[PASSED] International Patent Agreement

[Auralia]

I concur with this reasoning. The language is a holdover from an older resolution that defined patents as the right to use, manufacture, offer for sale, etc. the invention, as opposed to merely the right to exclude others from doing so. This definition is, of course, incorrect.

"Actually, you are incorrect, Ambassador. My sources hold that 'the right conferred by the patent grant is the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention. What is granted is not'--not, if I may emphasize--'the right to make, use, offer for sale, sell or import, but the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing the invention.'"

OOC: https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-s ... #heading-2

((OOC: I think we're actually saying the same thing. I was referring to Foreign Patent Recognition, not Foreign Patent Act.))

[Excidium Planetis]

In honesty, I'm asking if this will allow people to ignore patents that are being abused for more malicious intents aside from the original inventors ideas or the patents limits. Such as the snuffling of non-agreeing ideologies, the shunning of opposite people for the sole reasoning of "they don't like my economy policies? Fine.", or (as I am told by other nations) the strategic monopolizing of inventions and creations for the explicit use of bypassing others ideologies and to snuff them out as one would see fit.

OOC
1) The General Assembly Secretariat, the council of players responsible for interpreting the rules and determining the legality of GA proposals, has already ruled that this proposal does not violate the Ideological Ban rule, which is what Wallenburg and Tinfect earlier argued it did. International Patent Agreement is nit a ban on any ideology.
2) In what ways could patents be used maliciously that copyrights cannot? Foreign Copyright Recognition already requires nations to recognize foreign copyrights in a piece of legislation substantially similar to this one (and also written by Auralia). Wallenburg has claimed that by forcing nations to recognize the intellectual property rights of other nations, this proposal prohibits the ideology of [some ideology Wallenburg refused to name, but I suspect it was Communism all along]. As I have already pointed out, nations are already required to recognize foreign intellectual property. This resolution does nothing new.
3) Why should nations be allowed to manufacture patented inventions without the permission of the owner of those patents? And if they aren't allowed to do so, how is that not recognition of the patents? You seemed to say earlier that nations should be able to opt out of recognizing patents, but not be allowed to illegally manufacture those patented goods. If they can't violate the patents, aren't they recognizing the patents?

[Wallenburg]

"Actually, you are incorrect, Ambassador. My sources hold that 'the right conferred by the patent grant is the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention. What is granted is not'--not, if I may emphasize--'the right to make, use, offer for sale, sell or import, but the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing the invention.'"

OOC: https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-s ... #heading-2

((OOC: I think we're actually saying the same thing. I was referring to Foreign Patent Recognition, not Foreign Patent Act.))

OOC: Ah, I see. I misinterpreted the structure of that post. In particular, what "this" meant. Sorry about the confusion.

I'd like to take the time to formally apologize for my unexscuseable behavior to Wallenburg, back on the previous posts I've made in the voting forum for his proposal. I realize now that I wasn't understanding the situation. I thought unfairly of you due to the talks, and now that I can see the issue in this proposal, I realize... well honestly? How much of a jerk I was being. I hope all can be forgiven, and I formally take back any and all insults I lobbed over at you. Besides, it's clear to me that Wallenburg has invested a lot of time into this issue. I shouldn't have been so harsh about critizing his proposal.

Well, I appreciate the apology. I've been under some pressure the last few weeks with a rather busy schedule and only occasional periods where NationStates can really get much attention, and your rather assertive request for my time rubbed me the wrong way. As it is, I could have certainly been better to you, especially considering you are a new player, and so are relatively unfamiliar with this environment. Anyway, that's all about my defeated proposal, whereas this thread is for this proposal. I accept your apology and apologize in turn for not keeping my head as well as I ought to have. Now, to Patent Recognition TreatyInternational Patent Agreement!

Come to think of it... I'm almost at the point where I just want nations individually to handle it. Forget this WA patent office thing and be done with it, leaving it to individual nations. But that's a different debate for another forum.

OOC: Actually, that is a very appropriate topic for this proposal and any others dealing with patent law. National sovereignty has always been an important factor to consider in writing resolutions, and whether powers should be given to member states or held by the World Assembly can be the crux of the argument for or against many resolutions. I, personally, believe it is too important an issue to leave to the states, as does Auralia. We simply want different results with how the WA handles patent requests and how member states are affected.

