The advent of “Regional Officers” got moi thinking about the ebb and flow between the powers of delegates to maintain their incumbency and the ability of challengers to defeat incumbents.
Theoretical Assumptions
For the purposes of creating a theoretical framework for which geopolitical gameplay can then be traced with, imagine first: the means of defense, this is to say, the ways in which those in power in a region can prevent a involuntary seizure of said power.
The means of defense include:
- Endorsements not shared with your competition.
- Ejections.
- Bans.
- Communication (Tarting; the delegate also has mass- and welcome telegrams at their disposal).
- Passwords.
- Settings to limit access to the Regional Controls.
- Foundership.
- Dossier feeds to follow endorsement transfers and movement.
For the purposes of this framework, we will ignore “soft” means of defense like diplomacy and inter-regional agreements except to say they can be an auxiliary source of endorsements.
Then, we shall also consider the means of attack, this is to say, the ways in which those who do not yet hold control of a region can seize administrative power against the will of the incumbent.
The means of attack include:
- Endorsements not shared with the incumbent.
- Communication (tarting).
- Reconnaissance.
- WA Liberations – traditional, pre-emptive or “offensive” in nature.
- Region Hawking (i.e., founding the region after its died.)
From this we can first assert that incumbents normally have greater means to maintain their control over a region than insurgents and challengers. This is not necessary a good or bad thing – let's move on.
Next, let's imagine the means of defense and the means of attack in a perpetual balancing act:
1. If the means of defense greatly outweighs the means of attack, this situation can be described as “the house always win” in the sense that it is incredibly difficult for incumbents to be removed involuntarily . In this scenario, this political stability comes with extreme risk: without the ability to remove incumbents, a region becomes all the more vulnerable to the decisions of incumbents with far less means to reverse their incumbency. This is a significant fact of NationStates: the stability of individual leaders and the risks this poses to their region are strongly related; or as a Spiderman fan might lament: with great power comes great responsibility. We'll call this scenario, the Authoritarian example.
2. If the means of attack greatly outweighs the means of defense, this situation can be described as “the house always loses” in the sense that it is incredibly difficult for incumbents to ward off challengers to their position because their challengers possess means to coerce their way to power that is not available in equal measure to those in the seat of power. We'll call this scenario, the Anarchy example - but as far as I am aware, it's a ideal that is entirely hypothetical since I can think of no situation where there is a surplus in the means of attack, that is to say, the challengers are afforded more opportunity than the incumbent to challenge the delegacy – a very temporary example occurs when a delegate runs out of Regional Influence and resigns their position but “officially” maintains office until update, since during that time it could be said that their challengers are in a better position to become delegate than they are.
3. If the means of attack are equal to the means of defense, this situation can be described as an equilibrium – it emerges in-game typically as a Codgerian Peacezone; but I'll call it the Democratic example. In this scenario, incumbents have just as many means as the delegate do in the pursuit of power – in practice this usually means that neither the delegate nor their challengers can use coercive measures but are instead reliant on persuasion. The Rejected Realms is a concrete example of this scenario.
We could think of the balance between the means of attack and the means of defense as a spectrum between these extremes I've described – the vast majority of regions sit between the authoritarian and the democratic ideals as I've set out above. Those regions which constitutionally constrain their means of defense (i.e., domestic criminal and administrative law) become more vulnerable to the means of attack but reduce the deficit between the means of attack and the means of defense which, as of consequence, lowers the risks of rogue incumbency and increases the opportunity for political change. While regions which do not constrain their means of defense will maintain a high deficit between the means of attack and the means of defense and, subsequently, more closely reflect that authoritarian ideal. It is largely impossible under the current structure of NationStates to maintain a surplus in the means of attack over the means of defense (the "Anarchy" ideal).
Now for the practical component of this discussion...
Macro- Implications
As far as NationStates is concerned, the game itself has continued with each major new gameplay feature to become increasingly authoritarian – each “radical” reform has greatly advanced the means of defense over the means of attack, followed by a period of “corrective” reform where minor additions and innovations aimed to correct what were perceived as grievances caused by these reforms. These corrective measures are often reversed by site administrators, if not just simply too small to make a difference in the grand scheme of things. We began NationStates in a perfect state of equilibrium since in 2002 there was no WA Delegate – the first major reform, the addition of a WA Delegate along with ejection and banning powers, gave us greater means of defense. Then came Regional Founders, perhaps the greatest means of defense. Then, Regional Passwords. Then, Regional Influence. Then, Dossiers. Then, In-game Eject & Ban buttons (previously it was far less intuitive to eject and ban players). Now, we are faced with a new feature which aims to make our regions safer: Regional Officers.
