

Firing on a Fort, after months of warnings against resupply, after firing on Union ships off the coast of the Confederacy, after repeated diplomatic dispatches from Britain, France, and the Confederacy, after warnings from the border states that an invasion would result in further secessions, in Southern territory where no Union soldier died, is now considered an invasion with intent to overthrow the Union gov't?



I'm glad we got this cleared up.

[Offenheim]

The firing upon Fort Sumpter? The first military act was by the CSA when they attacked Fort Sumpter.

Firing on a Fort, after months of warnings against resupply, after firing on Union ships off the coast of the Confederacy, after repeated diplomatic dispatches from Britain, France, and the Confederacy, after warnings from the border states that an invasion would result in further secessions, in Southern territory where no Union soldier died, is now considered an invasion with intent to overthrow the Union gov't?



I'm glad we got this cleared up.

It's considered an act of rebellion. No one is suggesting that it counted as invasion.

[Distruzio]

Firing on a Fort, after months of warnings against resupply, after firing on Union ships off the coast of the Confederacy, after repeated diplomatic dispatches from Britain, France, and the Confederacy, after warnings from the border states that an invasion would result in further secessions, in Southern territory where no Union soldier died, is now considered an invasion with intent to overthrow the Union gov't?



I'm glad we got this cleared up.

It's considered an act of rebellion. No one is suggesting that it counted as invasion.

Yes, someone did.

Recall that the CSA invaded the Union and attempted to conquer it by force.

[Hittanryan]

It's considered an act of rebellion. No one is suggesting that it counted as invasion.

Yes, someone did.

Recall that the CSA invaded the Union and attempted to conquer it by force.

The CSA did invade the Union, and it resulted in the Battle of Gettysburg. Which, well, we all know how that turned out.

[Putria]

The firing upon Fort Sumpter? The first military act was by the CSA when they attacked Fort Sumpter.

Firing on a Fort, after months of warnings against resupply, after firing on Union ships off the coast of the Confederacy, after repeated diplomatic dispatches from Britain, France, and the Confederacy, after warnings from the border states that an invasion would result in further secessions, in Southern territory where no Union soldier died, is now considered an invasion with intent to overthrow the Union gov't?



I'm glad we got this cleared up.

Hey, Lincoln stated he would keep things going on a regular basis regardless of what the South claimed. He even clearly stated he would keep supplying the forts, along with the mail and etc. The South made the first move.

[Distruzio]

Firing on a Fort, after months of warnings against resupply, after firing on Union ships off the coast of the Confederacy, after repeated diplomatic dispatches from Britain, France, and the Confederacy, after warnings from the border states that an invasion would result in further secessions, in Southern territory where no Union soldier died, is now considered an invasion with intent to overthrow the Union gov't?



I'm glad we got this cleared up.

Hey, Lincoln stated he would keep things going on a regular basis regardless of what the South claimed. He even clearly stated he would keep supplying the forts, along with the mail and etc. The South made the first move.

I'm not aware that I've ever suggested the South didn't "make the first move." I'm not aware that I've ever blamed Lincoln for sticking to his stated intentions. He made clear his purpose, and fulfilled it. As did the Southerners.... they just failed to maintain it. I would like to see a rebuttal, if one can be forthcoming, against my question above.

[Katganistan]

Nope. Decided in 1865, even if some people have a romantic notion that it hasn't been.

[Seleucas]

Seriously doubt this. France and England were the Confederacy's biggest supporters, Hitler wanted to centralize Germany by suppressing separatists in Bavaria etc. (i.e., the exact opposite of what the Confederacy was trying to do- Hitler even said he thought Lincoln was his favorite president), and the Confederacy had notable Jewish people in its ranks such as Judah P. Benjamin. Besides, why would the Confederacy even want to get involved in a conflict on the other side of the pond?

I'm not sure telling the CSA to go fuck itself makes France and Britain its biggest supporters. If it does, that's kind of pathetic.

By the way, the Confederacy was perfectly happy suppressing separatists. They just weren't happy that the Union had the nerve to not fellate them. Recall that the CSA started the war. Recall that the CSA invaded the Union and attempted to conquer it by force.

Britain nearly went to war on the part of the CSA, I don't think that's telling it to go fuck itself. Only when a Northern victory was a foregone conclusion did Britain decide not to support the CSA (which was after it was defeated at Gettysburg,) which makes sense TBH to not support a side that it almost certain to lose and antagonize the winner. If anything, the Union would want to get back at France and the UK, while if the Confederacy had won it would have likely maintained its relationships with the two nations to keep the Union from attacking again.

As to whether the South started the war, that is debatable. They did open fire on Fort Sumter, but that was because Fort Sumter was a strategic threat from a nation that had declared that it was going to collect tariffs one way or another, and had rebuffed the offer to sell its holdings in the South. Had they accepted the deal, there probably would not have been a Civil War. The notion that the South wanted to conquer the North is absurd, though, seeing as how their invasion was more or less directed towards DC in order to bring an end to the war and not indicative of some attempt at annexation; if anyone wanted conquest, it was the North, which did a far more extensive invasion of the South and did in fact forceably bring it back into the Union.

[Revolutopia]

Britain nearly went to war on the part of the CSA, I don't think that's telling it to go fuck itself. Only when a Northern victory was a foregone conclusion did Britain decide not to support the CSA (which was after it was defeated at Gettysburg,) which makes sense TBH to not support a side that it almost certain to lose and antagonize the winner. If anything, the Union would want to get back at France and the UK, while if the Confederacy had won it would have likely maintained its relationships with the two nations to keep the Union from attacking again.

Britain was never all that close to going to war with the CSA, at most they might have recognized it if it seemed like it was going to win. However, in reality it was never in their political interests to support the CSA as they relied more on Union grain then they did Southern Cotton along with their working population being strongly against supporting the slave owning South.

