NationStates

If range mattered snipers would carry L-39s.

San-Silvacian wrote:You just killed your own argument.

No, I wanted to point out that the Soviets actually designed a DMR, but didn't really use designated marksmen and referred to them as snipers.

I actually agree.

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The Akasha Colony wrote:The M2 Browning was never meant to perform in a "sniper" role. That was no obstacle to Carlos Hathcock.

The point is that any rifle with sufficient accuracy can function as a "sniper rifle," whether it's semi-automatic or select fire, or classified as a battle rifle, marksman's rifle, sniper rifle, LMG, GPMG, etc.

The point of a sniper is to be able to provide accurate, long-range fire. As long as the weapon he uses is suitably accurate, he can achieve this mission.

Properly sighted and used, M27 can hit targets at twice that distance as well. The AI AWM has a "listed" effective range of 1,500 m, but has recorded kills at nearly 2,500 m.

And? Until relatively recently the standard sniper rifles for the US Army and USMC were modified versions of the civilian Remington 700. What does being purpose-built have to do with anything? The current SR-25 is a combination of the AR-10 and AR-15, both of which were assault rifles.

There is really nothing special that makes a rifle a sniper rifle aside from have reasonable accuracy, but even this is a rather fuzzy criterion. Reasonable accuracy depends on the expected mission at hand. If range were all that mattered, snipers would carry nothing but .50 BMG rifles, none of this weaksauce 7.62 NATO.

And the Browning does sort of function in a sniper role. They have an extremely heavy round, a solid weapon build and can hit targets very far away. Simply because a weapon wasn't originally intended to be used in a role doesn't mean it can't be, I never said that only bolt action precision rifles can be used by snipers.

Yes exactly, and the M27 can shoot targets at ranges which snipers will engage but can't function as well at more extreme ranges. Sure it can hit targets at longer ranges but it still uses 5.56 NATO which isn't that great for retaining kill power at range.

As a norm I expect combat conditions to allow the M27 to reliably hit targets (provided with a competent user) out to 750m, farther than that is a bit iffy IMO. Good shots can get long distance kills, while someone can kill another man farther away than anyone expected, it's a bit more important to look at the mean and not the few outriders.

Purpose built doesn't have to do with anything, I wanted to simply point out that WW2 era sniper rifles weren't really sniper rifles. They can still be used as snipers, but that's just like saying the M2 can be used as a sniper rifle, it isn't one but it can get the job done.

Range isn't all that matters, range is simply the thing that keeps the M27 from being a suitable sniper. It shoots a bullet with good muzzle velocity and functions in most ways that any gun would as well as being reasonably light, those criteria are already filled, but that doesn't mean they don't matter. .50 cal ammunition is large and cumbersome and frankly provides high risk of collateral damage, it's why many of those caliber rifles are anti-material.

Aelarus wrote:
Purpose built doesn't have to do with anything, I wanted to simply point out that WW2 era sniper rifles weren't really sniper rifles.

Amazing.

Triplebaconation wrote:Amazing.

You know, you could always say something constructive instead of sarcastically insulting my opinion.

"Sniper" isn't defined by their equipment, but what they do.

"Designated marksman" is a dumb neologism that the US Army came up with when they realized their rifle training sucked and they needed special snowflakes to "supply rapid accurate fire on enemy targets at ranges up to 500 meters," but the typical DMR is far more capable than the shooter and perfectly adequate for the vast majority of sniper engagements - most of which occur within 500 meters anyway because when a sniper's shooting a lot he's typically attached to an infantry unit in a role indistinguishable from a "designated marksman."

There's literally no difference between a semiautomatic or selective-fire DMR and a semiautomatic or selective-fire sniper rifle - snipers use DMRs routinely, and a typical recent DMR is as good or better than all but hyper-specialized sniper rifles.

Saying a WW2 sniper rifle wasn't really a sniper rifle is like saying a Spitfire wasn't really a fighter plane.