[Skymoot]

((OOC: I think we're actually saying the same thing. I was referring to Foreign Patent Recognition, not Foreign Patent Act.))

OOC: Ah, I see. I misinterpreted the structure of that post. In particular, what "this" meant. Sorry about the confusion.

I'd like to take the time to formally apologize for my unexscuseable behavior to Wallenburg, back on the previous posts I've made in the voting forum for his proposal. I realize now that I wasn't understanding the situation. I thought unfairly of you due to the talks, and now that I can see the issue in this proposal, I realize... well honestly? How much of a jerk I was being. I hope all can be forgiven, and I formally take back any and all insults I lobbed over at you. Besides, it's clear to me that Wallenburg has invested a lot of time into this issue. I shouldn't have been so harsh about critizing his proposal.

Well, I appreciate the apology. I've been under some pressure the last few weeks with a rather busy schedule and only occasional periods where NationStates can really get much attention, and your rather assertive request for my time rubbed me the wrong way. As it is, I could have certainly been better to you, especially considering you are a new player, and so are relatively unfamiliar with this environment. Anyway, that's all about my defeated proposal, whereas this thread is for this proposal. I accept your apology and apologize in turn for not keeping my head as well as I ought to have. Now, to Patent Recognition TreatyInternational Patent Agreement!

Come to think of it... I'm almost at the point where I just want nations individually to handle it. Forget this WA patent office thing and be done with it, leaving it to individual nations. But that's a different debate for another forum.

OOC: Actually, that is a very appropriate topic for this proposal and any others dealing with patent law. National sovereignty has always been an important factor to consider in writing resolutions, and whether powers should be given to member states or held by the World Assembly can be the crux of the argument for or against many resolutions. I, personally, believe it is too important an issue to leave to the states, as does Auralia. We simply want different results with how the WA handles patent requests and how member states are affected.

Thanks for accepting my apologies. I know I'm new-ish to NS, but that doesn't give me the right to be bullhead about it haha. Thanks again.

To the nation V. WA comment: That is true. You're statement reminded me of how the USA works, between the states and the federal government. Or how the EU works and the individual nations of continental Europe. Having the luxury of heindsight right now, I'm actually considering just letting the patent thing sit on the back burner and see how the WA and the nations play out. From what Excitium Planets has to say, it sounds like there's already some form of patent bureaucracy in the WA. Call me a crazy conservative, but what if we all just waited and kept an eye on how the patents play out between nations of the WA? (Then again, that could be the ramblings of a dumb new player. Fair warning haha.)

In honesty, I'm asking if this will allow people to ignore patents that are being abused for more malicious intents aside from the original inventors ideas or the patents limits. Such as the snuffling of non-agreeing ideologies, the shunning of opposite people for the sole reasoning of "they don't like my economy policies? Fine.", or (as I am told by other nations) the strategic monopolizing of inventions and creations for the explicit use of bypassing others ideologies and to snuff them out as one would see fit.

OOC
1) The General Assembly Secretariat, the council of players responsible for interpreting the rules and determining the legality of GA proposals, has already ruled that this proposal does not violate the Ideological Ban rule, which is what Wallenburg and Tinfect earlier argued it did. International Patent Agreement is nit a ban on any ideology.
2) In what ways could patents be used maliciously that copyrights cannot? Foreign Copyright Recognition already requires nations to recognize foreign copyrights in a piece of legislation substantially similar to this one (and also written by Auralia). Wallenburg has claimed that by forcing nations to recognize the intellectual property rights of other nations, this proposal prohibits the ideology of [some ideology Wallenburg refused to name, but I suspect it was Communism all along]. As I have already pointed out, nations are already required to recognize foreign intellectual property. This resolution does nothing new.
3) Why should nations be allowed to manufacture patented inventions without the permission of the owner of those patents? And if they aren't allowed to do so, how is that not recognition of the patents? You seemed to say earlier that nations should be able to opt out of recognizing patents, but not be allowed to illegally manufacture those patented goods. If they can't violate the patents, aren't they recognizing the patents?

(The numbers are just to show my responses to the paragraphs.)

1.Ok, so that isn't an issue then. Good to know then. Makes me feel a little safer with the proposals. I felt like I had to ask, just to be fair to Aurelia and Wallenburg. I still feel like there is this air of uneasiness around both of the proposals though. It's unique to my perspective. Growing up with healthcare this or immegration that as controversial topics, I never imagined patents becoming a new controversial thing in my life. It's awesome haha.