[Imperial--japan]

Back then yes the south did have a right to secede. Nowadays not so much.

[Dusk_Kittens]

Nope. Decided in 1865, even if some people have a romantic notion that it hasn't been.

Horse hockey. Here's why: Argumentum ad Baculum ("Appeal to Force") is a fallacy.

Rational people do not "decide" a philosophical issue (yes, Politics is a branch of Philosophy, not this partisan soap opera that is misnamed "politics," but actual Political Philosophy, and the issue in question was the question of centralized vs. decentralized government, not slavery as is so often maintained, or, to put in in more familiar terms, the issue was "Federalism vs. Anti-Federalism") by resorting to violence. Your claim that the question was decided by military might is, therefore, illogical.

As for those appealing to "Texas vs. White," I suggest a more thorough reading. The decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Texas vs. White et al ... Well, let me just give a brief excerpt (and yes, it is indeed brief, believe it or not) of a much longer post I've been working on, in reply to certain pro-Federalist critics in two or more previous similar threads:




the relevant portion is here:

It is needless to discuss, at length, the question whether the right of a State to withdraw from the Union for any cause, regarded by herself as sufficient, is consistent with the Constitution of the United States.

The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and [74 U.S. 700, 725] arbitrary relation. It began among the Colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form, and character, and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared to 'be perpetual.' And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained 'to form a more perfect Union.' It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words. What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not?

But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union, by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the States. Under the Articles of Confederation each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated to the United States. Under the Constitution, though the powers of the States were much restricted, still, all powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. And we have already had occasion to remark at this term, that cthe people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence,' and that 'without the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States.' 12 Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States. [74 U.S. 700, 726] When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, or through consent of the States.

Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of secession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the State, as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly follows that the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union. If this were otherwise, the State must have become foreign, and her citizens foreigners. The war must have ceased to be a war for the suppression of rebellion, and must have become a war for conquest and subjugation.

Our conclusion therefore is, that Texas continued to be a State, and a State of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to which we have referred. And this conclusion, in our judgment, is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any department of the National government, but entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and declarations since the first outbreak of the rebellion.

To begin, then, with the first bit of the above-quoted pontifications, we see the Supreme Court admitting that it is not going to consider at length whether a State's supposed right to secede is consistent with the Constitution:

It is needless to discuss, at length, the question whether the right of a State to withdraw from the Union for any cause, regarded by herself as sufficient, is consistent with the Constitution of the United States.

In short, then, the constitutionality of secession was, according to the statement of the Supreme Court just quoted again, not fully considered in this case. Thus, The Cat-Tribe's assertion here:

This is a flat lie. The legality of secession was addressed by SCOTUS several times and clearly settled, particularly in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 722, 724-727 (1869).

is entirely without foundation.

However, the Supreme Court then goes on to pontificate, cursorily, on the question of whether or not the Right of a State to Secede can be judged on the basis of the Constitution (immediately after stating that doing so was "needless"), and so it is stated:

The Union of the States ... was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form, and character, and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared to 'be perpetual.'

Quite so. However, ... well, let's continue where we left off, first, before I come to the however bit.

And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, ...

Come again? I believe that this assertion assumes that those who advocated for the Constitution were correct in their assessment of the Articles, even though there were certainly others who did not find the Articles in need of replacement, but only of Amendment. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continues:

And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained 'to form a more perfect Union.' It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words. What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not?

Ah, but here we have some interesting questions of semantics. Of course, it's all too common in contemporary society to dismiss questions of semantics with the obligatory Argumentum ad Hominem, but in questions not only of Philosophy, but also of Law and Justice, we must define our terms, so as to have as clear a picture of what we're discussing as possible.

I will, however, engage in some futile semantic exercises straightaway, so as to get them out of the way -- and also because the pro-Federalists will expect me to do so, hoping to catch me in some dubious contention which they can then mock as they have continually mocked every logical and legal argument I have offered, continually moving the goalposts from what my original contention was (viz., that the Secession of South Carolina was due to the violation of the Constitution, and not due to the question of slavery, even though slavery was most assuredly involved in the violation in question -- which I did demonstrate repeatedly) to whether or not secession could be considered legal under the Constitution (which I have successfully demonstrated more than once), and now on to how I can possibly "dare" to challenge the "infallible" (as they seem to believe) Supreme Court. I shall, therefore, if my above dismissal of the Supreme Court's "magisterium" is insufficient, go on to examine the supposed consideration of secession by the Supreme Court and demonstrate why it is not, actually, a complete consideration of the question of the legality of secession (and I shall point out that the Supreme Court itself states as much).

The Articles in referring to the "perpetual Union" of the Confederation are assumed, by the Supreme Court, to have been saying that the Union was "indissoluble," on the basis of the term "perpetual." Now, what exactly does "perpetual" mean (and remember, please, that we are dealing with people raised in a time period when education still involved the study of Latin and Greek, and that the authors of the Articles were not entirely uneducated folk)? Let's see what the etymology of the word can tell us. In Latin, there is an adjective "perpetuus, perpetua, perpetuum" (masculine, feminine, and neuter, respectively, all nominative singular forms of the adjective). This is defined, in The New College Latin & English Dictionary (John C. Traupman, Bantam Books, Toronto • New York • London • Sydney, 1966, 17th printing, May 1981) as follows:

perpetual, continuous, uninterrupted; general, universal; whole, entire ...

