[RULE CHANGE] Blocker rule revision

[Imperium Anglorum]

*** Public consultation on blocker rule revision ***

The GA Secretariat proposes revision of the current blocker rule. This change comes from a somewhat-dormant discussion that started in 2017 in the aftermath of the Rules Consortium's changes to the blocker rule text. It is well known that the blocker rule's official text is internally contradictory and needs revision. National Control of Elections [2016] GAS 2 ("'Broad and specific issues,' interpreted literally, is a meaningless and nonsensical phrase").

The following are the main points on which the Secretariat requests comment.

1. The status quo test is the "whole category" from [2016] GAS 2. Alternatively, the Secretariat could adopt a "majority-of-a-category" test. Should the Secretariat do so?
   
   
2. If the "majority-of-a-category" test were to be adopted, what specific guidelines should the Secretariat use to determine what constitutes a "majority" of a category?
   
   
3. Alternatively, would a discretionary standard (ie a "smell test") be acceptable?
   
   
4. Currently, without a clear and nondiscretionary test for "majority-of-a-category", Secretariat prefers a "whole category" test, which would preserve the status quo, implemented with the following wording. What improvement could be made to the wording below?
   
   
   No proposal may block off an entire category or area of effect. Nor may any proposal be "repeal-proof" or attempt to block repeal of another resolution. A proposal may not solely block legislation (a "pure blocker"); but blocking, in general, is permitted if there is additional action.
   
   
5. Should the blocker rule be expanded to take over prohibition of clauses such as those found in Protections During Territorial Transitions [2021] GAS 4 (ie clauses which insulate past resolutions' effects from repeal; holding that such clauses violate the game mechanics rule)? Would statement in the blocker rule be clearer than the current means of imputing the prohibition from game mechanics?

We would appreciate comments and responses to be topical.

Those voting in favour of the given wording were Bananaistan, Imperium Anglorum, Sierra Lyricalia, and Separatist Peoples. Grays Harbor is absent on leave. Under the procedures, this comment period will end in two weeks, subject to finalisation.

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Related resources.

(2011) 1 IAM 14. viewtopic.php?p=5750199#p5750199
(2011) 1 IAM 16. viewtopic.php?p=7199905#p7199905
[2016] GAS 2. viewtopic.php?p=30328564#p30328564
Consortium discussion. viewtopic.php?f=36&t=340118

[Tinhampton]

1. No. There is no need to introduce the sorites paradox to the Compendium, especially not by Secretariat fiat.

2. There are probably no good guidelines to determine when most of a category is blocked off. Simply saying "do not block off all Significant and Strong proposals" may work for strength-based categories but would function as a whole-category test for AoE-based categories and almost all of Environmental, for instance.

3. Yes; it might be the only way out for the Secretariat should it adopt an MoC rule.

4. If "Secretariat prefers a "whole category" test, which would preserve the status quo," why can it not just retain the current Blockers rule with some rewording, such as

Proposals cannot be "repeal-proof," attempt to prevent the repeal of any unrepealed or future resolution, or block off an entire category or area of effect. However, 'Blockers' themselves are not illegal provided there is additional action (eg. GAR#10: Nuclear Arms Possession Act).

as opposed to rewriting the rule?

5. No, but (perhaps because???) the proposed new statement that proposals cannot "be "repeal-proof" or attempt to block repeal of another resolution" should suffice in these regards.

[Imperium Anglorum]

4. If "Secretariat prefers a "whole category" test, which would preserve the status quo," why can it not just retain the current Blockers rule with some rewording, such as

Proposals cannot be "repeal-proof," attempt to prevent the repeal of any unrepealed or future resolution, or block off an entire category or area of effect. However, 'Blockers' themselves are not illegal provided there is additional action (eg. GAR#10: Nuclear Arms Possession Act).

as opposed to rewriting the rule?

This isn't Github; there is no actual benefit to minimising the diff. Given the prolonged quibbling about wording, I would prefer not introducing more red herrings. Cf Cornford, Microcosmographica Academica (1908):

The third accepted means of obstruction is the Alternative Proposal. This is a form of Red Herring. As soon three or more alternatives are in the field, there is pretty sure to be a majority against any one of them, and nothing will be done.