Triplebaconation wrote:"Designated marksman" is a dumb neologism that the US Army came up with when they realized their rifle training sucked and they needed special snowflakes to "supply rapid accurate fire on enemy targets at ranges up to 500 meters," but the typical DMR is far more capable than the shooter and perfectly adequate for the vast majority of sniper engagements - most of which occur within 500 meters any because when a sniper's shooting a lot he's typically attached to an infantry unit in a role indistinguishable from a "designated marksman."

There's literally no difference between a semiautomatic or selective-fire DMR and a semiautomatic or selective-fire sniper rifle - snipers use DMRs routinely, and a typical recent DMR is as good or better than all but hyper-specialized sniper rifles.

A fair point to be sure, many DMRs are effective at some longer sniper ranges, but you need to remember what this argument is about, and that's using LMGs as standard sniper weapons. Shooter is a good read detailing snipers in urban conflicts, and the main narrator uses bolt action snipers for the majority of the book, and he operates independently of standard fireteams and literally had a fireteam tasked around him as security.

Aelarus wrote:And the Browning does sort of function in a sniper role. They have an extremely heavy round, a solid weapon build and can hit targets very far away. Simply because a weapon wasn't originally intended to be used in a role doesn't mean it can't be, I never said that only bolt action precision rifles can be used by snipers.

Yes exactly, and the M27 can shoot targets at ranges which snipers will engage but can't function as well at more extreme ranges. Sure it can hit targets at longer ranges but it still uses 5.56 NATO which isn't that great for retaining kill power at range.

As a norm I expect combat conditions to allow the M27 to reliably hit targets (provided with a competent user) out to 750m, farther than that is a bit iffy IMO. Good shots can get long distance kills, while someone can kill another man farther away than anyone expected, it's a bit more important to look at the mean and not the few outriders.

And yet using an LMG makes them somehow become "detached fire support teams to roam and assist in firefights." Why does having an LMG suddenly make them a detached fire support team? Does a sniper become unable to use a fire selector to fire single shots when armed with an LMG?

Alternatively, this is the point of a sniper operating in direct support of a combat unit: to provide supporting fire while the unit's grunts move to secure whatever objective has been targeted. In this case, the sniper indeed becomes a "detached fire suppport team," but this is true whether they have an LMG or an anti-material rifle, as their mission is to operate independently (detached) while providing fire support to the main effort.

This is especially odd since the M27 is just an HK416 with a heavy barrel and designed for more sustainable fire. It isn't really an LMG at all. And both the USMC and US Army have been using 5.56 mm marksmen's rifles for some time (SAM-R/SDM-R).

Purpose built doesn't have to do with anything, I wanted to simply point out that WW2 era sniper rifles weren't really sniper rifles. They can still be used as snipers, but that's just like saying the M2 can be used as a sniper rifle, it isn't one but it can get the job done.

Again, what defines a sniper rifle?

WWII-era "sniper rifles" were accurized bolt-action service rifles firing rifle cartridges with equipment to mount an optic (e.g. M1903).

Cold War-era "sniper rifles" in the West were accurized bolt-action civilian rifles with equipment to mount an optic and bipod (e.g. M24, M40). There were a few purpose-built sniper rifles (e.g. WA 2000, MSG90), but these are not distinguished from converted civilian or service rifles (both were called "sniper rifles").

Current "sniper rifles" in the West are modernized, accurized versions of older semi-automatic or select fire rifles with equipment to mount an optic , bipod, and a few other bells and whistles (e.g. SR-25, Mk. 14 EBR). There are again some purpose-built weapons, especially in heavy calibers, but conversions of legacy rifles are still extremely common (e.g. XM2010).

So why do WWII-era conversions of existing rifles not count as "sniper rifles," and yet conversions of Stoner's AR-10 and AR-15 designs count, or the US Army/USMC's modifications of the existing civilian Remington 700? Or the USN/USMC's conversions of the venerable M14?

Unless you mean to say these don't count? In which case, laying out your exact criteria as to what defines a "sniper rifle" versus a "marksman's rifle" versus a conventional rifle would be very helpful, since it seems to vary quite a bit.