(thereafter, the Dictionary in question goes on to give examples of compound usage, which are not relevant to this discussion). Of course, we in 2011 typically make use of the derivative English word "perpetual" to mean "perpetual, continuous, uninterrupted." We may be pardoned for assuming that the use of the term in the Articles means exactly that. But the men who drafted the Articles were more well-versed in Latin than the average person in 2011, and would have known of the other translations of the Latin word "perpetuus, perpetua, perpetuum" -- other translations which included "general, universal" (and synonymous words) and "whole, entire" (and synonymous words). Of course, the Union in question could not possible be "universal," though it could certainly be "general." It is unlikely that the authors of the Articles would have used "perpetual" there to denote "entire," although they may well have had occasion to use the word to mean "whole" or "complete." But I shall allow the assumption that they did indeed mean "perpetual, continuous, uninterrupted," and, more or less, "eternal," or "everlasting," insofar as any of them believed that were possible (alluding here to the general belief at the time, and in the culture, in question that there would eventually be a destruction of the "world," if not the planet itself, "world" being the Greek "kosmos" and referring to the Order of Societies and Civilizations, rather than to the planet Earth itself). Yes, I shall allow that assumption, merely making note that it is, in fact, an assumption, which does not take into account the greater familiarity with the Classical Languages which "Western" societies encouraged in their educational systems at the time when the Articles were composed (even, for that matter, at the time of this Supreme Court decision in 1866). Let us simply consult an English-language dictionary definition, and allow it to be assumed to be the proper understanding of the word in this case:

Definition of PERPETUAL
1
a : continuing forever : everlasting <perpetual motion> b (1) : valid for all time <a perpetual right> (2) : holding (as an office) for life or for an unlimited time
2
: occurring continually : indefinitely long-continued <perpetual problems>
3
: blooming continuously throughout the season

Let's move on to what may be a more relevant semantic concern.

"Perfect." Yes, this is a very interesting term indeed. "Perfect." What does "perfect" mean in the Preamble to the Constitution in referring to the Union as "a more perfect Union"? First of all, we want to understand what the Founders meant by "perfect," then we want to know what they meant by "more perfect," and how that relates to the concept of a "Union." We are perhaps not unjustified to interpret, as the Supreme Court did, that "a more perfect Union" was, at least primarily, in reference to the "Union" mentioned in the Articles of Confederation (not merely once, but several times, and in most, if not all, cases of the use of the term "Union" in the Articles, it is paired with "perpetual" -- which might lead us to interpret, as the Supreme Court did, that "a more perfect Union" should be considered in light of the references in the Articles to a "perpetual Union" -- but if so, we may have to rescind our allowance just made concerning what "perpetual" meant in referring to the Union, and reconsider that -- or not).

To the Classical and Hellenistic Greeks, "perfection" involved the ideal of "completion," the idea that a thing had been "finished," that it had reached its telos (end or goal). Again, bear in mind that the Founding Fathers lived in a time when a decent amount of people in England and in the United States were far more familiar with Classical languages and literature (including, yes, the Philosophical and Theological ideas which had been discussed in Latin and Greek texts) than an equal percentage of people in England and the United States are in this day and age. Telos, it should be noted, is connected with a word that was one of the things reported to have been said by Jesus on the cross, namely, tetelestai ("It is finished," or "It is accomplished," a connection of which the Founders would not have been unaware, notwithstanding that they were not all "Bible-believing Christians"). Finished, having reached its goal or aim, accomplished, and, ergo, completed, or complete (again, we are reminded of the previous word "perpetuus, perpetua, perpetuum," as that idea also includes the meaning "whole" or "entire," that is, "complete"). Let me again repeat that we should bear in mind that the Founding Fathers lived in a time when a decent amount of people in England and in the United States were far more familiar with Classical languages and literature than an equal percentage of people in England and the United States are in this day and age -- and even without familiarity with the Greek and Latin ideals of "perfection" within Greek and Latin texts, this Greek ideal of "perfection" as "complete, completed, finished, accomplished, having reached its aim/goal" has had a major impact on "Western" thought. So "a more perfect Union," then, might denote "a more complete Union," no? Even if so, perhaps the Supreme Court was on the mark in conceiving of "a more complete Union" in connection with the "perpetual Union" of the Articles. But wait. "A more perfect Union"? What does "more perfect" mean? Surely, if a thing is "perfect," it cannot be "more perfect," can it? Even if we accept the Greek ideal of "perfection" as "telos," can something be "more" in possession of attainment of its goal than something which is in attainment of its goal? Can it be more finished than something which is finished? What is the point of inserting "more" there before "perfect"? It seems to defy the ordinary concepts, in Western societies, of what "perfect" means, whether we take it in the more contemporary sense of "flawless" or in the traditional sense of "complete, completed, finished, having attained its goal," etc. What the hell does "more perfect" mean? Is that very phrase not unlike, say, "more pregnant"? If you're pregnant, you're pregnant, there's no more or less about it, but simply yes or no. "More perfect?" The phrase is nonsensical on the face of it. Perhaps we do indeed need to go back and look at the word "perpetual," after all. What if the authors of the Articles did actually intend to convey, bu the choice of "perpetual," not "unending," but "complete"? Would that ameliorate this discomfort we feel in contemplating what "more perfect" might mean? If we see "perfect" in the predominant Western perspective as "complete," would then the Preamble to the Constitution be saying "a more complete Union than the complete Union of the Articles"? No? Surely, if a thing is complete, it is also like that question of "more pregnant," an either or thing? Or is it? Are we equivocating on the meaning of "complete"? Does it have more than one meaning? Perhaps we need to consider both "perfect" and "perpetual" together, in the sense, not of "unending," not of "having reached its end," but rather, in the sense of "pervasive" completeness, that is, that the Union of the Constitution was more pervasive than the Union of the Articles? A "more thorough" Union? That's the most sensible I can make it, but what would that mean anyway?