2. Wait. Rewind here.

So we're all complaining about a proposal, that is what we're already doing anyway? We're all actively complaining about a law that we're already following, but feel like we need to make a proposal to the law, and never mind the fact that we repealed a law simalar to the old, still status quo, laws?

My brain hurts a little now. ... Is this the WA on a good day? Is it ok if you could link me to the resolution or law in question that does this thing already? I'd like to read it so I know what my countries signed up for, patent wise. Thanks for the insight.

3. Well the whole idea behind the opt out for me was to avoid having ideology shoved down a country's throat. This was before I knew about the GA ruling. I remember from Wallenburg's proposal forum that I mentioned nations possibly changing their patent definitions to suit a new goal, other than what it wasn't initially intended. Then the "inventors" could use those patents to bypass a diffrent nations ideology. Like a inventor could go to a environmentally protective nation to make a wood cutting machine because the other nations patent definition let the inventor do that. All this of course is struck out because of the ideology ruling that the GA made, so... to dumb this down: it's a mute point, and I'll shut up about it now lol.

[Excidium Planetis]

2. Wait. Rewind here.

So we're all complaining about a proposal, that is what we're already doing anyway? We're all actively complaining about a law that we're already following, but feel like we need to make a proposal to the law, and never mind the fact that we repealed a law simalar to the old, still status quo, laws?

My brain hurts a little now. ... Is this the WA on a good day? Is it ok if you could link me to the resolution or law in question that does this thing already? I'd like to read it so I know what my countries signed up for, patent wise. Thanks for the insight.

Alright, I know it is confusing, but let me try to clear this up.

First, patents and copyrights are not the same, although they are very similar. In very simple terms, you patent objects, but you copyright ideas. So you can patent your new car that uses air for fuel, but you would copyright the book you just wrote... the book isn't an invention, you didn't make up a new object, but the book's story is your idea. You created it. You can copyright written works, art, music, videos, etc. You would patent inventions, chemical formulas, and a few other types of innovations.

Currently, the WA requires nations to respect the copyrights of foreign nations, but not the patents of foreign nations. So if a citizen of my nation writes a play, a citizen in your nation cannot put on that same play at the largest theatre in your nation and try to pass it off as their own (at least not for 20 years). But if a citizen of your nation invents the wheel, my nation can reverse engineer the wheel and begin producing wheels to sell to your trading partners at a price lower than your wheels. What Auralia is trying to do is make it so that if a citizen in your nation invents the wheel, my nation cannot produce wheels without that citizen's permission, at least until the patent expires (as set by the WAPO).

Now, as for what was being argued: Wallenburg, primarily, and others as well, was arguing that because this proposal forced nations to recognize privately held intellectual property rights, it was a ban on ideologies that do not recognize private property rights. I pointed out, however, that Foreign Copyright Recognition, which deals with another form of intellectual property (copyrights) already required nations to recognize the private intellectual property rights of other nations. For the record, the text of Foreign Copyright Recognition is here.

[Auralia]

This has been submitted.

Martin Russell
Chief Ambassador, Auralian Mission to the World Assembly

[The United Royal Islands of Euramathania]

Now, as for what was being argued: Wallenburg, primarily, and others as well, was arguing that because this proposal forced nations to recognize privately held intellectual property rights, it was a ban on ideologies that do not recognize private property rights. I pointed out, however, that Foreign Copyright Recognition, which deals with another form of intellectual property (copyrights) already required nations to recognize the private intellectual property rights of other nations. For the record, the text of Foreign Copyright Recognition is here.

