Fujian Military Academy (INVITE ONLY)

[New Aeyariss]

Fujian Military Academy

"In my strategy, the training for killing enemies is by way of many contests, fighting for survival, discovering the meaning of life and death, learning the Way of the sword, judging the strength of attacks and understanding the Way of the "edge and ridge" of the sword." - Miyamoto Musashi, Book of five rings

"The art of strategy is warrior's craft; he must become familiar with it just as much as a farmer becomes familiar with farming tools; only then he has a chance to be like a tiger, strong enough to defeat the foe." - Miyahara Yataro, Founder of Fujian military academy.

WELCOME TO FUJIAN MILITARY ACADEMY!

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Fujian military academy, running since 1662, is the highest centre of military science and defence studies in Wangda. Established by legendary General Miyahara Yataro in purpose of training Wangish officers for future wars, it is longest running military institution in the Empire. Currently it is one of major institutions created for teaching the members of various nations allied to Wangda about warfare. Run by qualified instructors, Fujian military academy made it's name as one of best in the world.

It is currently divided into three divisions. First division is for training officer cadets from all allied nations, such as SACTO alliance and other nations cooperating with Wangda. The students enter for 5 years military training, and end it with Balcheor's degree and also commission in armed forces of nation that send them. Fujian military academy is famous for teaching advanced and modern techniques of both conventional and unconventional warfare, putting huge amount on teaching the officers current trends.

Second division is for further training in specialized areas as well as for researching the military art and science. Attached to this unit is think tank division, which tracks current trends in warfare, formulates concepts and helps in guiding the fight. Here best military minds of all allied nations, including SACTO and other allies, form jointly military doctrines and new tactics that are needed on modern battlefield.

Third division is technological division, which goal is to answer problems related to modern military technology that may be met on the battlefield.

Tasks:

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To provide a world class military education to all members of the Fujian Military Academy based from Real Life experience/ doctrine or training by educating roleplayers with proper military knowledge.
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To assist in achieving SACTO's goal to create an exclusive and a premier military realism roleplay group in NationStates for as long as this alliance is in active operation.
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To provide a platform for military related discussion for NationStates roleplayer in the SACTO and allied nations in order to maintain, build and further our military skills and knowledge.
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To help improve and promote a realistic and high quality roleplaying environment throughout NationStates and International Incident sub forum.


Information:

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This thread is both IC and OOC at once. At this time most popular concept is seminar/lecture form, but the Academy plans also to run IC courses, such as testing the skills in practice. It is spiritual continuator of Santiago Military Academy, and is generally run by the same people. However, this time access to publishing materials was boradened: everybody who possesses serious knowledge can post here, after our acceptance.

Miyahara Yataro

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Miyahara Yataro was born in 1662 in poor Samurai family. At first, he adhered to Dosang school; however, he left it after two years of training he defeated their headmaster in combat. Since that time, he spent most of his life travelling around the county, and becoming most famous swordsman in Wangda, possibly one of best that even lived, rivalling only Miyamoto Musashi. He won over 58 documented duels and never was defeated, inventing some new weapons, such as bong stick. At age of 25 he was most famous Samurai in the county; and was taken into Imperial Guard of Emperor Wangjin. He served first as commander of Imperial guard in battle, he was nominated general in 1648; he led invasion of Biao and repelled powerful Tong Kingdom's invasion. However, in his last fight against Tong King Tongvarajarman, he had his hand cut off; even after managed to kill the king, this was a dishonour for him. He withdrew from active army commander's position and settled down in Ishikawa, and soon became teaching his ideas to the next generation. With imperial approval in Fujian town he was given a castle and an order to teach the new generation of officers; he died two years after the creation of Academy. Before his death he left treatises on Strategy "Book of the Tiger", treatise on swordsmanship "Book of the crane" and unfinished military philosophy "Book of emptiness".

[New Aeyariss]

LIST OF LECTURES:

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Introduction to Asymmetric warfare by New Aeyariss

Introduction to Terrain Analysis by Aeyariss

Stealth countermeasures by Riysa

Asymmetric urban warfare by New Aeyariss

Contemporary Main Battle Tank Tactics by Vaakal

Military Pioneering by Vaakal

LIST OF INSTRUCTORS:

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New Aeyariss/El Cuscatlan - Assymetric warfare, ground warfare.
Riysa - Military Technology.
Aeyariss - Infantry tactics.

[New Aeyariss]

INTRODUCTION TO ASSYMETRIC WARFARE
by Gen. Mita Nobuyori, Fujian Military Academy

War is a constantly changing phenomena, which can not be gasped by one mind. During the centuries it has evolved, and alongside with it, evolved methods, organisations and people. In recent days, we can observe totally new characteristic of war. The Nation-States are loosing monopoly over organized violence, and non-governmental factions are becoming more and more effective in their fight. A lot of unconventional tactics and methods were created by such organisations, and paramilitaries are drawing not from forms of organized military, but on the contrary, from their own self-created methods, which differ a lot from what is taught in military academies. If we are even to combat this phenomena, we have to understand how it works.

To explain theory of changing nature of war, idea of "generations of war" was created. It explains that first generation appeared after peace of Westphalia, and was characterized by invention of tactics of line and column. It was also moment when mercenaries and private armies lost monopoly over violence. 2nd Generation was characterized by "attrition warfare", and are firepower - based tactics. Third generation is maneuver warfare, war where you attempt to defeat enemy not by firepower but by maneuvering. Then comes 4th generation, which is defined as "assymetric warfare". It shall be described below.