Bah, let's just move on, shall we? We could play with those words and their meanings till Jørmungandr releases his tail. We've been exposed to the Preamble for much of our lives, required to memorize it for school, listening to it being sung on Saturday mornings while watching cartoons as children, all the time thinking it must be some potent stuff, this Preamble to the Constitution, full of mighty import. Nevertheless, I must confess, the expression "a more perfect" anything is the sort of nonsense I would expect to find in something written by Lewis Carroll. I cannot see how the Holy Magisterium of the Supreme Court can justify their insistence that "a more perfect Union" means "a more perpetual Union," since "perpetual," like "perfect" seems to be one of those "either it is or it isn't" things, and the idea of anything being "more perfect" than anything else, or "more perpetual" than anything else, is unintelligible, and I must conclude that the phrase "a more perfect Union" must simply be nothing but the pure fluff of prose, added to make a dramatic recitation or oratory reading of the thing more impressive to an audience. Yes, let's move on, for we are about to come to a word whose meaning cannot be so cavalierly interpreted as the Supreme Court sought to interpret it, a word which, in all Political thought, has a very potent significance, and which the Supreme Court did not actually address, indeed, ignored as essentially unimportant, when in fact it is ultimately important, and intensely relevant to the debate of whether or not a state within the United States of America has a right, or a power, or an authority to secede from the Union.

But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union, by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the States. Under the Articles of Confederation each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated to the United States.

Yes, we see here a very important word: sovereignty. We have now come to that "However," to which I alluded above. Surely, the sophistry of the Supreme Court in this entire passage I have quoted above does everything possible to deny any relevance to this word in connection with the question of Secession, to marginalize it, to minimize it, to gloss over it with all these other things it presumes to define -- indeed, to absolutely ignore it. This word is extremely important in connection with the States' Right to Secede, or, for that matter, for the right of the States to do anything. More to the point, this word is important in connection with the references to a "perpetual Union" in the Articles of Confederation so eagerly seized upon by the Supreme Court, since the Articles of Confederation do not merely speak of a "perpetual Union," but also assert, in Article II:

Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.

What, indeed, is "sovereignty"? The Supreme Court will continue on to, essentially, assume the meaning of this as "limited autonomy," without actually stating that it is doing so, but even "autonomy" has a very relevant meaning here, as do "freedom" and "independence" also mentioned in that portion of their comments just quoted. Yes, what is "sovereignty"? Let us turn (although we shall consider these terms again later) to that source which (as we all learned during Kenneth Starr's politically-motivated persecution of President Clinton) is the authoritative dictionary for the American Legal System, viz., the Merriam-Webster Dictionary:

Definition of SOVEREIGNTY
1
obsolete : supreme excellence or an example of it
2
a : supreme power especially over a body politic b : freedom from external control : autonomy c : controlling influence
3
: one that is sovereign; especially : an autonomous state

I am quite sure that nobody will object to my dispensing with the first, obsolete definition (nor even the third definition). I hope nobody is so desperate as to grasp that the straw of the obsolete definition in their efforts to endorse the idea that the States do not in fact possess "sovereignty" in the ordinary legal-political understanding of the term. Let us look, instead, at the second definition, and consider the meaning of "a body politic" first, from the same source:

Definition of BODY POLITIC
1
: a group of persons politically organized under a single governmental authority
2
archaic : corporation 2
3
: a people considered as a collective unit

Again, I believe we can dispense with the second definition here, and I'm sure noone will object. But there's more to consider in the definition of "sovereignty" above, viz., the meaning of "autonomy":

Definition of AUTONOMY
1
: the quality or state of being self-governing; especially : the right of self-government
2
: self-directing freedom and especially moral independence
3
: a self-governing state

Before we move on to the definition of "sovereign" (linked in the above definition of "sovereignty," just as was "autonomy"), let us consider what the meaning of "self-government" may be (since it is linked in this definition of "autonomy"):

Definition of SELF-GOVERNMENT
1
: self-control, self-command
2
: government under the control and direction of the inhabitants of a political unit rather than by an outside authority; broadly : control of one's own affairs

We could, since both "self-control" and "self-command" are linked in this definition, go look into the meanings of those as well, but I believe we can all agree that the meaning we are concerned with here is the second definition of "self-government," so let's go back to the earlier definition of "sovereignty," and consult the link to the definition of "sovereign" as found there:

Definition of SOVEREIGN
1
a : one possessing or held to possess supreme political power or sovereignty b : one that exercises supreme authority within a limited sphere c : an acknowledged leader : arbiter
2
: any of various gold coins of the United Kingdom

Again, we may dispense with definition 2; it is obviously not what is meant by the Supreme Court here, nor what is meant by the Articles of Confederation which the Supreme Court is referencing. Likewise, we may dispense with definition 1.c., for the same reason. Let us, then, consider what we have gathered from the definitions of these terms:[b]

"Sovereignty" is "supreme power especially over a group of persons politically organized under a single governmental authority," it is "freedom from external control," it is "the quality or state of being self-governing; especially : the right of government under the control and direction of the inhabitants of a political unit rather than by an outside authority; broadly : control of one's own affairs," it is "supreme political power." Even if we take the understanding of "sovereign" as meaning "only" "one that exercises supreme authority within a limited sphere," we are justified, by virtue of all the other things we have seen, both in these definitions and in Article II of the Articles of Confederation, in considering "a limited sphere" to refer to the state in question, that is, the sphere is limited by its political boundaries (the same concept is found in 1.c., in fact, the reference being to a Monarch or Autocrat or the like, a person who has supreme authority within the limits of his/her political territory). [b]Let us once again take note of Article II in the Articles of Confederation:

Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.