Range isn't all that matters, range is simply the thing that keeps the M27 from being a suitable sniper. It shoots a bullet with good muzzle velocity and functions in most ways that any gun would as well as being reasonably light, those criteria are already filled, but that doesn't mean they don't matter. .50 cal ammunition is large and cumbersome and frankly provides high risk of collateral damage, it's why many of those caliber rifles are anti-material.

And yet such weapons are commonly employed against unarmored infantry and insurgents. Rob Furlong and Arron Perry didn't exactly object to the use of .50 BMG on insurgents in Afghanistan, and Brian Kremer didn't even bat an eyelash at using Mk 211 Raufoss on soft targets either. Snipers use what's on hand, whether that's a .50 M82/TAC-50/M2HB, .338 AI AWM/TRG-42, 7.62 SR-25/M40/M24/MSR, or even a 5.56 SAM-R.

Aelarus wrote:A fair point to be sure, many DMRs are effective at some longer sniper ranges, but you need to remember what this argument is about, and that's using LMGs as standard sniper weapons. Shooter is a good read detailing snipers in urban conflicts, and the main narrator uses bolt action snipers for the majority of the book, and he operates independently of standard fireteams and literally had a fireteam tasked around him as security.

There's nothing wrong with it. As pointed out, most sniper shots occur within relatively short ranges. If additional range is needed, then you issue them a longer-range weapon at that time, just as you would replace a 7.62 mm weapon with a .338 or .50 BMG weapon for shots beyond the range of 7.62, but wouldn't make them carry around these heavy weapons all the time unless their range were really needed. Standard weapon =/= only weapon.

Aelarus wrote: Shooter is a good read detailing snipers in urban conflicts, and the main narrator uses bolt action snipers for the majority of the book, and he operates independently of standard fireteams and literally had a fireteam tasked around him as security.

Ah. It all makes sense now. It's an awful book and he wasn't a sniper.

Is there any way to mask a fleet from satellite surveillance?

Inyourfaceistan wrote:Is there any way to mask a fleet from satellite surveillance?

Shoot down the satellites.

Triplebaconation wrote:" but the typical DMR is far more capable than the shooter and perfectly adequate for the vast majority of sniper engagements

This applies to most rifles, period.

.50 cal ammunition is large and cumbersome and frankly provides high risk of collateral damage,

How do you imagine it does this? It does not explode (Raufoss excepted). It is just a very large, powerful bullet.

Unless there happens to be another person standing directly behind the guy you're shooting, the risk of collateral damage is not anyhow greater than any other round, and certainly not greater than a .50 cal machinegun (which are used extensively in combat, of course.

Inyourfaceistan wrote:Is there any way to mask a fleet from satellite surveillance?

Move around.

An excellent read on hiding naval forces at sea.

Inyourfaceistan wrote:Is there any way to mask a fleet from satellite surveillance?

To quote the article:

Overhead systems are in known orbits, are predictable, and their sensing capabilities known. So the track is varied, weather is sought out to hide in when vulnerable, blending into sea lanes (while staying out of visual detection range of ships) and such techniques. Deceptive lighting is used at night so that the obvious "blacked out warship" is instead thought to be a merchant or cruise liner.

Hasmonea wrote:An excellent read on hiding naval forces at sea.

Inyourfaceistan wrote:Is there any way to mask a fleet from satellite surveillance?

To quote the article:

Overhead systems are in known orbits, are predictable, and their sensing capabilities known. So the track is varied, weather is sought out to hide in when vulnerable, blending into sea lanes (while staying out of visual detection range of ships) and such techniques. Deceptive lighting is used at night so that the obvious "blacked out warship" is instead thought to be a merchant or cruise liner.

Okay, thanks.

New Vihenia wrote:
This better options needs metric to define because i haven't seen Long range SAM's dead out.. They just spawn better engagement radar, even longer ranging missiles and more sophisticated ECCM techniques.

Terrain hugging flight and perhaps doppler notch maneuver however attack fundamental weaknesses of radar which somewhat not really countered to date, same goes for low altitude supersonic penetrator which make tracking difficult.

