Meta-debate about the debate about the debate about 17 GA

[Imperium Anglorum]

"Intentions do not matter in legalese. Words do. What is intended and what is written can mean two different things."

OOC: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Originalism

OOC: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Originalism

OOC: The WA actually follows something called strict textualism.

OOC: The WA actually follows something called strict textualism.

OOC:
I disagree that this is the case. See: "Mandatory Donations".

OOC:
I disagree that this is the case. See: "Mandatory Donations".

Well, the entire reason people disagree about 17 GA is a dictionary fight, which would still be something relevant given strict textualism.

Well, the entire reason people disagree about 17 GA is a dictionary fight, which would still be something relevant given strict textualism.

OOC: this is fascinating, but it is getting off topic. I would love to participate...in another thread.

I'm down for this debate. Obviously, it's going to be OOC.

[Glen-Rhodes]

I can say for certain that not every member of GenSec subscribes to strict textualism-- though I imagine the phrase being referred to is actually supposed to be strict constructionism. The plain meaning doctrine is about the only universally recognized doctrine in the GA legal system, but that's not textualism and it's been ignored from time to time too.

[Wallenburg]

I disagree with both of these positions. To each nation their own manner of interpreting World Assembly resolutions, as long as you comply with GA#2.

[Sciongrad]

Is this even still in dispute? I feel the arguments have been exhausted.

[Canton Empire]

Is this even still in dispute? I feel the arguments have been exhausted.

It's relevant to the last clause of GA #355

[Imperium Anglorum]

Is this even still in dispute? I feel the arguments have been exhausted.

Well, this is the debate about the meta-debate, actually. So we're not debating about whether it is one way or another, but rather, whether the mechanism used to derive one conclusion over the other one is preferable mechanism.

[Sciongrad]

Is this even still in dispute? I feel the arguments have been exhausted.

Well, this is the debate about the meta-debate, actually. So we're not debating about whether it is one way or another, but rather, whether the mechanism used to derive one conclusion over the other one is preferable mechanism.

Oh, I see. Well, the appeal to originalism is ridiculous. It's a fringe philosophy in the real world. When trying to resolve legal ambiguities, you should rely on a few things. 1. the text itself, 2. the consequences of a particular interpretation. Is the text here ambiguous? I think a reasonable person could argue that mandatory donations are not prescribed in the text, so yes. But which interpretation makes the most sense, based on its outcome? Considering the sprawling bureaucracy of the WA, basic sociological principles like the free rider problem, and the consequences of a voluntary scheme, mandatory donations is the only interpretation that makes any sense.

Additionally, if you want to rely on originalism and believe that original intent or understanding was dispositive, then the question would still be resolved in favor of mandatory donations because despite the preamble, the author has repeatedly stated that he intended to create a mandatory donation scheme. Strict textualism is not a feasible approach in this case. There's no way to resolve the textual ambiguity without importing values from outside the text. EP seems to be under the impression that their interpretation is the one most consistent with strict textualism, but the dictionary right quite clearly demonstrates that a reasonable interpretation of the language supports both interpretations.

[Imperium Anglorum]

Additionally, if you want to rely on originalism and believe that original intent or understanding was dispositive, then the question would still be resolved in favor of mandatory donations because despite the preamble, the author has repeatedly stated that he intended to create a mandatory donation scheme.

I agree with your interpretation above. We've had some 1600 words of agreement on WALR in the past. But the manner in which people support optional donations is by strict textualism, not by originalism, which has some consideration of intent.

[Sciongrad]

But the manner in which people support optional donations is by strict textualism, not by originalism, which has some consideration of intent.

I agree that's what they think they're arguing, but I would push back on whether or not strict textualism is an appropriate interpretative method in this case. I made this edit above, in case you missed it:

Strict textualism is not a feasible approach in this case. There's no way to resolve the textual ambiguity without importing values from outside the text. EP seems to be under the impression that their interpretation is the one most consistent with strict textualism, but the dictionary fight quite clearly demonstrates that a reasonable interpretation of the language supports both interpretations.

[Excidium Planetis]

1. the text itself, 2. the consequences of a particular interpretation. Is the text here ambiguous? I think a reasonable person could argue that mandatory donations are not prescribed in the text, so yes. But which interpretation makes the most sense, based on its outcome? Considering the sprawling bureaucracy of the WA, basic sociological principles like the free rider problem, and the consequences of a voluntary scheme, mandatory donations is the only interpretation that makes any sense.

That's not textualism, however. Until I get a better definition of textualism, I'll quote Wikipedia:

Textualism is a formalist theory of the interpretation of law, holding that a legal text's ordinary meaning should govern its interpretation, as opposed to inquiries into non-textual sources such as the intention of the legislature in passing the law, the problem it was intended to remedy, or substantive questions of the justice and rectitude of the law.[1]

Emphasis added. Considering whether or not voluntary donations solve the problem of funding the GA bureaucracy is not textualism, it is outside it as the description of the textualist approach indicates.