Yes, we see there the following: "sovereignty" (which we have been at pains to define as clearly as possible), as well as "freedom" and "independence." I hardly believe that any honest reading of the Article in question could, by even the most rigorous of intellectual gymnastics, squirm out of the very obvious conclusion that "sovereignty" in this statement is to be considered with "freedom" and "independence." We have seen that this concept is one which excludes "outside authority" and "external control." Surely, then, in asserting that the individual States retain "freedom from external control," and "the right of government under the control and direction of the inhabitants of a political unit rather than by an outside authority," surely, I repeat, the States must have had the sort of Independence and sovereignty we ordinarily think of in terms of "political independence" and "political sovereignty" -- and if that is the case, then the several references to "perpetual Union" in the Articles of Confederation need to be considered in light of this very plain declaration in Article II. The Supreme Court, however, in its pontifical declarations in the case of The State of Texas vs. White et al, did not even attempt a consideration of what these terms in Article II mean. They may have assumed something, but they never did state it. Indeed, we could resort to a Dictionary of Philosophy (since Politics is a branch of Philosophy -- and so is Law), such as this one, and further enlarge our post here to the point that nobody would even attempt to bother reading it (and I'm sure it will be too long for the ADD crowd already without this), but it would not increase our understanding of these terms, nor allow for wriggle room to the pro-Federalists, since even one of their own has (as I will show below) acknowledged my points here regarding "sovereignty" and "freedom" and "independence." But I digress, in even proposing the consulting of such a dictionary; we have the meanings we need, without the verbosity of that sort of dictionary, and my own verbosity should more than suffice for verbosity -- but I am, after all, challenged to give an exhaustive critique of the entire matter, and no matter how thorough I have been thus far, the same acolytes of Federalism press me for more, saying that what I have provided so far is simply not enough. Well, then, the length of this post must be, not blamed on myself, but on them. Nevertheless, let us continue where we left off, with the shortcomings of the Supreme Court in reference to these vitally important words.

In their failure to consider the meanings of these terms, the Supreme Court has failed to, as The Cat-Tribe put it, consider the legality of secession, much less clearly settle it. Why, you ask? Because, gentle reader, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments acknowledge that the Rights not enumerated in the Constitution and Bill of Rights are nevertheless still in the possession of the People, and that any power which has not been delegated to the Federal Government by the Constitution and any power not prohibited to the States by the Constitution is reserved to the States or to the people. That Sovereignty, Freedom, and Independence were explicitly stated, in the Articles of Confederation, to belong to the States cannot be denied, and therefore, they continued, under the Constitution, to belong to the States individually, since, not only do Amendments 9 and 10 count, but also the entire body of the Constitution itself, which never once mentions these ideals, much less the notion of secession, nullification, or any other concept relevant to the question of secession. Regardless of any talk of "perpetual Union" in the Articles of Confederation, without considering the seeming contradiction between that talk and the powers explicitly noted to belong to the States in Article II, the matter of the legality of secession has NOT been considered by the Supreme Court, at least not fully, and the Supreme Court itself admits that it isn't going to consider it fully. Shall I quote that bit again? Yes, let me do so:

It is needless to discuss, at length, the question whether the right of a State to withdraw from the Union for any cause, regarded by herself as sufficient, is consistent with the Constitution of the United States.

Bias, in spite of your mockery of my assertion, is indeed a criterion for validity, not only in Logic, but also in Law, as can be witnessed time and time again in the records of the Justice system. Further, how can a person even pretend to imagine that, in the year 1866, anyone on the Supreme Court could possibly be anything other than pro-Federalist? I submit that since the Justices were aware of their bias, that is why they did not undertake a full consideration of whether secession were consistent with the Constitution -- they knew that their bias would be considered as disqualifying their conclusions in such a consideration; nevertheless, they did go ahead and utter an opinion on the matter, without fully considering it, as we shall see.

But let us continue, pointless as it may be now that I have already demonstrated the flaws in this supposed Supreme Court consideration of the legality of secession.

The statement of the Supreme Court continues:

Under the Constitution, though the powers of the States were much restricted, still, all powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Indeed, as I have shown several times.

And we have already had occasion to remark at this term, that the people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence,' and that 'without the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States.'

This certainly is not helping the claim that the Supreme Court has considered secession and found it to be illegal under the Constitution. The verity presented here is that a State is "endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence." That does indeed seem to weaken any case against the legality of secession. They go on to claim, that "'without the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States'." Now this is a problematic assertion, because it proclaims that without the States, and the implication is "all of the States," in union, the United States could not exist as a body-politic. However, the fact that this is ludicrous on the basis of the Constitution has already been shown by me previously, in pointing out that the Constitution itself says that only nine of the thirteen States were necessary to ratify the Constitution -- a direct contradiction of the Articles of Confederation under whose authority the Congress that approved the drafting of the Constitutiuon met -- but let us, for now, overlook that, and focus instead on the claim of the Constitution itself in this matter, that is, Article VII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

The Constitution itself has thus stated that only nine of the States then operating under the Articles of Confederation were necessary for the assumption of the Constitution as the new Law of the Land -- of those nine States, at least. I daresay the Supreme Court has not ever declared that any State which did not ratify the Constitution would nevertheless be subject to its dictates. Therefore, it must follow that the body-politic of the United States could indeed exist, according to the Constitution itself, with only nine States, notwithstanding any subsequent admissions of new States (nor the departure of previous States). This claim of the Supreme Court is, then, shown as inconsistent with the Consititution. The Constitution requires only nine States to agree to its terms in order to constitute the United States under the Constitution. As long, therefore, as there are at least nine States subscribed to the Constitution, the body-politic styled "the United States of America" and operating under the authority of the Constitution, would still exist, according to the Constitution itself. The Supreme Court continues:

Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government.