Assymetric warfare is terrain - dependant. Currently, we can observe that two major schools appeared. First school is represented by Mao Zedong. It states that guerilla war must begin it rural areas, and then be moved to cities. Mao, unlike previous strategics, put equal matter to self-conservation than to destroying the enemy. In his military theory, the goal is not to hold terrain, but to destroy the enemy's strength while saving our own strength. Such self-conservational element was revolutionary in warfare, and gave rise to modern guerilla movements. Countless people attempted to emulate Mao, with different results. The points of strategy of "People's War" as such war is called were outlined in little red book:

(1 ) Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.

(2 ) Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.

(3 ) Make wiping out the enemy’s effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy’s effective strength, and often a city or place can be held or
seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.

(4 ) In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy’s strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances,
use the method of dealing the enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and an attack on one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other
enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we shall be absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the
campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy.

(5 ) Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves.

(6 ) Give full play to our style of fighting — courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest).

(7 ) Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities.

(8 ) With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. At opportune moments, seize all enemy fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. As for all strongly defended enemy fortified points and cities, wait till conditions are ripe and then take them.

(9 ) Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army’s main sources of manpower and matériel are at the front.

(10 ) Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should not in general be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.

Mao advocated creation of "resistance bases" which will be the centres from which the rebellion will arise. Mao qualified three types: In mountains (where long-term bases may be set; on working purposes we can call it bases in hard terrain), on plains (where only short term bases can be set when enemy is lacking forces to cover whole area, as well as operations carried by specific climate factors, such as winter snow or summer vegetation) and on terrains with high presence of water ( he claimed that rivers, seas and lakes can be very useful during initial operations).

Maoist school, even if used a lot by countless groups around the world, has one serious weakness. It can not be launched if rural terrain does not posses qualifications allowing it to wage a guerilla campaign. If the terrain is not a dense jungle, high mountains or other forms of terrain that allow the guerilla units to exist, they can not be employed. Thus, the second school arose. It's author is Carlos Marighella. He can be considered father of modern terrorism. The Marighellist approach puts enormous attempt on de-centralisation of warfare. According to him, major unit in guerilla war should be 3-5 man "firing squad", operating independently, in what is characteristic to his school, URBAN ENVIRONMENT. The guerillas who were unable to fight in rural areas in counties where rural area is lacking characteristics where Guerilla war can be waged, moved to cities, which were natural cover for guerilla operations. Example of such guerillas are Irish Republican Army (IRA) operating in Northern Ireland. Other characteristics of Marighellist schools are:

1) Use of light, easy to transport arms which allow to be quickly hidden. Thus use of SMGs and compact assault rifles.

2) Attack on close distance, using raids and ambushes as major operations.

3) Logistics in MMWAE form - mechanisation, Money, weapons, ammunition, explosives.

4) Intelligence - driven operations.

5) Units operating on web - like structures, not knowing others, "leaderless resistance".

6) Lack of Formal operation bases.

However, what many people do not understand is that process of revolution can not be reversed. 4GW is single edged sword, and even if conventional armies are becoming more and more vulnerable to asymmetric warfare, we can not use their strategy against them, for it is developed to overthrow governments - not to defend against overthrow attempt. Thus, we have to develop new kind of tactics, which will be discussed later.

[Aeyariss]

TERRAIN ANALYSIS
Simplified Version

In the military, soldiers use a simple concept in studying the terrain. It's called OCOKA.

When studying the ground, these are the most important thing a commander must understand. (Assuming you can read a map and do a simple land navigation). For the sake of this RP, well, we have no other choice but to use the available maps. Unless someone can produce a restricted 1:50,000 topographic map.

• Observation and Field of Fire
• Cover and Concealment
• Obstacle
• Key Terrain and Vital Ground
• Avenue of Approach

Your tactics on the ground, how you maneuver, how your fight is pretty much depends on these aspect.

Observation and Field of Fire refers to your soldiers abilities to observe the surrounding battlefield, being at the front, that means you can see 180 degree views as far as you can, and your soldiers should have the ability to use his weapons without any hindrance. Being on a high ground gives you bonus, and a higher angle of field of fire. This is also includes the maximum and effective range of all your weapon.

Cover means your soldier have protection from incoming enemy fire, and concealment means your soldier have the ability to not be seen by the enemy observation. Hiding behind a bush gives you concealment, but not cover from enemy small arms fire. Your soldier wants good degree of cover and concealment.

Obstacles refers to any object - natural, man made or mixed - that can slow down, stop or divert an enemy movement. Cliff and thick vegetation (jungle) are two example of natural obstacle. It limits troops movement, limit weapons effectiveness.

From this limitation, we use the following phrase to decide troops movement in conjunction with the type of terrain.

"Good Go" - No problem traversing.
"Slow Go" - Need to take some effort to traverse, but still possible if not difficult.
"No Go" - Troops can't go through this area.

Open field is a good go for infantry and tanks.
Marshes,swamp , river, jungle, and mountains and hills usually a slow go for infantry.
Marshes, swamps, thick jungle, high mountains are no go for tanks.

Key Terrain and Vital Ground, are ground that a forces must control or risk losing a battle. Controlling an area that provide good observation, cover and concealment such as a high ground is an example of key terrain. Other than that, roadways, cities, bridges are also considered as key terrain. Vital ground is something you must not lose control of or your war effort will be severely disadvantaged; eg. a port for the naval forces to make port, airfield.

Avenues of Approach is what we in the military call: "The options of how can we get to Point B from point A.", is the path that a force can take to get to the objective. Either in defense or offense, by understanding the path that you or your enemy can take to reach to your objective you can mount a good offensive or defensive operations against them.