To borrow an argument from something I read a long time ago in a USAF magazine: Modelling of air defense has historically vastly overstated the lethality of SAMs and the actual achievements airpower in breaking through air defenses has consistently exceeded model predictions. In both Vietnam and Iraq USAF modellers predicted heavy attrition losses from enemy SAMs that utterly failed to materialize. Or as the author argued (and I would agree) air defense modelling fails to capture the reality that the combined effects of effective technology and tactics (all tactics, not just individual counter-SAM tactics) is far greater than the sum of it's parts.

But even looking at the purely technical side: Conescan radars were susceptible to jamming from the beginning. Monopulse radars are much less susceptible, but were essentially a non-entity on the battlefields of the Cold War. Now monopulse radar is widespread but so are towed decoys and crosseye jammers. And crosseye jammers in particular have defied predictions by being easy to build (one university team built a working retrodirective cross eye jammer using COT equipment in a few months), highly reliable in operation (skin returns are much less important than was believed) and effective against all existing radar fire control systems (and also contrary to some predictions, it can produce pointing errors much larger than the width of the beam to achieve total break-lock and huge miss distances). It isn't a red queen race because radar has improved a lot, especially against support jammers and natural clutter, but self-protection jammers remain an extremely powerful tool against radar fire control.

Retrodirective crosseye jamming may actually have caused fire control radar to loose ground against jammers because there is nothing in the traditional ECCM toolkit which can defeat it. Right now IRL an aircraft protected by a crosseye jammer effectively cannot be engaged successfully by existing radar-guided weapons except in the aspects not protected by it. Which can usually be covered by a towed decoy.

And then there is stealth. And hacking.

Triplebaconation wrote:

Aelarus wrote: Shooter is a good read detailing snipers in urban conflicts, and the main narrator uses bolt action snipers for the majority of the book, and he operates independently of standard fireteams and literally had a fireteam tasked around him as security.

Ah. It all makes sense now. It's an awful book and he wasn't a sniper.

I quite liked Sniper One by Dan Mills. Possibly good reading, dunno how it stacks up against other war books.

North Korean Koksan artillery, yes or no? I don't have a specific role or goal for it in mind, just as general artillery.

Santa Agua wrote:North Korean Koksan artillery, yes or no? I don't have a specific role or goal for it in mind, just as general artillery.

For general artillery, it's capabilities are almost wasted. It's a specialist piece that's capable of long-range counterbattery, engaging of enemy HQs, interdiction operations etc.

The Kievan People wrote:

New Vihenia wrote:
This better options needs metric to define because i haven't seen Long range SAM's dead out.. They just spawn better engagement radar, even longer ranging missiles and more sophisticated ECCM techniques.

Terrain hugging flight and perhaps doppler notch maneuver however attack fundamental weaknesses of radar which somewhat not really countered to date, same goes for low altitude supersonic penetrator which make tracking difficult.

To borrow an argument from something I read a long time ago in a USAF magazine: Modelling of air defense has historically vastly overstated the lethality of SAMs and the actual achievements airpower in breaking through air defenses has consistently exceeded model predictions. In both Vietnam and Iraq USAF modellers predicted heavy attrition losses from enemy SAMs that utterly failed to materialize. Or as the author argued (and I would agree) air defense modelling fails to capture the reality that the combined effects of effective technology and tactics (all tactics, not just individual counter-SAM tactics) is far greater than the sum of it's parts.

But even looking at the purely technical side: Conescan radars were susceptible to jamming from the beginning. Monopulse radars are much less susceptible, but were essentially a non-entity on the battlefields of the Cold War. Now monopulse radar is widespread but so are towed decoys and crosseye jammers. And crosseye jammers in particular have defied predictions by being easy to build (one university team built a working retrodirective cross eye jammer using COT equipment in a few months), highly reliable in operation (skin returns are much less important than was believed) and effective against all existing radar fire control systems (and also contrary to some predictions, it can produce pointing errors much larger than the width of the beam to achieve total break-lock and huge miss distances). It isn't a red queen race because radar has improved a lot, especially against support jammers and natural clutter, but self-protection jammers remain an extremely powerful tool against radar fire control.