And yet, when some States sought to behave in accordance with this "separate and independent autonomy," what happened? The result was an attempt on the part of the Federal Government to overthrow the legitimately-elected governments of those States, the maintenance of which governments, the Supreme Court has just stated, is "as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the [alleged, since the Constitution nowhere actually states this] preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government." Does nobody else see the contradiction here? The Supreme Court has just contradicted itself. Oh, let's give them some slack, though, since they have already stated that "the question whether the right of a State to withdraw from the Union for any cause, regarded by herself as sufficient, is consistent with the Constitution of the United States" is "needless to discuss at length." They're not actually considering the question of the legality of secession in connection with the Constitution. They're simply delivering an opinion without proper consideration of the matter. What more do they say, then?

The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.

Really? Where? I have seen no evidence of this in the Constitution, nor has anything in this statement of the Supreme Court so far justified this assertion with reference to the Constitution. No, they have pronounced an opinion that "the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government" are "within the design and care of the Constitution," but they have provided no evidence in support of this opinion, nor have they provided any argument to that end. This is simply, then, an instance of Begging the Question (no matter if any evidence elsewhere exists, since they have not shown or provided it). They continue:

When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation.

Therefore? Therefore?? Wherefore? There is no argument here, so there cannot be a conclusion prefaced by "therefore." There is an assertion, with no basis given for it, and then a "therefore." What possible justification can be given for this butchery of the Logical (and Legal) process? Oh, right, the Constitution has invested the Supreme Court with the hoary glory of infallibility on questions of law, so they don't actually have to make sense, do they? Wrong. Even a decision of the Supreme Court can be overturned by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court (and if the governed do not consent to such a decision, then it is impotent, no matter how many jack-booted government thugs they send to enforce it, for the minds of the people cannot be made by force to endorse a proposition which is ridiculous to them), and this Court has already stated that a discussion at length of whether secession of a State is consistent with the Constitution is "needless." Why is it needless? Oh, because they're simply going to pontificate (without giving the question a full, and therefore, a proper, consideration)? That must surely be it, and our fellow poster Laerod has given his approval to such nonsense, declaring them, for all intents and purposes, as beyond question or challenge. They continue:

All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State.

I wonder if such "obligations" were in the fine print. Surely none of this was explained to Texas or any other State when they joined the Union or ratified the Constitution. Is there any evidence that the Constitution was presented as establishing a "perpetual union" anywhere in the document itself? No? Implied, according to this statement of the Supreme Court, but certainly not explicit. Alright, how about in The Federalist Papers? Anything? No? Well, yes, in the debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists (which we shall examine momentarily) --

-- but of more weight, within the ratification instruments of the States themselves this issue is discussed. These ratification instruments were the States' several conditions for ratifying the Constitution. They would ratify, but with these understandings. What understandings? Let us examine some of them.

"... Virginia ratified the Constitution on the express understanding that 'the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression.'
"Similar ideas surfaced in New York. Writing as Publius in The Federalist No. 84, Alexander Hamilton explained that 'here, in strictness, the people...retain everything [and] have no need of particular reservations. "WE THE PEOPLE..., to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution...." Here is a [clear] recognition of popular rights.' By 'popular rights' Publius meant rights of the people qua sovereign, including their right to revise what they had created. Following Virginia's lead, New York used its ratification instrument to underscore the understanding of the Preamble's principles: 'All power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people.... The powers of government may be reassumed by the people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness.'
"These assorted speeches, essays, and ratification texts emphasizing the 'popular rights' that 'the people' 'retain' and 'reserve' and may 'resume' and 'reassume' exemplified what the First Congress had centrally in mind in 1789 when it proposed certain amendments as part of a general bill of rights. With its last three words proudly paralleling the Preamble's first three, the sentence that eventually became the Ninth Amendment declared rights implicitly 'retained by the people,' such as their right to alter what they had ordained. Similarly, the Tenth Amendment declared powers 'reserved... to the people,' and the First Amendment guaranteed 'the right of the people peaceably to assemble' in constitutional conventions and elsewhere. In all these places, the phrase 'the people' gestured back to the Constitution's first and most prominent use of these words in the Preamble."
-- Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography Random House, 2005, p. 11 (italics and ellipses in original)

Mr. Amar will go on, in this book, to argue that the Constitution was not a compact (so I cannot be accused of quoting from a text biased in favor of my contentions), in spite of what he has just written and quoted on page 11 (and in spite of what he omitted on page 11 in reference to the Tenth Amendment, that portion thereof which declares powers "reserved to the States," as I have already quoted multiple times). However, before he gets to that, let us see what he has to say about the Articles of Confederation:

The opening passages of the Articles of Confederation variously described the arrangement among the States as a "confederacy," a "confederation," and "a firm league of friendship with each other" in which "each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence." Legally, the words "confederacy," "confederation," and "league" all connoted the same thing: the "United States" would be an alliance, a multilateral treaty of sovereign nation-states. Moreover, the word "retains" strongly suggested that each state was already sovereign and had been since independence. So, too, the words "freedom, and independence" echoed the Lee-Adams motion and Jefferson's Declaration itself while making it clear, as the earlier language had not, that each state was "free and independent." The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution further reinforced the point in a clause that reworked the language of the Articles: "The people of this commonwealth have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves, as a free, sovereign, and independent state." The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 featured a virtually identical clause.
The act of confederation confirmed the text of Confederation. The Articles did not formally go into effect until ratified by each and every state. Thus, no state was bound absent its own consent. Historian Jack Rakove has observed that during debates over the drafting of the proposed Articles -- debates after the Declaration of Independence -- "threats of disunion flowed freely. ..." [I am omitting the threats, not because I wish to conceal a threat which Mr. Amar reports from South Carolina, nearly 100 years prior to Secession, pertaining to slavery, but because I am typing this in by hand, and do not care to type the entire book, which would in any case be a violation of copyright. I have noted that such a threat was made, which should be sufficient to dispel any allegations of selective quotation.] If independence in early July had given birth to one indivisible nation rather than thirteen sovereign states working together, how could so many of the Declaration's signers speak so freely of quitting the union? Why was each state's consent even necessary to formally activate the Articles?
The Articles further provided that any subsequent amendment would require the states' unanimous approval -- the hallmark of a multilateral treaty regime based on the sovereignty of each state, as opposed to a national regime founded on a truly national people. If the people retained an inalienable right to amend, why should an overwhelming majority of Americans be thwarted simply because a single state -- perhaps a tiny one -- refused? The obvious answer was that both before and after ratifying the Articles, the people of each state -- and not the people of America as a whole -- were sovereign. A state populace would no more be bound by confederate amendments agreed to in sister states than it would be obliged to obey laws enacted in Geneva or Amsterdam. As Philadelphia delegate William Paterson (who would one day serve on the U.S. Supreme Court) explained these defining traits of the Articles, "This is the nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done, must be unanimously undone."