From this OCOKA, you can plan where to put your troops, you can predict where the enemy is going to land, or the route he might take to get to you, you can plan artillery fire mission, you can place obstacles to the enemy axis of advance. So, even in a future RP where there is no map, you can write a lot more than just: "My troops attacked the enemy. But lost 40 men.". You can imagine the battlefield more.

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The following article has been posted previously by me under a different account.

[Riysa]

مكافحة الشبح
Stealth Countermeasures
(Unclassified, translated, publicly available excerpt from field manual KJ-5)

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Introduction

On the modern battlefield, there is a growing number of "stealth" aircraft and their usage is increasing. Stealth aircraft purport to be silent, deadly, and near-unstoppable; however, this can not be farther from the truth. This section of the air force training manual is designed to explain methods a smart commander or soldier can use to negate a so-called "advantage" from the enemy side, and force combat on his own terms.

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Overview

Stealth aircraft are designed to minimize their infrared and radar signature, allowing them to slip by enemy air defenses and launch surprise attacks on enemy aircraft and positions. They have been marketed as true "killers of the sky", the next generation of aerial combat. However, with this power comes a giant price tag on such vehicles; a B-2A is nearly a billion dollars a piece, and a F-22 is over 150 million - double that of the latest TaH-29s and equivalent aircraft. Even the F-35, which is less stealthy than the others mentioned, costs around 130-140 million. Thus, scoring even a single kill on one of these types of aircraft will make a noticeable difference in the enemy ranks, let alone several.

While it is entirely possible that, with the most modern technology, one can shoot down stealth aircraft without taking advantage of their weaknesses, it goes without saying that a smart commander will attempt to use everything at his disposal to minimize his own losses and maximize enemy losses. These concepts note weaknesses in stealth designs, and thus, utilizing them will give the commander a great advantage.

Low frequency-band radar: Stealth aircraft are designed to minimize radar returns operating in the X band of frequencies - as well as any other high-frequency radar. However, they are much less effective in minimizing low-frequency radar returns, such as the L band of frequencies. Stealth aircraft are about 10 times more visible in low frequency bands than in the X-band; while this many not seem like much, it can be a vital difference. For example, a 92N6E can spot a F-22 at around 90 kilometers, while a QANAS supplemental L-band search radar would theoretically be able to spot it at around 160 kilometers.

The primary downside to using radars operating in these bands are that they have a lower resolution than X-band radars, and thus will not be as accurate, making them unsuited for fire control. Also, low-frequency radars are no better than X-band radars at detecting non-stealth aircraft, making them redundant and in fact detrimental if facing off against an opponent with an extremely small or non existent stealth arsenal. Therefore, low frequency radars should always be paired with high frequency radars whenever possible, such as on the R-19 system used with TaH-29T fighters, or the Type 045 destroyer's sensor package.

ESM: All aircraft give off emissions, whether it is radio waves, datalinks, or radar and jammer emissions. Using a series of ESM/ELINT arrays, such as a Kolchuga package, one can identify the enemy plane and get a rough idea of where it is located. While it may not be sufficiently accurate for fire control, it will allow an early warning of the incoming aircraft.

The main downside of this is that, of course, it is dependent on the enemy emitting signals; a force wishing to achieve maximum surprise may enforce emission silence, preventing the use of this method. On that same note, however, zero emissions would make the enemy's job much more difficult and would probably even make the aircraft more vulnerable to the other listed methods, as they would not be able to rely on their radar for easy search and detection of your assets, and their jammers for jamming your missiles or radar systems.

More often, you'll find aircraft using LPI or AESA radar systems, which will make detection more difficult. Usage of the most modern ESM systems is key in this case, as you'll still be able to retain your range advantage, although it is not impossible to still detect these systems with somewhat older ESM units.

Infrared and optical sensors: Stealth aircraft attempt to reduce their overall signature; however, they still remain highly vulnerable to infrared and optical sensors and seekers. Stealth aircraft have a lower frontal infrared signature, but their infrared signatures to the side and rear are much greater, almost or as equal as conventional aircraft such as the Su-27 or F-15. Some aircraft have taken measures to reduce their rear signature, including non-stealth jets such as the TaH-29, although they still remain highly vulnerable to the more modern infrared seeker systems. As for pure electro-optical systems such as the Python 5's seeker or the Pantsir-S1's supplemental package, there is little difference between stealth and non-stealth aircraft, giving it a definite advantage in combat.

The primary downside to this method is that they are much shorter ranged, can generally track less targets than radar (and thus are better at single targets), and in particular for electro-optical sensors, tend to be somewhat expensive.

Open Doors: Stealth aircraft have to equip their armaments in internal weapons bays if they wish to retain their stealth characteristics, as mounting them on external hardpoints negates their signature reduction techniques. However, they must open the bay doors to release ordnance at an enemy, which for a a short period of time (until the doors close again) will make the aircraft fully visible on radar. The F-117 downed in Yugoslavia was caught using this knowledge.

The main downside of trying to wait for the aircraft to open its doors for an attack is that, of course, its preparing to attack, at which point there's a very real risk of you or your friends being its target and thus any chance at successfully targeting and shooting down the enemy aircraft before it strikes is very, very low.

Overall, a field commander should try to mix these methods to create a viable anti-stealth defense. Having a decent number of MANPADS systems will cover short-ranged tactical incursions, while ESM and L-band systems will provide a strategic cover for your operations. If it all goes for the worst, having backup systems will allow you to take advantage of the aircraft being very visible during its attack phase. Note that all of the above are usable for both air defense commanders and fighter pilots; all modern fighters have ESM/RWR systems of varying capabilities, and most have IRST. The TaH-29T, TaH-29Th, and TaH-26 m.2007A also use the R-19 radar system, which has both X-band and L-band portions for maximum stealth detection capabilities.