I wish to clarify my arguement as one of those opposed to Auralia's interpretation. I am opposed to resolutions which place the burden of enforcing rules contrary to a states values on those member states. I don't feel that anything in this resolution bans or even restricts a member state from choosing their economic values. However, it does make it so that those governments without intellectual property protections in their home countries are a disadvantage, and are placed in the position of siding with foreign entities over inside producers.
Most clearly in this example would be underdeveloped nations. Instead of being able to resort to intellectual property theft, which may be immoral, to improve the development of such a nation they would be forced to buy the goods from a more well developed nation, presumably they would not be able to afford. In order to make sure that such a system which could become unfair to deveolped nations and entities that invented such goods, we proposed separating the markets and placing on those members the burden of the rule. We even made it so that members without patent protection could not directly benefit from the existence of a World Patent body.
The other country model disadvanted in this resolution is those member states lacking in a state for which to enforce such rules. Such anarchies are placed in an ideological bind, that means favoring foreigners over their own people. They would have to apply WA rules at the border despite not having such rules within their borders.
Such effects mean that this resolution is contrary to a principle of using a least restrictive means of achieving its goals. If the goal is ensuring producers and inventors receive fair compensation for goods, they are able to fully untilize their patent in a robust market of states that share their values. Universality of the rule only serves to exploit vunerable states lacking in protections. Clearly such states are a minority of the WA, and given the option to not place the burdens of WA legislation on them, it would not unduly impact the goals of the resolution to seek their protection.
As to how patent protection is unique from copyright protection is the nature of what is protection. Patents go to the core of production and thus economic viability. In many cases it is larger and thus established entities which are able to persue patent violatations, typically against less established entities. In an international context this places the WA in the role of favoring such larger states and entities over smaller ones. Copyrights protect more empheral materials and thus less crucial to economic activity. Even your example, you copyright music, you patent the wheel. Which is more necessary? The threshold for WA intervention should be much higher for parents than for copyrights.

[Excidium Planetis]

The other country model disadvanted in this resolution is those member states lacking in a state for which to enforce such rules. Such anarchies are placed in an ideological bind, that means favoring foreigners over their own people. They would have to apply WA rules at the border despite not having such rules within their borders.

OOC
Such WA member nations either do not exist or are in non-compliance. The WA requires a national government.

[Overthinkers]

Hall: "After much deliberation—"
Ryder: "Overthinking, one might say..."
Hall glares at Ryder for a moment before continuing: "Ahem. After much deliberation, Overthinkers has come to the following conclusion—due to the present controversy surrounding the issue, our delegation will be voting against any international patent proposal in the near future."
Ryder: "That means this one, too."
Hall: ...

[Reborn Ottoman Sultan]

There is nothing wrong with the protection of intellectual property rights which ensure that inventors are recognized for their productions. It is all too easy for big business to sideline independent inventors beneath the clout of the bottom line. However, it becomes imperative to realize that humans have not been driven to invent and innovate simply to procure fame and recognition for their patents... As a tangible example, for each idea, concept, and invention he devised, Benjamin Franklin opposed patents for all three categories insisting that his work was intended to unequivocally serve the common good.

Inventors should not be muscled out of their patents simply because their livelihoods depend on it. Yet, on the other hand, intellectual property laws manipulate and regulate processes of manufacturing preventing third world nations from developing their own industries. Such an international system will preserve the great developmental divide between the first and third worlds respectively. How do we transcend intellectual property laws that hinder a nation's development while protecting the patent rights of independent inventors/innovators everywhere? This could be classified as the balancing of geo-economic autonomy between macro and micro applications...

Peoples around the world have the right to develop their societies just as threads of genius merit recognition and assurances of reasonable economic solvency without realities of blatant marginalization or perpetual economic servitude...

[Imperium Anglorum]

On the question of whether or not patents hurt developing economies, the answer is no. Empirically, this was shown over two decades ago in a commonly-cited 1996 paper by Gould and Gruben The role of intellectual property rights in economic growth. They concluded that 'empirically, we find that stronger intellectual property rights protection corresponds to higher economic growth rates in a cross-country sample'. However, they also note that the statistical difference is small and the effect is lessened in less competitive and more protected markets.

A more recent paper in 2013 by Hu and Png showed that increased patent protections in Turkey and Singapore were associated with increased growth rates from both factor accumulation and higher productivity.

Highly developed nations are going to be the ones with more patents, because they are currently highly developed. But people consistently forget two things: (1) that patents have limited enforcement periods and (2) that other nations can develop too, and can assert similar intellectual property right claims.

The majority of the technologies which undeveloped nations want to implement (like infrastructure, public health, and other basic projects) have been out of patent for generations. Almost all new production technologies are extremely capital intensive and have high upfront costs. Even if undeveloped nations wanted to get them, they probably couldn't afford the purchasing costs anyway. Even if they had them, they don't have the human capital necessary to operate it.