5. No, but (perhaps because???) the proposed new statement that proposals cannot "be "repeal-proof" or attempt to block repeal of another resolution" should suffice in these regards.

Do you have any reasons why such a change shouldn't be made? As to the second point about the section that "should suffice", there is an argument that repeals and preservation of effect are not the same. Addition of the words "or effects thereof" at the end would actually suffice.

In the status quo, a new player would have to intuit through – not clearly transmitted – knowledge of the game that game mechanics prohibit clauses such as "[preserves] any other rights guaranteed by earlier legislation passed by this international body that has not been replaced". Placing it in the blocker rule is thematically consistent with the other rule provisions. Making it explicit resolves the un-intuitiveness.

[Rick Perry]

I agree with Tin with this.
She took the words out of my mouth, then added grammar!

[The Orwell Society]

Now this is a rule change I might be able to support. The blocker rule is a bit troublesome when you get down to the nitty-gritty, and a rewrite would be favorable.

[Wallenburg]

It is not only difficult, but impossible to measure "majority of category". That requires each and every policy consideration, including those which haven't been imagined yet, to be assessed and quantified in terms of category "weight", followed by examination of blockers for the fraction of total category weight obstructed by their language. No one is ever going to agree on the weight of any given policy within a category; after all, we can rarely agree on which categories they belong in in the first place. Leaving this standard totally undeveloped and simply entrusting GenSec with discretion in this regard is the worst possible choice, since it leaves GenSec unprepared to actually exercise discretion should a blocker issue come up. Total or near-total category blockage is the best standard we can manage.

Frankly, I see no reason to change this rule at all, beyond addressing the "broad and specific issues" problem. The rule has hardly caused problems in recent memory.

[Princess Rainbow Sparkles]

I am conceptually opposed to most blockers. They are undeniably undemocratic. When you get down to counting brass tacks, blockers exist just to stifle debate so some nations can have an expedient way to brush aside arguments for certain proposals they disfavor without having to bother actually addressing the merits.

That said, I am struggling to see how a "majority of the category" test could be applied in practice. It would necessarily require the exercise of judgement and discretion. I agree with Wally's opinion on that unless someone can articulate how that discretion would be fairly and uniformly applied.

The current "whole category" test does a lot of harm to the community's freedom to pursue worthy subjects, but it benefits from being an easy test to apply. The burden is on the proponent of the blocker to show that at least one single resolution could still be passed within the category. If the proponent can show that, the blocker is legal. I think the obvious harm from the rule becomes apparent once you frame it properly, but such trivialities aside it is such an easy rule to apply. So I could propose a law that prohibits the WA from further expanding civil or human rights "excepting proposals seeking to grant children the right to play in the sewer" and, voila, it is a legal blocker!

If we are going to have such a debilitating rule as the whole category test why bother having it at all? Just let whole categories get blocked off; the difference between that and the current rule is insubstantial.

[Imperium Anglorum]

Re the "majority of the category", the position that most commenters so far have taken – focusing on the lack of judicially cognisable standards – is also the position that prevails in the Secretariat.

I want to note also that the justification in general for why larger portions than whole categories (eg a "majority of a category") should not be blocked is to reduce the extent to which new players have to review previous legislation. A proposal which blocks off an entire category basically makes that category selection useless on the selection screen while not making that at all immediately obvious. The proposal to use a "majority of a category" test was to make sure that the selection would continue to be at least materially relevant. Of course, if that standard is not feasibly implemented, we should not do it unless the community were willing to accept a discretionary "smell" test.

As to the democracy argument, it doesn't really apply here. Blockers are themselves democratically legitimised by their passage. What it restricts is authorial freedom in the aftermath of the blocker (because authors have freedom as well to write blockers). Blockers also are related to primary legislation. The resolution Death Penalty Ban is an inherent blocker on "mandatory death penalty for incorrect utensil usage". In both cases, the democratic will of the Assembly can still be used to repeal the – direct or indirect – blocker.