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The Stealth Triad

In general, most stealth aircraft can be classified into three general categories - B-2 analogues, F-22 analogues, and F-35 analogues.

B-2 analogues are stealth strategic bombers, designed to penetrate enemy air defenses and completely wreck their targets. These will generally be the most expensive and logistics-intensive of all stealth aircraft, and also the least visible, although of course this depends on the nation. Aircraft such as these are definitely the most dangerous for ground forces, but at the same time, the most vulnerable of all stealth aircraft if caught before it can attack. Shooting down just a single one of these can force an enemy on the defensive and give you some breathing room.

F-22 analogues are pure stealth fighters, designed to wrestle control of enemy skies from enemy fighter craft and undertake certain interdiction and strike missions that don't necessitate or are too risky for such an advanced aircraft as a B-2 or similar bomber. These are much cheaper than stealth bombers, and tend to have excellent signature reduction, even if it is less than a B-2's. These are less vulnerable, of course, than stealth bombers, but are more visible. These should be treated with caution, although of course standard techniques apply.

F-35 analogues are stealth multiroles, cheaper than their fighter counterparts, and designed for a wider range of missions. Although arguably the most popular type of stealth craft, they have a much greater signature than their stealth counterparts as well. By in large, these types of stealth aircraft - and particularly the F-35 itself - are considered to be some of the biggest mistakes in aviation in an overall picture, although the appeal of having a "baby stealth" fighter that presumably is not much more expensive than conventional aircraft - which is mostly untrue - overcomes any supposed shortcomings for many nations. Aircraft of this class neither have the same capabilities as F-22-class aircraft in regards to their signature, nor are they cheap enough to be usable in forming a large air force unless the nation is willing to run into debt, making them essentially large money sinks. Caution of course should still be taken with them, but they are comparatively quite easy to shoot down, and thus do not pose anywhere near the same level of threat as a F-22 analogue.

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Example Fire Mission

Listed here is an example of a fire mission taken up against a stealth aircraft, specifically a B-2A, incorporating both anti-stealth techniques and some tricks useful for pretty much any occasion. This is not a boilerplate algorithm; your response to an incursion will differ depending on the situation, such as ECM and weather conditions, but these can provide you with a guide on how to effectively implement anti-stealth techniques.

Scenario start 18:30 (B-2A 800 km away, cruising ~550 km/h, assume RCS = .0001m2)

Regimental ESM arrays and/or AEW ELINT detect unknown aircraft 18:52 (B-2A ~600 km away), B-2A's LPI mode makes it difficult to identify at this point

Confirm no friendly aircraft in general direction 19:00 (B-2A ~527 km away)

IFF interrogation negative for allied aircraft. ESM arrays confirm emission identify as AN/APQ-181 (B-2A radar). Has not appeared on radar systems. 19:13 (B-2A ~405 km away)

Two options available from here:

OPTION 1 (Preferred):
Relay information to nearest fighter squadron for GCI, presume 2 minute form-up time. 19:15 (B-2A ~390 km away)

Squadron heads out, guided to general location by ESM. Presume Mach 2 cruising speed. B-2A intercepted at close range and shot down. Scenario ends. 19:30

OPTION 2 (Fighters unavailable):

Organize and prepare QANAS or analogous strategic SAM batteries (ex. S-400, HQ-9). Move radar systems to advantageous location. Time N/A

IF Riysian L-band strategic radar is present, B-2A will be spotted at ~107 km and FCS will shortly follow, allowing an earlier shootdown. 19:45 (B-2A ~100 km away)

IF standard or low-range L-band radar present, such as 92N6E (S-400 search radar), B-2A will be spotted at ~60 km dependent on system capabilities. 19:50 (B-2A ~ 60 km away)

FCS radar will now spot it (S-400's 92N6 will see it at around 20-40 kilometers, Riysian QANAS' FCS will spot it at around 60 kilometers). Supplement radar with ESM for maximum accuracy. Engage and destroy target. Scenario ends 20:00.

Although the B-2A primarily carries guided bombs, which are well within the engagement envelope, sometimes stealth bombers such as the B-2A will carry cruise missiles, making the long-range intercept option preferable whenever possible.

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Conclusion

Stealth aircraft have their uses, but they are more of a proverbial knife, useful for strategic strikes. Their cost especially limits their tactical usage as they tend to be some of the most expensive aircraft serviceable, yet they still remain vulnerable to several exploits seen on the battlefield. If an enemy relies heavily on these techniques, it is quite possible to win a war not by simple conquest, but also by economic ruin as the enemy nation starts to be unable to procure more stealth aircraft.

Current Riysian doctrine with the famous TaH-29 emphasizes reduced signature techniques, but not full out stealth; similar tactics can be seen on the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon, for example. This gives it a measurable advantage, but does not make it prohibitively expensive, allowing the Riysian Air Force to be composed of a lot of "good" aircraft rather than a small number of "great" ones.