Rather, if textualism is governing interpretation with the ordinary meaning of the text, then the interpretation that fits the ordinary meaning of donation... which is a voluntary thing, as nobody in real life uses donations to mean mandatory payments in ordinary uses of the word, then voluntary donations follow from textualism. I'll agree that assess can be used either way... but again, the most ordinary meaning is not to assess a fine, which is the least common usage today as I pointed out in discussing the difference between the OED and Oxford Dictionaries.

An approach through strict textualism yields the voluntary interpretation.

[Sciongrad]

Emphasis added. Considering whether or not voluntary donations solve the problem of funding the GA bureaucracy is not textualism, it is outside it as the description of the textualist approach indicates.

What are you talking about? I explicitly said that textualism is not an appropriate method of interpretation in this case, not that using an assessment of the consequences of an interpretation is textualist.

Rather, if textualism is governing interpretation with the ordinary meaning of the text, then the interpretation that fits the ordinary meaning of donation... which is a voluntary thing, as nobody in real life uses donations to mean mandatory payments in ordinary uses of the word, then voluntary donations follow from textualism. I'll agree that assess can be used either way... but again, the most ordinary meaning is not to assess a fine, which is the least common usage today as I pointed out in discussing the difference between the OED and Oxford Dictionaries.

You are beginning with your conclusion and using the interpretative method to justify it. The fact that you're, like, the only one that thinks your reading of the resolution is the plainest demonstrates quite clearly that it is not as unambiguous as you think. Because a plain reading of the text can render two possible meaning, textualism is not an appropriate method to assess the meaning of the resolution here. When there are two reasonable interpretations of the text, you must necessarily rely on other methods to construct the meaning. An approach through strict textualism yields nothing instructive here.

[Gruenberg]

And for those of us not versed in US legal terminology...?

[Unibot III]

Agreed with Gruenberg, these US terms are esoteric to non-Americans.

My take is that the proper way to interpret law is both textually and substantively.

[Separatist Peoples]

Agreed with Gruenberg, these US terms are esoteric to non-Americans.

My take is that the proper way to interpret law is both textually and substantively.

At least in American Constitutional analysis, those two can't both be done at the same time. One needs to come first. Which, I think, is ultimately what is being discussed here.

[Unibot III]

Agreed with Gruenberg, these US terms are esoteric to non-Americans.

My take is that the proper way to interpret law is both textually and substantively.

At least in American Constitutional analysis, those two can't both be done at the same time. One needs to come first. Which, I think, is ultimately what is being discussed here.

That's because in Canadian jurisprudence, "substantive" does not strictly mean original intent but a dimension of common meaning logically related and supported by the text. That is to say, one is not being "textual" if they're ignoring the substance and logical consequences behind the precise text being interpreted, they're just being daft.

The US take on judicial interpretation seems to be a funhouse of assumptions intended narrowly to squeeze whatever politics folks want out of the US Amendments.

[Separatist Peoples]

At least in American Constitutional analysis, those two can't both be done at the same time. One needs to come first. Which, I think, is ultimately what is being discussed here.

That's because in Canadian jurisprudence, "substantive" does not strictly mean original intent but a dimension of common meaning logically related and supported by the text. That is to say, one is not being "textual" if they're ignoring the substance and logical consequences behind the precise text being interpreted, they're just being daft.

The US take on judicial interpretation seems to be a funhouse of assumptions intended narrowly to squeeze whatever politics folks want out of the US Amendments.

Eh, there's more to it than that, certainly, but I'm not yet familiar enough with it to speak in-depth on the topic. That said, the Textualist approach rather does seem to be "What would the 18th century do?" in the US.

[Bananaistan]

Agreed with Gruenberg, these US terms are esoteric to non-Americans.

My take is that the proper way to interpret law is both textually and substantively.

Me also. We really shouldn't be taking our lead from a legal system which regularly ties itself up in knots wondering what some eejit thought 250 years ago when he was worried about the King of England oppressing him or injuns burning his crops and carrying off his wife.

I'd always take the plain meaning rule as being the primary basis for interpretation. Given that this is *gasp* just a game, we don't need to worry about sending people to jail based on absurd laws, so I would say that we shouldn't even mention the golden rule. And the mischief rule has to be out from the get go.

[Excidium Planetis]

Emphasis added. Considering whether or not voluntary donations solve the problem of funding the GA bureaucracy is not textualism, it is outside it as the description of the textualist approach indicates.

What are you talking about? I explicitly said that textualism is not an appropriate method of interpretation in this case, not that using an assessment of the consequences of an interpretation is textualist.

Then we are agreed. This whole debate started when IA said that the GA used strict textualism, and I countered by pointing to the mandatory donation argument as proffered that strict textualism was not how most in the GA interpreted resolutions. By affirming that textualism was not used to reach the majority interpretation of GA#17, you are agreeing with me.

The fact that you're, like, the only one that thinks your reading of the resolution is the plainest demonstrates quite clearly that it is not as unambiguous as you think.