I don't think anyone is interested in total abolition of the rule. The current rule does a number of things beyond the type of blockers it prohibits: "pure blockers" and repeal blockers.

[Unibot III]

The ‘democratic’ quality of a blocker resolution however comes into question when it is unclear what is and isn’t blocked by the resolution and the scope of the blocker, rather than being decided by the GA, is interpreted by the unelected GA Secretariat.

This has been an ongoing problem with many blockers because they’re written intentionally vague since the authors are usually trying to leave room for reasonable exceptions but broadly covering an entire topic — which results in a legal rorschach test. The old Mod team tended to defer to the GA Chamber to determine what it felt conflicted with a blocker (most things were allowed to be submitted, you could almost always get around a blocker realistically) whereas the current iteration of the GA Secretariat tends to want to determine these conflicts for itself resulting in much more stringent enforcement of blockers.

Take for instance, NAPA, which was badly undermined by years of legal precedent, establishing that it preserves almost nothing except STRICTLY possession of SOME quantity of nuclear weapons (NAPA doesn’t even block nuclear weapon disarmament agreements.) Blockers typically were seen as more narrower than they are regarded today and moderation was more open to submissions provided the author made an attempt to establish why their resolution didn’t conflict with the blocker.

[WayNeacTia]

Take for instance, NAPA, which was badly undermined by years of legal precedent, establishing that it preserves almost nothing except STRICTLY possession of SOME quantity of nuclear weapons (NAPA doesn’t even block nuclear weapon disarmament agreements.) .

Ah yes.... NAPA. The penultimate argument against blockers. Every time nuclear weapons legislation comes up the first question is always "Does it violate NAPA"? Is it trying to take away ALL of your nukes? If not then it don't violate NAPA.

[Unibot III]

Take for instance, NAPA, which was badly undermined by years of legal precedent, establishing that it preserves almost nothing except STRICTLY possession of SOME quantity of nuclear weapons (NAPA doesn’t even block nuclear weapon disarmament agreements.) .

Ah yes.... NAPA. The penultimate argument against blockers. Every time nuclear weapons legislation comes up the first question is always "Does it violate NAPA"? Is it trying to take away ALL of your nukes? If not then it don't violate NAPA.

Yup.

It’s what happens when an author writes their resolutions in crayon and the adults have to decipher its meaning and scope after the fact. I see this as a perennial problem with blockers. It’s never clear what they accomplish until years and years of rulings “shape” their meaning.

Effectively, the *real* impact of most blockers is to shift power from the GA to the Secretariat as they’re the ones who have to determine what these blockers mean.

[Anne of Cleves in TNP]

Is blocking a “majority” of a category considered as using a resolution to forbid the passage of resolutions on most topics in that category expect for a select few topics if the category? If this type of blocker prohibition were to be enforced, then how could it be enforced? Depending on the category, there may be many topics within each category, so it may be hard to get a quantitative result. I may need some guidance regarding this blocker subject.

[Spiderman]

I believe there should at least be a definition (or boundary) for majority-of-a-category. 51%/simple? 66%/two-thirds, or some other metric? With current whole blocking, the line to cross there can be relatively clear and objective. But if we are to open up part of a category or area of effect to blocking, how will we mark when it has gone too far? Reducing the blocking threshold from (essentially) 100 down to 66, 51 or something else seems like it could add on extra work and subjectivity, possibly requiring adjudication to parse through text to demarcate blocking, as opposed to status quo differentiating between what is more or less black versus white.

[Imperium Anglorum]

I believe there should at least be a definition (or boundary) for majority-of-a-category. 51%/simple? 66%/two-thirds, or some other metric? With current whole blocking, the line to cross there can be relatively clear and objective. But if we are to open up part of a category or area of effect to blocking, how will we mark when it has gone too far? Reducing the blocking threshold from (essentially) 100 down to 66, 51 or something else seems like it could add on extra work and subjectivity, possibly requiring adjudication to parse through text to demarcate blocking, as opposed to status quo differentiating between what is more or less black versus white.