Retrodirective crosseye jamming may actually have caused fire control radar to loose ground against jammers because there is nothing in the traditional ECCM toolkit which can defeat it. Right now IRL an aircraft protected by a crosseye jammer effectively cannot be engaged successfully by existing radar-guided weapons except in the aspects not protected by it. Which can usually be covered by a towed decoy.

And then there is stealth. And hacking.

This sounds like it would kill the idea of using BVR radar guided weapons from stealth platforms to destroy enemy aircraft before you are even seen as a concept. So why has it not done so?

Purpelia wrote:

The Kievan People wrote:
To borrow an argument from something I read a long time ago in a USAF magazine: Modelling of air defense has historically vastly overstated the lethality of SAMs and the actual achievements airpower in breaking through air defenses has consistently exceeded model predictions. In both Vietnam and Iraq USAF modellers predicted heavy attrition losses from enemy SAMs that utterly failed to materialize. Or as the author argued (and I would agree) air defense modelling fails to capture the reality that the combined effects of effective technology and tactics (all tactics, not just individual counter-SAM tactics) is far greater than the sum of it's parts.

But even looking at the purely technical side: Conescan radars were susceptible to jamming from the beginning. Monopulse radars are much less susceptible, but were essentially a non-entity on the battlefields of the Cold War. Now monopulse radar is widespread but so are towed decoys and crosseye jammers. And crosseye jammers in particular have defied predictions by being easy to build (one university team built a working retrodirective cross eye jammer using COT equipment in a few months), highly reliable in operation (skin returns are much less important than was believed) and effective against all existing radar fire control systems (and also contrary to some predictions, it can produce pointing errors much larger than the width of the beam to achieve total break-lock and huge miss distances). It isn't a red queen race because radar has improved a lot, especially against support jammers and natural clutter, but self-protection jammers remain an extremely powerful tool against radar fire control.

Retrodirective crosseye jamming may actually have caused fire control radar to loose ground against jammers because there is nothing in the traditional ECCM toolkit which can defeat it. Right now IRL an aircraft protected by a crosseye jammer effectively cannot be engaged successfully by existing radar-guided weapons except in the aspects not protected by it. Which can usually be covered by a towed decoy.

And then there is stealth. And hacking.

This sounds like it would kill the idea of using BVR radar guided weapons from stealth platforms to destroy enemy aircraft before you are even seen as a concept. So why has it not done so?

Because you are missing the point. These technologies don't stop long range SAMs, they just make them less dangerous. Similarly BVR weapons are probably not as dangerous as some people think, however they will still achieve kills and pose a threat to enemy planes.

If you can strike the enemy at a longer range you get an advantage, which is why despite these technologies long range SAMs and BVR combat will still be a thing.

Crosseye jammers and towed decoys are still extremely rare outside the west. They aren't even that common in the west.

There is awareness of the problem though. The USAF is investing in a BVR Sidewinder in anticipation of advanced countermeasures proliferating over the next decade or so.

Spirit of Hope wrote:Because you are missing the point. These technologies don't stop long range SAMs, they just make them less dangerous. Similarly BVR weapons are probably not as dangerous as some people think, however they will still achieve kills and pose a threat to enemy planes.

If you can strike the enemy at a longer range you get an advantage, which is why despite these technologies long range SAMs and BVR combat will still be a thing.

I was not saying that we should abandon BVR missiles or anything like that. But there is a massive amount of wanking going round about the idea of having invincible stealth fighters that no one can see whilst they somehow spot you from a huge distance without giving them self away by using radar and will shoot down all inferior non stealth aircraft before they are even noticed and end air wars without ever having a single loss. And I am asking why people still believe in this to this extent.

The Akasha Colony wrote:Current "sniper rifles" in the West are modernized, accurized versions of older semi-automatic or select fire rifles with equipment to mount an optic , bipod, and a few other bells and whistles (e.g. SR-25, Mk. 14 EBR). There are again some purpose-built weapons, especially in heavy calibers, but conversions of legacy rifles are still extremely common (e.g. XM2010).

I probably can't justify this, but In my mind the Mk.14 and SR25 are marksman rifles, whilst things like the L115a3 are 'sniper rifles'