Most patents are not relevant to your developing nation. For your extremely poor nation, they are even less so for the same reasons. And even then, such a nation is unlikely to be able to enforce intellectual property rights anyway, so whatever the patents regime is, it doesn't have any detrimental effect on domestic production, full stop.

Even with that in mind, patent systems do not create this absurd outcome of 'eternal servitude' (scary voice™). Empirically, we have significant numbers of patents coming out of India and China, currently developing nations right now. The issuance of patents are generally dependent on human capital and corporate investment rather than who is currently developed. As other nations develop, other nations will have more patents.

The literature clearly shows that in all nations, however, stronger patent rights increase returns to innovation, because they give for limited times state sanctioned monopolies. This leads to higher inputs of capital and labour, along with the productivity increases which innovation entails.

From Hu and Png's 2013 paper, they estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function from the empirical parameters, which showed clear benefits from stronger patent regimes to factor accumulation (with middling impacts on total factor productivity in developing nations, with higher impacts in developed nations). Thus, from a theoretical and empirical perspective, to be clear: the patent system causes higher rates of return for innovation, which leads to greater investment, which employs more capital and labour, which leads to economic growth.

It isn't like we need any of this literature to even show this to be the case. From a first-principles basis, working directly off of the Solow-Swann growth model, the primary cause of economic growth is capital accumulation. Patents increase the level of capital accumulation by increasing factor returns. This would simply result in convergence to the steady-state at a faster rate. Even if we endogenise total factor productivity growth, the determinants of that growth are more to do with intertemporal elasticity, time-discount factors, and capital share than some nebulous market for ideas.

The literature is clear on this. There is strong theoretical argumentation in favour of it. There is empirical proof of it happening in multiple cross-country analyses. There aren't any real trade-offs and there isn't a debate to be had.

[Gages Icelandic Army]

The phrase, "composition of matter" scares me. I feel like it can be abused. If I can get over that, I'll vote for it.

[Wallenburg]

On the question of whether or not patents hurt developing economies, the answer is no. Empirically, this was shown over two decades ago in a commonly-cited 1996 paper by Gould and Gruben The role of intellectual property rights in economic growth. They concluded that 'empirically, we find that stronger intellectual property rights protection corresponds to higher economic growth rates in a cross-country sample'. However, they also note that the statistical difference is small and the effect is lessened in less competitive and more protected markets.

A more recent paper in 2013 out of the National University of Singapore showed that increased patent protections in Turkey and Singapore were associated with increased growth rates from both factor accumulation and higher productivity.

Highly developed nations are going to be the ones with more patents, because they are currently highly developed. But people consistently forget two things: (1) that patents have limited enforcement periods and (2) that other nations can develop too, and can assert similar intellectual property right claims.

The majority of the technologies which undeveloped nations want to implement (like infrastructure, public health, and other basic projects) have been out of patent for generations. Almost all new production technologies are extremely capital intensive and have high upfront costs. Even if undeveloped nations wanted to get them, they probably couldn't afford the purchasing costs anyway. Even if they had them, they don't have the human capital necessary to operate it.

Most patents are not relevant to your developing nation. For your extremely poor nation, they are even less so for the same reasons. And even then, such a nation is unlikely to be able to enforce intellectual property rights anyway, so whatever the patents regime is, it doesn't have any detrimental effect on domestic production, full stop.

Even with that in mind, patent systems do not create this absurd outcome of 'eternal servitude' (scary voice™). Empirically, we have significant numbers of patents coming out of India and China, currently developing nations right now. The issuance of patents are generally dependent on human capital and corporate investment rather than who is currently developed. As other nations develop, other nations will have more patents.

The literature clearly shows that in all nations, however, stronger patent rights increase returns to innovation, because they give for limited times state sanctioned monopolies. This leads to higher inputs of capital and labour, along with the productivity increases which innovation entail.

From Hu and Png's 2013 paper, they estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function from the empirical parameters, which showed clear factor accumulation (with middling impacts on total factor productivity in developing nations, with higher impacts in developed nations). Thus, from a theoretical and empirical perspective, to be clear: the patent system causes higher rates of return for innovation, which leads to greater investment, which employs more capital and labour, which leads to economic growth.