Is blocking a “majority” of a category considered as using a resolution to forbid the passage of resolutions on most topics in that category expect for a select few topics if the category? If this type of blocker prohibition were to be enforced, then how could it be enforced? Depending on the category, there may be many topics within each category, so it may be hard to get a quantitative result. I may need some guidance regarding this blocker subject.

Yes, these are the main issues which the Secretariat identified with a "majority of the category" approach and the main issues why the Secretariat rejected that approach for lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards. We opened comment for possible input on resolving these issues if possible.

[WayNeacTia]

Is blocking a “majority” of a category considered as using a resolution to forbid the passage of resolutions on most topics in that category expect for a select few topics if the category? If this type of blocker prohibition were to be enforced, then how could it be enforced? Depending on the category, there may be many topics within each category, so it may be hard to get a quantitative result. I may need some guidance regarding this blocker subject.

Blockers: Proposals cannot be "repeal-proof" or prohibit legislation on broad and specific issues. However, 'Blockers' themselves are not illegal provided there is additional action (eg. GAR#10: Nuclear Arms Possession Act).

You have never been able to block off a whole category.

[Sandaoguo]

I'll reiterate what I said in 2015 about this rule. The "moral purpose" of the Blocker Rule is to allow the game to continue being played. The purpose of the General Assembly is to write international law, not to stop international law from being written. It's basically a self-preservation rule to extend the life of the General Assembly before it has to be hard reset.

The most glaring issue with a "whole category" approach to implementing this kind of rule is that it ignores cumulative effects. Two blockers that cover 50% each of a category cumulatively block the whole category, but in isolation are legal. The kicker is that's a problem with a "majority of the category" framework, too. There's no way to implement this rule by judging against some ratio of possible policy topics being blocked... while staying true to its purpose, at least.

If the Secretariat wants to make this rule work for the actual purpose it exists, the only way I personally see is that the Secretariat has to judge author intent. Proposal that are meant to stop other authors from writing resolutions where the World Assembly does something are the problem, and that's what should be against the rules. You can combine with the proposal categories, but at the end of the day intent is usually pretty clear, though I'm sure people will like to pretend it's not.

Since that's probably a no-go, the next best option is a "majority of the category" framework. Basically, anything that'll prevent, at any level, more blockers. There's no objective way to define a "majority of the category", so a smell test is all that you can hope for. If players don't trust the Secretariat to make that kind of subjective judgment, that's a separate issue altogether.

[Princess Rainbow Sparkles]

I believe there should at least be a definition (or boundary) for majority-of-a-category. 51%/simple? 66%/two-thirds, or some other metric? With current whole blocking, the line to cross there can be relatively clear and objective. But if we are to open up part of a category or area of effect to blocking, how will we mark when it has gone too far? Reducing the blocking threshold from (essentially) 100 down to 66, 51 or something else seems like it could add on extra work and subjectivity, possibly requiring adjudication to parse through text to demarcate blocking, as opposed to status quo differentiating between what is more or less black versus white.

Is blocking a “majority” of a category considered as using a resolution to forbid the passage of resolutions on most topics in that category expect for a select few topics if the category? If this type of blocker prohibition were to be enforced, then how could it be enforced? Depending on the category, there may be many topics within each category, so it may be hard to get a quantitative result. I may need some guidance regarding this blocker subject.

Dear friends, the problem is that nobody knows what “51%” of the civil rights category is. Or the education and creativity category, or the environmental category, or ANY category.

It is immediately difficult to see how to approach the problem from some kind of “majority” standpoint. We ordinarily think of the majority as a mathematical concept: we usually determine majority by counting something. But that approach in this context would seem to require the completion of an impossible task: how do you count the probably infinite total number of possible ideas for an “environmental” proposal to see whether a “majority” of them have been ruled out? You can’t!

Gen Sec couldn’t either. That is why they are appealing to us: to see if someone from the crowd can think of a standard they couldn’t.