[New Aeyariss]

ASYMMETRICAL URBAN WARFARE
Part #1: Offence

"When surrounding the cities, if enemy side has few soldiers but plenty of food supply and external aid, one should conduct quick attack" - Sun Tzu, 100 Strategies of war

Sun Tzu had valid reason for disliking attacking the cities, as attack on urban terrain is nightmare for any army. This approach, at first taken from Sun Tzu, has been for a long time basic for tactics of asymmetric offensive within the city. Because there is very few literature how to conduct mobile warfare in urban terrain, one should draw parallels from it's applications from other terrain. First thing to do in case of asymmetric offensive in urban terrain is to occupy terrain without enemy knowing it. Second thing, and the biggest priority in such situation, is to go directly for enemy's key points. Sun Tzu described it in 100 strategies of war;

"Despite enemy's thick walls and deep moats, one should attack they key areas which they will have to defend" - Sun Tzu, 100 Strategies of war

The assymetric warfare is based on surprise, so that is the way that the attack is always conducted. To make enemy leave the guerilla commander has just to disrupt C2 and supply network, which, however strange may it sound, is not the hardest of tasks. The attack in guerilla urban offensive is always conducted only and as long as guerilla commander has initiative, and should be disengaged as soon as initiative is lost; in each situation, his basis is that unnoticed enemy won't be stopped and that already occupied target is easier to assault.

One of classic methodologies used during urban offensive was developed by Viet Cong during assault on Phat Diem in 1952. Vietcong, while assaulting the city, tried to avoid enemy' s positions on the city's borders and instead strike deep into their key areas. Instead, it launched network of columns moving directly around the city centre, which had goal to eliminate the command posts of the enemy and capture key objectives. Once the enemy was scattered and leaderless, attack was launched outward to purge the city out of disorganized enemy. This method was derived from ancient Chinese Yingwei battle array. Each of columns attacking the city had it's Area of Operations or strategic objective it had to capture.

Such attack can not be launched without preparation. To do so, so called "one slow, four quick":

One slow:
- Repeated reconnaissance of target, building scale model, rehersals, planing, preparation of the battlefield (such as placing the supplies in hidden points by the guerillas).

Four Quick:
- Movement from base areas in small groups which re-assemble before the target.
- Quick Attack
- Clearance of wounded and taking the captured equipment.
- Withdrawal on safe positions.

Guerillas usually use two types of reconnaissance: 1) Spy infrastructure infiltrating targets days weeks before 2) Recon teams researching the area days before. Guerillas have also interesting method of providing supply to their forces. Instead of classic supply lines, the guerilla formations smuggle the supplies in close proximity of the target, where advancing units usually take them. It was evidenced in Hue that Vietcong had prepared resupply points inside the city long before the offensive itself.

General assault procedure usually consists of:

1) Light artillery fire
2) Mortar fire
3) RPG fire
4) Frontal attack, overt
5) Rear/Flanking attack, covert.

The guerillas in urban areas also were noted to use grappling hooks and ladders to reach the higher buildings quickly. During such offensives all types of deception were practised, including guerillas wearing enemy uniforms to confuse the enemy side.

DEFENCE

Classic of Assymetic offensive within the city - interestingly resembling methods used by Vietcong - was seen in 1995 when Russians attacked Grozny. Russian armoured columns surrounded the city yet encountered stunning defeat. Chechens did not used classic defence lines, instead used network of semi independent hunter-killer teams which gave Russians enormous losses - to the point that Russian army went in disarray and commanders lost control over their troops.

(WIP)

[Vaakal]

Contemporary Main Battle Tank Tactics.
"An introduction to the hammer and anvil of the armoured battlefield-by Praetor Saul Samus, 14th Armoured Cohort, Grand Army of Vaakal ."

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When you need a tank, you need a tank!-Lt.Col Riley, 3rd Armored Cavalry, US Army.

A 'Leopard 2A' Main Battle Tank of the Royal Danish Army ISAF Contingent, Afghanistan 2012.

Introduction.
The tank is dead, long live the tank! The undeniable silhouette of the American M1 'Abrams' main battle tank, with the sand of the Iraqi desert streaming through it's tracks remains, to this day, one of the the key images of modern warfare, however, as constant improvements and upgrades in tactics and technology instigate change in the ever developing battle space of today, so to must the doctrine of the Main Battle Tank adapt and evolve to deal with, and overcome these new threats. This lecture, shall serve not only as an introduction to the Main Battle Tank and it's roles and it's capabilities, but also to educate readers on heavy armoured tactic relevant for conventional and asymmetric conflicts that face the modern militaries of the world.

The Tank Crew.
'I can’t remember many things these days, but I still remember the names of my tank crew.’-Anonymous British WWII Veteran.
To understand anything about modern armoured tactics, one must first be fully competent in there knowledge of the main battle tank, and the men that crew it. The majority of the world's Post-Cold War MBT's are crewed by four men, a Commander, who directs the vehicle, it's armaments and it's crew, and acts as a link in the 'chain of the command, the gunner

A cross section layout of the British 'Challenger II' Main Battle Tank,
including it's four man crew:Commander, Gunner, Driver, Loader .

, who aims, fires and other wise operates the tank's main gun and co-axial weapon, the driver, who steers and aids maintenance of the vehicle and the loader who selects the correct ammunition, often mans exterior weapons and aids with multiple ad-hoc jobs. Some examples of Modern MBT's have removed the tank's loader with an automatic, electronic 'Auto-Feed' system, though these mechanisms have many critics, and are far from flawless, some being prone to malfunction, dangerous 'double feeds' and needing excessive maintenance in theater. For a crew to operate at maximum war time efficiency the tank crew must work as one consciousness, with each man performing his role exactly how and when he is needed, under the gaze of a competent commander and with effective support. A weak link in the tank's crew is potentially just a lethal as any mine or shell, and as such MBT crews are incredibly tight knit units of fighting men, capable of being aware of actions inside the hull of their vehicle as well as around it.

Armour Armaments of the Main Battle Tank.
'Their horse cavalry... charged valiantly against the swarming tanks...but could not harm them...'-Sir Winston Churchill.
Although weapons systems and armour grades are near invariably unique to the Main Battle Tank, common themes have been established and shared between all vehicles that bare the classification of the omnipresent MBT, regardless of service history or indeed, country of origin. A guide to these unifying armaments and defenses are detailed below:
Weapon Systems.