It isn't like we need any of this literature to even show this to be the case. From a first-principles basis, working directly off of the Solow-Swann growth model, the primary cause of economic growth is capital accumulation. Patents increase the level of capital accumulation by increasing factor returns. This would simply result in convergence to the steady-state at a faster rate. Even if we endogenise total factor productivity growth, the determinants of that growth are more to do with inter temporal elasticity, time-discount factors, and capital share than some nebulous market for ideas.

The literature is clear on this. There is strong theoretical argumentation in favour of it. There is empirical proof of it happening in multiple cross-country analyses. There isn't a debate to be had.

Yeah, we get it, you study economics.

[Gages Icelandic Army]

@Imperium Anglorum
Did you study economics or something? You seem to really know your stuff.

[Nationalist Republic of Alaska]

I'd assume this is a direct copy of the last resolution, which was struck down duly?

[The United Royal Islands of Euramathania]

The other country model disadvanted in this resolution is those member states lacking in a state for which to enforce such rules. Such anarchies are placed in an ideological bind, that means favoring foreigners over their own people. They would have to apply WA rules at the border despite not having such rules within their borders.

OOC
Such WA member nations either do not exist or are in non-compliance. The WA requires a national government.

How so? I can understand that some esstential functions are necessary, to uphold previously passed resolutions but it would directly contradict GA2.1 that members may choose for themselves the form their state takes. Which resolution requires the existence of a formal national government to be established?
I am merely arguing that the burden is on the affirmative to prove why it is necessary to enforce patents universally, and further that their method is the least restrictive on member states in order to achieve such ends. I believe I have made a fair case as to why a minor exception in this matter would not diminish the effects of the resolution. I have also provided the language of such an exception that ensures the goals of the resolution are upheld without unduly burdening members conflicted by the universality of the mandate. I also believe that a fair case exists that such countries who would seek the alternative are minor enough that it would not diminish the market for patent goods. Given the choice between a resoultuon which considers a diversity of states, and their needs, and one which doesn't: the GA has a greater obligation to favor the free expression of members to choose how their states are governed, and seek to do so by enforcing laws with the least restrictive means of achieving ones ends.

[Wallenburg]

I'd assume this is a direct copy of the last resolution, which was struck down duly?

You could always read the resolution, and compare it to the previous one.

[Sciongrad]

Yeah, we get it, you study economics.

OOC: No offense, but you're the one that's waded deep into the economic mire by arguing that patents cripple socialist states. You can't start a discussion on a topic that's fundamentally economic and then dismiss IA's arguments because they rely on the very thing you're arguing over!

Not singling you out, but this isn't the first time this has happened. Either don't stake out such a passionate position on economic issues or be prepared to defend them when confronted with actual economic argumentation. :/

[Wallenburg]

Yeah, we get it, you study economics.

OOC: No offense, but you're the one that's waded deep into the economic mire by arguing that patents cripple socialist states. You can't start a discussion on a topic that's fundamentally economic and then dismiss IA's arguments because they rely on the very thing you're arguing over!

OOC: I'm not dismissing his arguments. I am simply pointing out that there are better ways to discuss economics than to flaunt formal education before those who have not taken it upon themselves to dedicate their studies to economics.

Not singling you out, but this isn't the first time this has happened. Either don't stake out such a passionate position on economic issues or be prepared to defend them when confronted with actual economic argumentation. :/

OOC: And this isn't the first time IA has waved his dick with regard to his education in economics. This is an ongoing problem that he refuses to speak in English when talking about economics. He is entirely capable of reducing his jargon into more universally understandable language.

[The United Royal Islands of Euramathania]

OOC:

Either don't stake out such a passionate position on economic issues or be prepared to defend them when confronted with actual economic argumentation

I shall endaveor to defend my economic claims, as you have rightfully put it.

One: The issue of patents isn't as settled as IA makes it seem. As recently as 2013, the WTO has debated in open session wether or not undeveloped nations , most notably Kenya, should be exempted from international patent frameworks. The major reason being that imposing the higher patent standards of western nations on Kenyan patents basically meant few such patents could be made to locals, and almost patents where foreign held. Nagala Rizk, promentient IP scholar at the American University in Cairo Egypt, wrote several case studies and economic impact analysis of the international patent framework which were the underlying framework of the debate. While the WTO ultimately decided to leave the frameworks in place in late 2014, the Kenyans did receive a few concessions toward reducing lower barriers to local patent registration. Further models have demonstrated that the lower barriers in Kenya have encouraged patent registration and local production.