1) I am certainly not the only one who thinks the voluntary reading is the plainest.
2) Especially since I cited Oxford as putting my definition of assess as the plainest definition of assess (if you think to impose a fine is more common, go tell Oxford they got their dictionary wrong)
3) Ask anyone you know if donations has a voluntary or mandatory connotation. The plain, ordinary use of that word is voluntary.

[Sciongrad]

1) I am certainly not the only one who thinks the voluntary reading is the plainest.
2) Especially since I cited Oxford as putting my definition of assess as the plainest definition of assess (if you think to impose a fine is more common, go tell Oxford they got their dictionary wrong)
3) Ask anyone you know if donations has a voluntary or mandatory connotation. The plain, ordinary use of that word is voluntary.

These arguments do not get you anywhere for two reasons. Firstly, a plain meaning reading of the text is not textualism. ("Similarly, textualism should not be confused with the "plain meaning" approach, a simpler theory used prominently by the Burger Court in cases such as Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, which looked to the dictionary definitions of words, without reference to common public understanding or context.") But additionally, seeing as we've already both agreed that textualism is inappropriate here, defending your position based on the text is illogical.

And if you are not the only one that believes your reading of the text is plainest, you are one among very, very few.

[Bears Armed]

A policy of placing author's intentions above strict textualism would still fall short in cases where the author (who wasn't under any 'legal' obligation to post in this forum at all, of course) hadn't made those intentions perfectly clear in some publicly-accessible place (preferably this forum, of course) initially and wasn't around to clarify them later on. In those cases somebody would have to decide an "official" opinion about the author's presumed intentions, and as I understand it a reluctance to get involved in such arguments was why the Mods supported a 'strict textualism' approach instead from verry early on... That policy was already in place before my involvement with the NS-UN began in November '05.

"The law does what the law says".

[Separatist Peoples]

What are you talking about? I explicitly said that textualism is not an appropriate method of interpretation in this case, not that using an assessment of the consequences of an interpretation is textualist.

Then we are agreed. This whole debate started when IA said that the GA used strict textualism, and I countered by pointing to the mandatory donation argument as proffered that strict textualism was not how most in the GA interpreted resolutions. By affirming that textualism was not used to reach the majority interpretation of GA#17, you are agreeing with me.

Dammit, EP, I'm certainly in complete agreement with that assessment!

1) I am certainly not the only one who thinks the voluntary reading is the plainest.
2) Especially since I cited Oxford as putting my definition of assess as the plainest definition of assess (if you think to impose a fine is more common, go tell Oxford they got their dictionary wrong)
3) Ask anyone you know if donations has a voluntary or mandatory connotation. The plain, ordinary use of that word is voluntary.

I am willing to take a substantive approach to the law, but not in total opposition to what the text actually says. There really isn't an ambiguity in GAR#17 to me. Its voluntary, and while I accept that the author might not have intended this, the text doesn't leave me with a lot of ambiguity to work with.

I don't know what that means for my interpretive style. My legal analysis up to this point has been common law and regulatory agency law. I usually give constitutional style interpretation a wide berth.

[Excidium Planetis]

Edit: somehow snipped this quote out and forgot to respond.

But additionally, seeing as we've already both agreed that textualism is inappropriate here, defending your position based on the text is illogical.

This isn't a debate about whether my position is correct or even if textualism is appropriate for GA#17 or not. The debate is about two things:
1) What method of interpretation does the GA use, as a community? (My position: strict textualism, "the law does what the law says", is not it)
2) What method of interpretation is used to interpret GA#17 in the mandatory fashion? (My position: not strip textualism, as textualism yields the voluntary interpretation)

I have been arguing backwards on point 2, that strict textualism yields the voluntary interpretation, to argue my point on 1, that strict textualism is not the GA method of interpretation.
/edit

---

These arguments do not get you anywhere for two reasons. Firstly, a plain meaning reading of the text is not textualism. ("Similarly, textualism should not be confused with the "plain meaning" approach, a simpler theory used prominently by the Burger Court in cases such as Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, which looked to the dictionary definitions of words, without reference to common public understanding or context.")

I may have used the word plain, but I did not intend to imply what is described in bold. I took into account the public understanding of the words "donation" and "assess", as well as the context (in this case, the resolution's preambl especially).

And if you are not the only one that believes your reading of the text is plainest, you are one among very, very few.

*of GA regulars, and I suspect even then "very very few" is an exaggeration.

I haven't conducted a survey, but I did run an unrelated poll awhile back, and several players gave answers that indicated acceptance of the voluntary interpretation. I suspect, but don't have proof, that the average NS player who read GA#17 with no context about the debate, would believe that it called for voluntary donations, as the author intended, since the resolution was designed to mislead people by the author's own words. If the average person looked at GA#17 and said "yeah those are totally mandatory donations", the whole thing would have fallen apart, as Kenny said:

The thing currently on the books was an extremely hard sell -- and it never even told nations they were being taxed!

GA#17 was designed to look like a voluntary scheme, it reads like a voluntary scheme, it uses word with voluntary connotations, and the ordinary person would interpret it as voluntary. Anything less, and the ruse would fall apart.