-- ibid., pp. 25-26

And yet, as we have seen in Article VII of the Constitution, undoing the Articles required only nine States to ratify the Constitution, and not all thirteen. The validity of the Constitution itself, then, may well be questioned in legal terms under the Articles of Confederation, as it was on 21 June 1788 (more than nine months after the Constitution was complete), New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the Constitution. By its own standards, then, it was the governing document of the new nation, with four other states not subject to it. However, it was not until 13 September 1788 that "the United States in Congress assembled" (the Congress of the Articles of Confederation) certified ratification of the Constitution, and even at that late date, there were still two states holding out: North Carolina and Rhode Island. Now, according to Article VII of the Constitution, this was sufficient, and even more than sufficient for ratification of the Constitution. However, the Congress which certified this proposed Constitution as ratified was the Congress of the Articles of Confederation, which required unanimity, according to Article XIII, which states:

Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.

notwithstanding Article X, which states:

The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United States in Congress assembled, by the consent of the nine States, shall from time to time think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled be requisite.

Article X does not cover alteration of the Articles of Confederation, much less their dismissal and replacement with a Constitution, since the Congress which certified the ratification of the Constitution was not in recess. Article XIII would, but only on the agreement of the Congress and the subsequent confirmation of the legislatures of every State. As the Constitution was drafted under the Articles, it would be subject to the requirements of the Articles. The ratification of the Constitution by nine States would not suffice to do away with the Articles and replace them with the Constitution. The Constitution, then, is an illicit document of government by the standards of government at the time it was certified as ratified, in that it itself requires only nine, and not all, of the States to ratify it, and in that only eleven, and not all, of the legislatures of the States had ratified it. This entire question of the legality of secession under the Constitution is irrelevant nonsense, for the Constitution itself is illegal, and the Articles of Confederation remain the legal document of government for the United States.

The Supreme Court continues:

The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body.

I am delighted to break it to you -- or, well, I can't, since you Justices have all been dead for decades now, but anyway, maybe you can hear my thoughts from beyond the grave -- a Constitution of this sort (that is, a document which establishes a national government made up of several distinct States) is a Treaty between the States. Guess what a Treaty is? That's right, a contract. Now, what exactly is a "compact"? No, no, not that thing in my purse containing powder and a puff and a mirror. No, no, not a small automobile. A political compact. What is that? Let us again resort to the official dictionary of the US legal system:

Definition of COMPACT
: something that is compact or compacted: a : a small cosmetic case (as for compressed powder) b : an automobile smaller than an intermediate but larger than a subcompact

I've already dismissed definition a and definition b, which leaves us with the preface definition, "something that is compact ..." (no, I think we can rule that out as well) "or" "something that is ... compacted" (hmm). Let us once more consult the tome wherein we have found definitions:

Definition of COMPACT
transitive verb
1
: to make up by connecting or combining : compose
2
a : to knit or draw together : combine b : to press together : compress
intransitive verb
: to become compacted

Now this suggests that "compact" is referring to "connection or combination," but that's not exactly helpful, so let us consider if there be any other possible meaning, more particular to the terminology of Political Philosophy (Politics, after all, being a branch of Philosophy, and not to be confused with the three-ring, or rather, usually, two-ring, machiavellian circus that is more properly known as "partisan political posturing and rhetoric"). Well, the Dictionary of Philosophy suggested above is of little help here, as it gives some 61 entries featuring the term, and ranging from Logic and Mathematics to "Modal Fictionalism and Possible Worlds Semantics." I hope you will excuse me, gentle reader, for refusing to slog through all of those, and resorting instead, once again, to that fount of allegedly unreliable information that is Wikipedia, which, yet again, delivers on this question some apparently reliable answers:

Compact as used in politics may refer broadly to a pact or treaty; in more specific cases it may refer to:

* Interstate compact
* Compact government, a type of colonial rule utilized in British North America
* Compact of Free Association whereby the sovereign states of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau have entered into as associated states with the United States

Compact, then, is a pact or treaty, exactly as we have seen previously, then, a contract between two or more independent parties. I trust noone will take exception to this. It is, after all, the idea we have seen repeatedly, that the South regarded the Constitution as a "compact." Let us, however, take upon ourselves the task of examining at least the term "Compact government" as mentioned in Wikipedia, as it could perhaps be relevant -- oh, well, no help here, I'm afraid:

Compact governments or compacts were the conservative colonial cliques that ruled colonies, particularly in British North America prior to the granting of responsible government. They were usually Tory in orientation and were representative of the local elite. The best known one was the Family Compact that ruled Upper Canada. There was a similar group in Lower Canada, the Château Clique.