• Main Cannon: With the entire turret, and indeed vehicle built to house it, a tank's primary means of offensive and defensive fire power, is it's main gun. Usually rating at around 120mm in size and often well over two meters in length, these guns, either rifled or smooth bore, are capable of throwing high velocity ammunition over several kilometers. Ammunition for these guns include the anti-armour HEAT (High Energy Anti Tank), the bunker busting HESH (High Explosive Squash Head), the Canister Round, much feared by infantry the world over, and the ubiquitous smoke shell, among many others.
• Co-Axial Weapon: Used primarily to discourage would be fast moving assailants, and housed alongside the vehicle's main gun is the Co-Axial weapon, colloquially known as the 'Co-Ax'. Fired by the vehicles gunner, the weapon can take many forms, most modern main battle tanks employ 7.62mm medium machine guns, although exceptions exist such as Israel's Merkava IV, armed with a 30mm Auto Cannon. A secondary use of this weapon, when loaded with 'tracer ammunition' is to allow the gunner to see where potential shots would fall without wasting valuable shells.
• Top Cover: These weapons are placed on the exterior of the turret's cupola's and most MBT's are armed with one, if not more of them. They come in a wide array of variations, but by far the most common are 7.62mm medium machine guns, .50 Caliber heavy machine guns, and increasingly, automatic grenade launchers. These weapons are externally fired, most often by the tank's commander when in the 'hatch up' position, but on occasion the vehicle's loader too. On some modern tanks, these man operated weapons are being replaced with Hi-Tech RWS (Remote Weapons Systems) further improving crew livability.

Armour and Defence

• Armour-As vehicles almost universally referred to as 'Armour', it comes as no surprise that the MBT's primary defensive asset it it's hull. Often classified, and always incredibly durable, the armour on tanks such as the French 'AMX Leclerc' British 'Challanger II' and Japanese built 'Type 96' is constructed from a latticed formation of laminated plastics, steel, composite metals and top secret compounds, layered in structurally impervious designs. Armour such as this can shrug of most conventional blows including RPG, LAW, 30mm Cannon, .50 Caliber Bullet, small arms and even direct hits from 100mm plus guns.
• Dischargers-Arranged on several points across the tank's chassis, turret and sometimes even running gear, discharges play a pivotal role in the defence of the Main Battle Tank. Each discharge takes the form of a cluster of three to five tubes facing outwards from the vehicle's hull, as well as each single shot array emitting smoke, many modern rounds are also loaded with thousands of reflective metal fletchettes which act as disruptions for enemy laser guided weapons.
• Other-As technology advances, so do the myriad defenses employed on Main Battle Tanks, such experimental upgrades for the vehicle have been known to include BAE Systems thermal camouflage, new ablative armour, angular radar signatures, advanced paint and ever developing advancements in stealth and counter IED strike technology.

Armoured Formations & Organization.
"Military organization, like religious organization, can be seen as a paradigm of organization in general."-Robert Shea

-THE ROYAL DRAGOON GUARDS-
"Who Shall Separate Us!"

-THE 1st MARINE TANK BATTALION-
"Steel On Target!"

The most common methods of organizing formations of Main Battle Tanks are the 'Commonwealth' and the 'American' methods. Both are prevalent across the army's of the 'free world', the former being notably more popular in the armies who have sworn fealty to the British Monarchy and/or part of the Commonwealth, the latter is the status quo for most member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of allies of the United States. Though named differently, the units in these two hierarchy are linked in all but title. Other than lone tanks, the smallest unit of MBT's is the Troop or Platoon, this is the bedrock for all other armoured units, and allows main battle tanks to pursue objectives safe in the knowledge they are protected by vehicles of equal power. 18-20 Tanks makes a Squadron or Company, these formations are most common during conventional operations, such as invasions across open ground, and they allow the main battle tanks, and attached forces to engage and over run multiple enemy locations.Rarely deployed in one engagement the Regiment/Battalion,a single unit of sixty Main Battle Tanks and several dozen support vehicles.


Tactics & Doctrine.
'If the tanks succeed, then victory follows.'-Heinz Guderian.
Coordination.
Normally, multiple Platoons/Troops coordinate with their mobile motorized infantry counter parts and utilize their mobility and firepower to force, and then capitalize on breaches in OpFor's lines. This is where the Main Battle Tanks powerful power packs, tracks and full traversing turrets come into their element. Indeed the ability to rotate the turret by a full 360° allows coordinated movement between units of all classes while defending against attacks from multiple directions and engaging troops and vehicles without stopping or slowing down. Similary as the tank provides fire power and mobility, the infanteers can too, support the tank, there agility and ability to stay 'on the swivel' aiding the crews perception of their surroundings, creating a near symbiotic relationship.
Going Hull Down.

Challenger II of the Queen's Royal Lancers demonstrating
the Hull Down tactic during the advance of Basra.