Two: Historical evidence shows that patent protections as used by western states, are a form of economic coercion on less modern, developed, or integrated states. A scholar of international law at University of Pennsylvania, Charles Collins-Chase J.D, wrote in 2008:

Developing countries face great pressure to sign FTAs, often under threat of trade sanctions, but many factors indicate that they should not enter into these agreements. The benefits are more modest than developed countries predict, and developing countries constrain their policy options greatly by signing these FTAs, especially in the pharmaceutical field. In countries with a significant HIV/AIDS problem, the economics are even less favorable due to the costs of the disease and the diminished options for treatment that the FTAs cause. In the case of Thailand and the SACU countries, a comparison of the costs of AIDS to the anticipated benefits of the FTA indicates that the economic and social costs outweigh the benefits, and these countries have done well to move away from FTAs with the United States.

Other notable examples of this phenomenon include post-British India, South Africa, and Post Belgian Congo. As each state moved away from former colonial ties as well as integrated patenting systems the economic advantages became more known.

Finally, I contend that as I have been arguing on this mater, the importance of the economic arguement is less central to the debate than whether or not the resolution at hand can achieve its goals without placing undue burdens on member states which do not share the author's worldview. My character has consistently argued that there is a less invasive means of doing so, has provided a framework for understanding why it is important to do so, reduced the impacts associated with the framework, and argued that the GA itself has a strong obligation toward choosing to do so. The question of economic coercion underscores the need to have such a framework but is not the sole justification for doing so. I believe that the natural diversity of states should give the GA pause before placing on all members onerous regulations.

[The Greater Siriusian Domain]

Teran Saber: "I have to bring up the elephant in the room... or really, the Siriusian Wildcat in the room, seeing as though the Greater Siriusian Domain is one of the nations that makes this a problematic proposal. The technological levels of member nations vary wildly, from pre-Renascence to levels that invoke Clark's Third Law. Even disregarding the potential issues of economics, a sufficiently advanced nation could, in theory, force its less advanced neighbors into a state of technological stagnation by simply claiming that any developments that the more primitive nations make violate this proposal. As a hypothetical example, the Greater Siriusian Domain could prevent other nations from developing a keyhole drive similar to the ones used by Siriusian starships, forcing the less advanced nation to continue to utilize slower, more primitive warp drives or attempt to find an alternative founded on completely new research that may or may not even bear fruit. An aggressive, imperialistic nation could use this to prevent weapons development in other nations during peacetime, so that they would then stand unopposed once they go on the warpath, while a mercantile nation could use it to maintain a trade monopoly."

"Because of this issue, the Greater Siriusian Domain has no choice but to vote no, despite having incentives, both legitimate and otherwise, to do so."

[Auralia]

Even disregarding the potential issues of economics, a sufficiently advanced nation could, in theory, force its less advanced neighbors into a state of technological stagnation by simply claiming that any developments that the more primitive nations make violate this proposal. As a hypothetical example, the Greater Siriusian Domain could prevent other nations from developing a keyhole drive similar to the ones used by Siriusian starships, forcing the less advanced nation to continue to utilize slower, more primitive warp drives or attempt to find an alternative founded on completely new research that may or may not even bear fruit.

Only inventions that have not been disclosed to the public prior to the filing of a patent application with the WAPO can be patented. The situation you describe cannot occur.

Martin Russell
Chief Ambassador, Auralian Mission to the World Assembly

[States of Glory WA Office]

Quite honestly, I've been meaning to argue against this proposal, but there's been more debate in the Legality thread than there has been in the actual thread, and I've vowed to avoid all GA Secretariat threads, so now's my chance.

Let's say, for the sake of argument, that a socialist nation has a law that says that only the state may hold a patent. All innovation and production is managed solely by the state, which hires scientists, entrepreneurs and inventors to conduct R&D before the invention is then manufactured by engineers. The state doesn't make any money from this, of course; they provide these inventions for free, after all. That said, they technically hold a patent so that private hands can't obtain the invention and start selling it.

This socialist nation realises that not every country works like this, so they refrain from pirating goods and enforcing their patents in other nations. Therefore, they see no reason to file an international patent with the WAPO. All seems fine, but while the nation's scientists are working on a brand new potentially life-saving invention, a foreigner from a capitalist nation decides to steal the invention and patent it in their own nation. They then decide to file an international patent.