Maybe "Interstate compact"? We must be quite thorough in our efforts to play the stupid game foisted upon us by those who have stubbornly refused to admit that they have failed to overturn our arguments, after all, in the probably vain hope that they might finally pack it up and surrender. Well, let's see, then -- again, not really helpful:

An interstate compact is an agreement between two or more states of the United States of America. Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides that "no state shall enter into an agreement or compact with another state" without the consent of Congress. Frequently, these agreements create a new governmental agency which is responsible for administering or improving some shared resource such as a seaport or public transportation infrastructure. In some cases, a compact serves simply as a coordination mechanism between independent authorities in the member states.

Alright, how about that "Compact of Free Association" business? Let's have a peek -- ooo, this is more interesting:

The Compact of Free Association (COFA) defines the relationship that three sovereign states—the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Republic of Palau—have entered into as associated states with the United States.

Now sovereign nations, the three freely associated states were formerly part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a United Nations trusteeship administered by the United States Navy from 1947 to 1951 and by the United States Department of the Interior from 1951 to 1986 (to 1994 for Palau). Under the COFA relationship, the United States provides guaranteed financial assistance over a 15-year period administered through the Office of Insular Affairs in exchange for full international defense authority and responsibilities.

It continues a bit more, but I think we've seen enough at this point to conclude that the a "compact" in the sense used in discussions of the right of a state to secede from the American Union is intended as a treaty or pact involving something akin to free association, between two or more sovereign, free, and (politically) independent nations, and therefore, a contract between such nations. Well, now, this seems to be exactly what the esteemed pro-Federalist author Mr. Amar has described in connection with the Articles of Confederation, notwithstanding the several references in that document to a "perpetual Union." And if this is the case, then, as I have shown previously, regardless of such language as a "perpetual Union," if any member fails to discharge its duties under the compact, the entire compact is nullified, exactly as the South has stated. The only question that remains is whether or not the Constitution be a compact.




Now, I could go on quoting the post I'm still working on. I do address the question I note remains, by reference to The Federalist Papers, The Anti-Federalist Papers, and sundry other sources, but I think I'll save that for a later time, especially since I doubt many have bothered to read the tiny excerpt I have provided.

So for now, I close. Chew on this for a while, defenders of the Union, before you start spouting the same old tired crap you have spouted previously.

(edited for code corrections)

[Distruzio]

DK... I love you.

[Conserative Morality]

Horse hockey. Here's why: Argumentum ad Baculum ("Appeal to Force") is a fallacy.

Rational people do not "decide" a philosophical issue (yes, Politics is a branch of Philosophy, not this partisan soap opera that is misnamed "politics," but actual Political Philosophy, and the issue in question was the question of centralized vs. decentralized government, not slavery as is so often maintained, or, to put in in more familiar terms, the issue was "Federalism vs. Anti-Federalism") by resorting to violence. Your claim that the question was decided by military might is, therefore, illogical.

Good thing this isn't a philosophical issue, huh?

[Dusk_Kittens]

Horse hockey. Here's why: Argumentum ad Baculum ("Appeal to Force") is a fallacy.

Rational people do not "decide" a philosophical issue (yes, Politics is a branch of Philosophy, not this partisan soap opera that is misnamed "politics," but actual Political Philosophy, and the issue in question was the question of centralized vs. decentralized government, not slavery as is so often maintained, or, to put in in more familiar terms, the issue was "Federalism vs. Anti-Federalism") by resorting to violence. Your claim that the question was decided by military might is, therefore, illogical.

Good thing this isn't a philosophical issue, huh?

On the contrary, the issue at hand at the time was Federalism vs. Confederation, and the issue at hand presently in this thread is whether or not the South had a political/legal right to secede. Both of these issues are indeed philosophical, the first being a question of Political Philosophy, and the second being a question of Political and Legal Philosophy (Philosophy of Law is a branch of Political Philosophy).

[The UK in Exile]

Horse hockey. Here's why: Argumentum ad Baculum ("Appeal to Force") is a fallacy.

Rational people do not "decide" a philosophical issue (yes, Politics is a branch of Philosophy, not this partisan soap opera that is misnamed "politics," but actual Political Philosophy, and the issue in question was the question of centralized vs. decentralized government, not slavery as is so often maintained, or, to put in in more familiar terms, the issue was "Federalism vs. Anti-Federalism") by resorting to violence. Your claim that the question was decided by military might is, therefore, illogical.

Good thing this isn't a philosophical issue, huh?

good thing they weren't rational either.

[Conserative Morality]

On the contrary, the issue at hand at the time was Federalism vs. Confederation, and the issue at hand presently in this thread is whether or not the South had a political/legal right to secede. Both of these issues are indeed philosophical, the first being a question of Political Philosophy, and the second being a question of Political and Legal Philosophy (Philosophy of Law is a branch of Political Philosophy).

We're arguing NOW whether or not they had a right to secede.

[Dusk_Kittens]

On the contrary, the issue at hand at the time was Federalism vs. Confederation, and the issue at hand presently in this thread is whether or not the South had a political/legal right to secede. Both of these issues are indeed philosophical, the first being a question of Political Philosophy, and the second being a question of Political and Legal Philosophy (Philosophy of Law is a branch of Political Philosophy).

We're arguing NOW whether or not they had a right to secede.

Thanks for that news flash, CM. Maybe you could re-read my reply a bit more attentively? Look, I'll emphasize the bit I'm calling your attention to by means of the underscore:

On the contrary, the issue at hand at the time was Federalism vs. Confederation, and the issue at hand presently in this thread is whether or not the South had a political/legal right to secede. Both of these issues are indeed philosophical, the first being a question of Political Philosophy, and the second being a question of Political and Legal Philosophy (Philosophy of Law is a branch of Political Philosophy).

Still a philosophical issue.