When on the defensive, they wait in prepared positions or use any natural terrain elements (such as small hills) for cover. A tank sitting just behind a hill crest ("hull-down") exposes only the top of its turret, with the gun and sensors, to the enemy, leaving the smallest possible target while allowing it to engage the enemy on the other side of the hill. Tanks are usually able to depress the main gun below the horizontal since modern kinetic energy (KE) rounds have nearly flat trajectories. Without this they would be unable to exploit such positions. However, upon cresting a hill, the tank may expose its thinly armoured underside to enemy weapons.
Psychological Operations
Perhaps the most common use of main battle tanks, especially in asymmetric theaters of war, is the use of their sheer 'fear factor'. The wide spread stories and claims of the Main Battle Tank's impregnability, momentum and fire power has become the stuff of legend among the fighting forces of the world. As such the appearance of just one these 70 tonne behemoths entering a fray is often enough reason for all but the most hardened enemy forces to turn to retreat, as such, there presence is also a huge boon for the morale of friendly forces.
Forming A Rolling Defence
When used defensively, tanks are often sunk into trenches or placed behind earth berms for increased protection. The tanks can fire off a few shots from their defensive position, then retreat (reversing) to another prepared position further back and drive behind the berms or into the trenches there. These positions can be constructed by the tank crews, but preparations are better and quicker if carried out by combat engineers with bulldozers. Overhead protection, even if it is fairly thin, can also be very useful since it can help pre-detonate artillery shells and avoid direct hits from above which can be deadly to tanks, by striking them at their thinnest armour. In short, tank crews find as many ways as possible to augment the armour on their vehicles.
Preparation of Ammunition
Tanks usually go into battle with a round in the gun, ready to fire, to minimize reaction time when encountering an enemy. The NATO doctrine calls for this round to be a kinetic energy (KE) round, as the reaction time is most important when meeting enemy tanks, to get the first shot (and possibly the first kill). If troops or light vehicles are encountered, the usual response is to fire this round at them, despite it not being ideal—it is difficult and time-consuming to remove a round which is already in the breech. In this case, after the KE round is fired, a HEAT round would normally be loaded next to continue the engagement.
Urban Combat
Tanks can be decisive in city fighting, with the ability to demolish walls and fire medium and heavy machine guns in several directions simultaneously. However, tanks are especially vulnerable in urban combat. It is much easier for enemy infantry to sneak up behind a tank or fire at its sides, where it is most vulnerable. In addition, firing down from multi-story buildings allows shots at the soft upper turret armour and even basic weapons like Molotov cocktails, if aimed at the engine air intakes, can disable a tank. Because of these limitations, tanks are difficult to use in city conflicts where civilians or friendly forces might be nearby, since their firepower can't be used effectively.

Susceptibilities and Compensation Thereof .
'There's a technical term for a tank stranded on the battlefield...A Target!.'-Anonymous British Recovery Operator
Despite

WIP-LECTURE INCOMPLETE

[Riysa]

ألعملية التفكير والخطة الاستراتيجية تبع الجيش الريسي
(الجزء الأول: ألمقدمة)

:مؤلف
مشير الأول محمد مصطفى الحداد
:شارك في الكتاب
الزعيم عميد محمد توفيق الهواري
الزعيم السابق مشير محمد منصور الهواري


The Thinking and Strategic Planning Processes of the Riysian Military
(Chapter 1: Introduction)

Author:
Marshal-General Muhammad Mustafa al-Haddad
With Assistance From:
The Za'im, Brigadier General Muhammad Tawfiq al-Hiwari
The former Za'im, Air Marshal Muhammad Mansour al-Hiwari
(Translated by the KTR International Affairs Group)

---

Introduction

In the name of God, to whom all praises belong to, and with prayers and greetings upon the Prophet of God, our messenger Muhammad,
May the peace, mercy, and blessings of God be upon you, dear reader.

Recently, Riysa has been moving into the limelight, with brave troops once content to defend their homes taking the fight to the enemies of God and Riysa across the world, and increased diplomatic and trade missions and statements of an international scale coming from our dutiful ministers and diplomats. With fame, however, comes attention - good and bad, and for perhaps the first time in our history the Riysian military is being closely watched around the world. All thanks and praises to God, the military and us as a nation is generally viewed positively around the world, proving true the Words of God in his Holy Book:

"بَلۡ نَقۡذِفُ بِٱلۡحَقِّ عَلَى ٱلۡبَـٰطِلِ فَيَدۡمَغُهُ ۥ فَإِذَا هُوَ زَاهِقٌ۬‌ۚ "

T: "Nay, we fling down the truth against the falsehood, so it destroys it, and behold - it has vanished!"
(T/N: This verse of the Qur'an is taken from chapter 21 ("al-Anbiyaa" - the Prophets), sentence 18)

While the reviews of our moral-political standpoint are positive, one thing that foreign think tanks and military analysts often find confusing is the thought processes and planning of our military. I have been asked many questions about our funding and deployment strategies from around the world, some interested, some confused, and some accusatory. Some of you might recognize the following questions from interviews that I and the Za'im have given:

"Why does the Riysian Armed Forces receive so much funding when, calculating equipment and maintenance costs, doesn't seem to use more than half of it?"
"Why does the Riysian Air Force push for modernized VHF radars instead of building up a sizable fleet of stealth aircraft?"
"Why is the Riysian Navy so invested in diesel-electric submarine research when it has already planned for a large nuclear submarine fleet?"
"Why are most of the infantrymen of the Riysian Joint Ground forces mounted in light APCs, when there is clearly enough funding to convert them to IFVs?"

I have read a wide variety of opinions on think tank websites and defense industry magazines, some of which call into question the technological base of Riysa by proposing that most of our advances were made through hacking or stealing tech from other nations, or even worse accuse the Riysian Armed Forces as being nothing more than a giant embezzlement scheme by the ruling elite! The latter opinion is, without a doubt, offensive and disgusting, but I do understand where many of the rest are coming from. To an outsider not acquainted with the Riysian mentality, SACTO doctrine, or of typical "Western" mentality, decisions such as prioritizing the upgrades of seemingly obsolete radar designs over fielding Raptor-like aircraft or keeping most of the infantry APC-based, seem confusing and oftentimes counterproductive.