Each of these major reforms have caused “blowback” which have required corrective measures and innovation to find ways to either reduce the means of defense or expand the means of attack such as to ultimately address the growing deficit between the latter and the former. When the first series of griefings emerged and the spectacle of Francos Spain took hold, the Site Admins devised griefing rules and a cap on the number of bans that a delegate could give. Players also corrupted a part of the site's infrastructure to launch “puppetmaster” strikes against incumbents, using a trick (no longer available) where they could endorse players in an incumbent's region without joining the region. The admins also devised “warzone” regions where the means of defense were constrained (bans refresh). After the abolition of the griefing rules and the creation of “Regional Influence”, once again players suggested that the means of defense were too high, too injurious to the project of civil governance – the advent of “password raiding” (popularized by Macedon) inspired the creation of the WA Security Council and Liberation proposals which could act as a means of attack and a cap on one means of defense to redress present imbalances. Faced with an increasingly difficult environment for combating invaders and challenging incumbents, gameplayers relied on innovation as they had in the days of Puppetmaster: experimentation with the XML “Daily Dumps” discovered a recorded update order and provided the foundations of a “triggering” method which greatly advanced the accuracy of liberations and invasions, then the advent of safe switching (as supported by site administrators) helped advance each player's individual means of attack. Players also began experimenting and researching the growth of Influence to learn its vulnerabilities and hopefully exploit its weaknesses with “attrition warfare” where they could gain use their knowledge of the Influence rules as an advance and a means of attack and resistance against a determined incumbent.
Site Administrators, without much player consultation at all, reversed griefing rules, curtailed the possibility of “puppetmaster” techniques (known by future generations as magic endorsements) and after the “R/D Summit” (where administrators sat around and ignored players diligently for a couple of months) announced they would scramble the Daily Dumps and effectively cancel the practice of triggering.
What can be said is: each major reform has grown the deficit between the means of defense and the means of attack –
It's up to players to decide whether this trend is a good development or a bad development. Now for a senile, grumpy warning for future players: as the opportunity for incumbents to maintain their power increases, the avenues for redress become fewer and fewer. Dictatorial regimes face less credible challenges to their incumbency, liberations become rarer, occupations and insurgencies become more irreversible and more threatening. The business of geopolitics shrinks alongside the avenues for involuntary political change. I question whether this development is heading towards a direction that is good for the health and activity of the game itself.
Micro- Implications
If you're just a player wondering what to take away from this theory as far as their own region is concerned, you'll have to decide your own priorities as far as a government is concerned; your priorities will inform your opinion of how great the limits of the means of defense and the means of attack should be in your own region. Todd McCloud advocated in “The Necessity of Chaos”, for example, that political volatility creates positive and negative activity but for the most part is a good thing for a region because it inspires people to get involved, even if drama can detract from a regional experience for some players. After some thought, I would argue the focus on chaos is a bit of a misnomer. Political stability, is, in my view, good for a region in moderation because it's stability that gives players the confidence that their government will continue with successive governments and, therefore, is worth their participation, as far as a social, cultural or political capacity is concerned. A highly volatile region that changes governments at the drop of the hat doesn't offer a foundation for cultural and political growth because people who don't have confidence in a state will not necessarily develop an attachment to said state or see it worth their involvement or their loyalty. Political stability for a region is therefore a balancing act: you want an incumbency to be stable enough that residents are confident the state is a relatively permanent fixture but you also don't want an incumbent to be stable enough that they don't feel the need to contribute to the growth or the good governance of their region.
The game's expansion of the means of defense has brought about an increase of political stability; if you're concerned, as I am, with this trend, there are therefore some things to keep in mind. For smaller regions (more vulnerable to a traditional invasion), the concern with greater means of defense and greater stability is the risks of incumbency: invasions become more and more frequently sites of griefing and oppression with fewer means of recourse. For Game-Created Regions, the concern with greater means of defense and greater stability is both the greater threat a coup poses to these incumbents and the lack of an opportunity for political change and renewal.
In the face of these issues: smaller regions should reconsider the allowance of Regional Controls to WA Delegates and the use of Regional Passwords (which do little to deter invaders and make it more difficult for defenders to respond to invasions), while Game-Created Regions should encourage endorsement-trading, hold high endorsement caps, maintain an alert (and independent) body of security councilors and limit the use of the ejection and ban tools constitutionally with a Bill of Rights and a package of Constitutional Law which constrains the use of executive force.
Many Game-Created Regions have already used this theory in practice to their advantage.
Several regions like Osiris, the South Pacific and now Lazarus, have responded to a reputation/legacy of instability by implementing some or all of these suggestions. But no region is a better example of the success of this policy than the North Pacific. When I joined NationStates, the North Pacific was regarded as the most unstable Game-Created Region, when I left, it was regarded as the most stable. The difference in its reputation has been earned through a massive political and cultural transformation led by the ideas of its political leaders, Eluvatar, r3naissanc3r, McMasterdonia, Astarial (and many more), who deserve all of the credit for devising a new way of doing things in the North Pacific: encouraging not discouraging the diversity and proliferation of endorsements in the North Pacific through programs was especially novel, but the creation of a Security Council and a commitment to constitutional and democratic constraints on the power and stability of the executive have struck the kind of a balance of desirable political stability that I articulated above. They've largely eliminated the risks of political incumbency, curtailed the abuse of administrative power and bolstered regional confidence in the continuity of its state all the while restricting their incumbency's own confidence in their ability to continue as leader without maintaining the personal support of a wide and diverse coalition of local political supporters.
From the primary axiom that the powers available to the incumbency outweigh those of their challengers comes a second axiom that states that greater stability of one incumbent holds greater risk for the region as a whole – from this we can conclude with a final lesson: the security of a leader and the security of their region are not necessarily analogous. Take care, dear readers.