If Gen Sec wants to weaken the ability to effectively block of entire categories, consider requiring blockers to fit within the scope of the proposal that creates them. For instance, a blocker passed in civil rights-minor category and could itself have only a mild blocking effect with the civil rights category. Gen Sec is presumably already able to make sound judgments about category and strength violations so no new metrics would necessarily need to be developed.

I want it clear that I never advocated getting rid of the blocker rule entirely. It serves an interesting role in the metagame of the GA. But if you don’t intend to weaken it, then you may as well get rid of the part that says a blocker will be illegal if it blocks off a whole category. Because most of Gen Sec believes that you can very easily work around the rule to effectively block off a whole category simply by leaving some essentially meaningless window for extremely limited work in that category behind. If that’s the state of the rule just call it what it is: a blocker may block off an entire GA resolution category. If players are unsatisfied with that and want to legislate in the category, they must repeal the blocker.

Who cares if new players think they can pass resolutions in a category that they actually can’t because of a blocker? Who cares if they have to read prior resolutions to see what parts of the game’s category system they can and cannot play legislator in. That is not a good justification for changing the rule’s test. In fact, I may go so far as to call this motivation irrational. Even if one blocker by its lonesome could not block off a majority of a category, two or three or four blockers working together would do the trick.

Apologies to Sandaugo if I repeat things they just said; we were drafting replies at the same time.

[Imperium Anglorum]

I'll reiterate what I said in 2015 about this rule. The "moral purpose" of the Blocker Rule is to allow the game to continue being played. The purpose of the General Assembly is to write international law, not to stop international law from being written. It's basically a self-preservation rule to extend the life of the General Assembly before it has to be hard reset.

The most glaring issue with a "whole category" approach to implementing this kind of rule is that it ignores cumulative effects. Two blockers that cover 50% each of a category cumulatively block the whole category, but in isolation are legal. The kicker is that's a problem with a "majority of the category" framework, too. There's no way to implement this rule by judging against some ratio of possible policy topics being blocked... while staying true to its purpose, at least.

If the Secretariat wants to make this rule work for the actual purpose it exists, the only way I personally see is that the Secretariat has to judge author intent. Proposal that are meant to stop other authors from writing resolutions where the World Assembly does something are the problem, and that's what should be against the rules. You can combine with the proposal categories, but at the end of the day intent is usually pretty clear, though I'm sure people will like to pretend it's not.

Since that's probably a no-go, the next best option is a "majority of the category" framework. Basically, anything that'll prevent, at any level, more blockers. There's no objective way to define a "majority of the category", so a smell test is all that you can hope for. If players don't trust the Secretariat to make that kind of subjective judgment, that's a separate issue altogether.

Thanks for this contribution to the discussion. Perhaps to go slightly beyond the OP's questions (that said, the OP's questions have stopped nobody else from going beyond them), what do you think about blocker legality in general?

[Old Hope]

It's also helpful to consider strength, and what a blocker actually is.
A blocker is a part of a resolution that reserves powers to member states. Sometimes it is actually useful to leave some things to member states to prevent micromanagement.
Proposals usually have various amounts of strength, as defined in the strength rule.
So there's already a de facto subjective rule here, and one tied to mechanics.
What I'd like to see definitely gone are any proposals with a blocking strength exceeding the actual proposal strength by one category or more.(A mild proposal with Significant blocking effects, a Significant proposal with Strong blocking effects or a Strong proposal with illegally strong blocking effects like "Leaves everything else related to democracy to individual decisions by member states, subject to extant WA resolutions"). These blocking effects cannot be explained by carving some exceptions or so; they are the primary focus of legislation, and that should be banned.
What I'd ideally prefer:
Strength(addition): Proposals that address entire categories(or nearly do so, or more) have a strength of "too much" and are forbidden(e.g. "Bans all forms of environmental restrictions in member states")
Blocking: Proposals may have exceptions from rules(as long as these don't make the proposal optional).Proposals may also reserve powers to member states(blockers). However, the following characteristics are illegal:
-Clauses that reserve powers to member states if they do not fit the active scope of the proposal(e.g. "Bans marriage, and reserves any decision on environmental issues to individual member states)
-The blocking strength of the proposal is equal or higher than the legislative strength of the proposal.
-Any combination of the above(if a minor tangentially related aspect of the proposal is getting high blocking strength plus a small clause your proposal WILL get shot down... don't try to circumvent the rule like that!)
When in doubt, avoid them.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