Therefore, I sat down with the current Za'im and my son-in-law, Brigadier-General Tawfiq al-Hiwari , and my friend the first Za'im of Riysa, his father Marshal Mansour al-Hiwari (may God grant both of them good health and long lives), to come up with a concise and unclassified guide to how we think and operate. Though, while the obviously opinionated nature of our academic essay may drive off some readers, and may cause others to think of our military as "delusional", I do indeed hope that this puts to rest some major questions about the Riysian military.

Now, then, onwards to victory! Wahidu!
-M.Mustafa al-Haddad

[Riysa]

ألعملية التفكير والخطة الاستراتيجية تبع الجيش الريسي
(الجزء الثاني: عوامل غير ألقتالية)

:مؤلف
مشير الأول محمد مصطفى الحداد
:شارك في الكتاب
الزعيم عميد محمد توفيق الهواري
الزعيم السابق مشير محمد منصور الهواري


The Thinking and Strategic Planning Processes of the Riysian Military
(Chapter 2: Non-Combat Factors)

Author:
Marshal-General Muhammad Mustafa al-Haddad
With Assistance From:
The Za'im, Brigadier General Muhammad Tawfiq al-Hiwari
The former Za'im, Air Marshal Muhammad Mansour al-Hiwari
(Translated by the KTR International Affairs Group)

---

Introduction

To understand the Riysian military, and indeed some other armies, we must first learn about and recognize some key concepts, which form the basis for much of Riysian military doctrine. From here onwards, I will be referring to the concepts mentioned in this section as "non-combat factors," which I will explain below.

Defining Non-Combat and Combat Factors

The question here is, what are non-combat factors? "Non-combat factors" is a blanket term used in the Riysian military to describe a wide variety of factors which affect the course and outcome of a battle, however these factors are not intrinsically tied into direct combat. This is opposed to "combat factors", which are factors that are intrinsically tied into direct combat. It can be definitely confusing, particularly for an outsider, to understand the difference between non-combat and combat factors, so for future reference, here is a good rule of thumb: combat factors are centered around the weapons used in a conflict, while non-combat factors are centered around the human beings themselves.

Examples of non-combat factors include:

• Education of the troops in both military and civilian fields.
• Psychology and morale of the Armed Forces.
• Officer initiative and preparation.

Examples of combat factors include:

• Technological level of the Armed Forces.
• Numbers of men and materiel.

The rough equivalent to the concept of non-combat factors in foreign militaries is the "human factor" or "moral-political factor". Both are accurate, but the Riysian concept of non-combat factors can be much broader than either term.

Recognizing the Importance of Non-Combat Factors

Unfortunately, there is a surprisingly common trend in modern times towards marginalizing or even ignoring non-combat factors. Many modern doctrines, without mentioning specific countries, emphasize the number and/or quality of arms as the most - and oftentimes only - deciding factor during a battle. Many modern training regimes barely touch on this side of warfare, even officer training academies. This way of thinking is at best foolish, and at worst extremely dangerous for the nations in question. This is not to deny the importance of technology or force concentration, but neglecting the large and diverse group of non-combat factors leaves a very vulnerable opening in one's defensive doctrine, which an intelligent enemy can make use of. Indeed, throughout history, we've seen these factors play as big of a role in concluding a war as conventional military defeats.

One example I'd love to cover is in fact the Iran-Iraq War, which many forget even occurred in light of Desert Storm. At the beginning of the war, it is not an exaggeration to say that Iran in fact had better technology overall thanks to the military equipment given to the previous Shah by the USA and refusal of the Soviets to export more advanced equipment, and in terms of number of soldiers the two were pretty evenly matched. However, let us look at the non-combat factors involved:

Foreign relations/views: Iraq had good foreign relations with most of the Arab world and even the West. Iran, as a vividly anti-Western theocracy, alienated much of the world, even the "other side" of the Cold War.

Soldier training and education: Prior to the start of the war, Iraq had extensively trained its military in attacking the Iranians. Instructors from places such as India had retrained the Iraqi military after its embarrassing loses in the October War. As for the Iranians, much of their officer corps and military had been purged, thus depriving them of leadership once Iraq attacked.

Supply throughput & Logistics: Tying into foreign relations, Iraq was able to continuously receive spares for its equipment, and even received Western weapons such as air-to-air missiles during the war. On the other hand, Iran's weaponry was in a dangerously underserviced state and thus was forced to cannibalize their equipment to produce enough spares.

Morale and National Psychology: Iraq overall felt more justified in the war than Iran did; Iraq claimed to be fighting for liberation, and then when they started losing territory to the Iranians, started fighting for defense of the homeland. Iran was fighting for its survival, but ran out of encouragement as the war progressed.

Internal Politics: Iraq had been under Saddam's regime for some time and was thus generally stable. Iran was fraught with internal politics and divisions. As the war progressed, Iraq became a more capable conventional fighting force as it learned from its mistakes, while Iran kept being beset by ideological divisions throughout the war.

The culmination of all of this was that, in 1988, Iraq managed to launch a massive counterattack in the form of the Forty Stars and the Tawakalna ala Allah operations, destroying the majority of Iran's remaining armed forces and convincing Iran that total annihilation was imminent, forcing a ceasefire. By the conclusion of the war, Iranian losses were at least double that of Iraqi losses, and Iranian economic losses were much greater than that of Iraqi economic losses.

There are many other examples throughout history that I can mention, but for the sake of time I shall not. The point, regardless, is clear - one can tout his nation's technological prowess and army size as much as he wants, but if you do not take care of the non-combat factors as well, then you are condemning your subordinates to an unnecessarily high risk.