Beginning to see the problem? Under Clause Two, the nation in question is prohibited from using or manufacturing an invention which they themselves created without first asking permission from the thief who patented it. Of course, under national law, the state holds the patent as per usual, but now they're effectively held hostage by a foreigner who could make unreasonable demands in exchange for the right to produce the invention. What's worse is that unlike in your last proposal, there is no requirement stating that the patent holder has to exploit the invention in that particular member state, so even if this doesn't force a socialist member state to recognise private enterprise, it still blocks them from utilising their own invention.

Right now, I can't support the draft in its current state. What is your reply to the above hypothetical?

[Imperium Anglorum]

One: The issue ...

Considering that the World Trade Organisation is a political body, I would be surprised if they didn't discuss the matter. But as always, the statements of politicians rarely have any bearing on the truth. The question of patent registration itself is an interesting one. I'm not familiar with research on the topic, especially as the registration processes of patents themselves isn't something which can very well be measured empirically. The World Intellectual Property Organisation notes (pg. 56) that the literature is divided on how much economic growth increases due to the existence or non-existence of patent regimes.

Writ large, much of the negative literature arises from concerns about the pharmaceutical industry. However, due to Access to Life-Saving Drugs, this is basically irrelevant in its entirety. The World Assembly has already solved that problem. Regarding economic development writ large, I don't think we can so easily discount the empirical work already done which shows increased economic growth rates for nations with patent systems. That isn't to say that patent protections should be extremely strong, but rather, that we ought have one.

Again, quoting the WIPO minutes, 'It concludes that national patent protection alone does not stimulate domestic growth or innovation. The article finds that there is an optimal level of IP rights regulation above which further strength reduces innovative activities' (pg. 58). Auralia's act here establishes a relatively loose and relatively weak patents system. My response is to all the spilt ink on whether or not we ought have a patent system at all.

Two: Historical evidence ...

I don't think that Western coercion is a compelling argument. If Western coercion increases economic growth rates and distributes that money to the masses, I have no problem with it. The foremost obligations we have are towards the utility of people on the ground, it is to the physical resource constraints they are presented with, not to the political or governmental objectives of a regime which believes it has been wronged. This argument has three major issues: (1) Western coercion is irrelevant to people's day to day struggle to feed, clothe, and house themselves, (2) it could be used to argue against practically any former colonisers intervening in former colonies, even when there are more important things to worry about — I for one, would certainly support armed humanitarian intervention in the former Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, and (3) it primarily deals with pharmaceutical drugs, which aren't an issue, as Access to Life-Saving Drugs has already solved that problem.

Finally, I contend ...

Ideology has anything to do with it. First, from a utilitarian perspective, this framework allows for massive harms to be committed against populations with no gains. It would be perfectly moral to circumscribe anyone's ideology if it imposes a real and immediate harm to people on the ground. While agrarian Communism is certainly an ideology which people can hold, the World Assembly should not care strongly you believe in agrarian Communism if you're set on making sequels to Pol Pot and the Great Leap Forward. Secondly, the World Assembly has long restricted ideology in the name of the general welfare. I see no reason why it should stop doing so now.

The physical environment is a defining limitation of experience writ large. A necessary precondition of flourishing of any sort is the presence of the physical resources which can be marshalled to that purpose. We have a moral obligation to rectify and expand those limitations, as not doing so imposes an implicit cost to the members of society. As this is the primary precondition to flourishing, we ought prioritise it above any sense of ideological purity.

[Auralia]

This socialist nation realises that not every country works like this, so they refrain from pirating goods and enforcing their patents in other nations. Therefore, they see no reason to file an international patent with the WAPO.

Personally, I think this is a mistake on their part. The socialist nation should file for an international patent to ensure that they retain control over the invention, even if they do not intend to enforce the patent. They have no reason not to. However, even if they do not file for a patent, the situation you describe later cannot occur, as I explain below.

All seems fine, but while the nation's scientists are working on a brand new potentially life-saving invention, a foreigner from a capitalist nation decides to steal the invention and patent it in their own nation. They then decide to file an international patent.

Such an application would be denied. Since the socialist nation has already made the invention available to the public, it is not eligible for a WAPO patent under clause 3(b)(ii).

Martin Russell
Chief Ambassador, Auralian Mission to the World Assembly