It's also helpful to consider strength, and what a blocker actually is.
A blocker is a part of a resolution that reserves powers to member states. Sometimes it is actually useful to leave some things to member states to prevent micromanagement.
Proposals usually have various amounts of strength, as defined in the strength rule.
So there's already a de facto subjective rule here, and one tied to mechanics.
What I'd like to see definitely gone are any proposals with a blocking strength exceeding the actual proposal strength by one category or more.(A mild proposal with Significant blocking effects, a Significant proposal with Strong blocking effects or a Strong proposal with illegally strong blocking effects like "Leaves everything else related to democracy to individual decisions by member states, subject to extant WA resolutions"). These blocking effects cannot be explained by carving some exceptions or so; they are the primary focus of legislation, and that should be banned.
What I'd ideally prefer:
Strength(addition): Proposals that address entire categories(or nearly do so, or more) have a strength of "too much" and are forbidden(e.g. "Bans all forms of environmental restrictions in member states")
Blocking: Proposals may have exceptions from rules(as long as these don't make the proposal optional).Proposals may also reserve powers to member states(blockers). However, the following characteristics are illegal:
-Clauses that reserve powers to member states if they do not fit the active scope of the proposal(e.g. "Bans marriage, and reserves any decision on environmental issues to individual member states)
-The blocking strength of the proposal is equal or higher than the legislative strength of the proposal.
-Any combination of the above(if a minor tangentially related aspect of the proposal is getting high blocking strength plus a small clause your proposal WILL get shot down... don't try to circumvent the rule like that!)
When in doubt, avoid them.

Do you have any examples of proposals or passed resolutions that do these things?

[Old Hope]

It's also helpful to consider strength, and what a blocker actually is.
A blocker is a part of a resolution that reserves powers to member states. Sometimes it is actually useful to leave some things to member states to prevent micromanagement.
Proposals usually have various amounts of strength, as defined in the strength rule.
So there's already a de facto subjective rule here, and one tied to mechanics.
What I'd like to see definitely gone are any proposals with a blocking strength exceeding the actual proposal strength by one category or more.(A mild proposal with Significant blocking effects, a Significant proposal with Strong blocking effects or a Strong proposal with illegally strong blocking effects like "Leaves everything else related to democracy to individual decisions by member states, subject to extant WA resolutions"). These blocking effects cannot be explained by carving some exceptions or so; they are the primary focus of legislation, and that should be banned.
What I'd ideally prefer:
Strength(addition): Proposals that address entire categories(or nearly do so, or more) have a strength of "too much" and are forbidden(e.g. "Bans all forms of environmental restrictions in member states")
Blocking: Proposals may have exceptions from rules(as long as these don't make the proposal optional).Proposals may also reserve powers to member states(blockers). However, the following characteristics are illegal:
-Clauses that reserve powers to member states if they do not fit the active scope of the proposal(e.g. "Bans marriage, and reserves any decision on environmental issues to individual member states)
-The blocking strength of the proposal is equal or higher than the legislative strength of the proposal.
-Any combination of the above(if a minor tangentially related aspect of the proposal is getting high blocking strength plus a small clause your proposal WILL get shot down... don't try to circumvent the rule like that!)
When in doubt, avoid them.

Do you have any examples of proposals or passed resolutions that do these things?

Not really more at the moment, but "Freedom from Want" would still be illegal(massive blocker strength on a Mild proposal)
and National Control of Elections would be illegal(Mild proposal, and the scope of the blocking is vast)
I can't provide legal examples, probably because the purpose of blockers is to block off legislation instead of passing legislation, which is exactly what my proposed rule bans.